A Descriptive Analysis of Language and Cognition in Congenitally Blind Children Ages 3 Through 9 by Anderson, David Wm.
University of North Dakota 
UND Scholarly Commons 
Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects 
8-1-1979 
A Descriptive Analysis of Language and Cognition in Congenitally 
Blind Children Ages 3 Through 9 
David Wm. Anderson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses 
Recommended Citation 
Anderson, David Wm., "A Descriptive Analysis of Language and Cognition in Congenitally Blind Children 
Ages 3 Through 9" (1979). Theses and Dissertations. 2644. 
https://commons.und.edu/theses/2644 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at UND 
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of 
UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu. 
A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE AND COGNITION IN 
CONGENITALLY BLIND CHILDREN AGES 3 THROUGH 9
by
David Wm. Anderson
Bachelor of Arts, Gordon College, 1965 
Master of Education, Temple University, 1970
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty 
of the
University of North Dakota 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Doctor of Education
Grand Forks, North Dakota
August
1979
This dissertation submitted by David Wm. Anderson in partial ful­
fillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Education from 
the University of North Dakota is hereby approved by the Faculty Advisory 
Committee under whom the work has been done.
This dissertation meets the standards for appearance and con­
forms to the style and format requirements of the Graduate School of 
the University of North Dakota, and is hereby approved.
ii
Permission
A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE AND COGNITION IN 
Title_______CONGENITALLY BLIND CHILDREN AGES 3 THROUGH 9_______
Department Center for Teaching and Learning_________________
Degree________Doctor of Education______________________________
In presenting this dissertation in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for a graduate degree from the University of 
North Dakota, I agree that the Library of this University shall 
make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that 
permission for extensive copying for scholarly purposes may be 
granted by the professor who supervised my dissertation work or, 
in her absence, by the Chairman of the Department or the Dean of 
the Graduate School. It is understood that any copying or pub­
lication or other use of this dissertation or part thereof for 
financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permis­
sion. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given 
to me and to the University of North Dakota in any scholarly use 
which may be made of any material in my dissertation.
iii
I
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES..............................................  vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS........................................ .. . viii
ABSTRACT....................................................  ix
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................  1
Background
Purpose of the Study 
Research Questions 
Procedure
Limitations of the Study 
Definition of Terms
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE............................  11
Language and Thought
Development of Word and Concept Meaning 
Studies with Congenitally Blind Children
III. DESIGN OF THE S T U D Y ................................  45
Introduction
Planning the Investigation 
Research Population 
Gathering the Data 
Treatment of the Data
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE D A T A ................................  62
Cognitive Functioning 
Verbal and Tactual Attribution 
Nominal Realism and Animism 
Manual Expression 
Object Identification
Receptive and Expressive Use of Comparatives 
Verbal Comparison of Less Tangible Objects 
Forced-Choice of Dimensional Adjectives
V. SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS,
AND IMPLICATIONS......................................  129
Summary
Summary and Discussion of Major Findings 
Conclusions
Recommendations and Unanswered Questions 
Implications for Education
APPENDIX. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL ................................  158
REFERENCES..................................  174
V
LIST OF TABLES
Table
1. Descriptive Data on Blind Subjects...................... 47
2. Descriptive Data on Sighted Subjects ....................  48
3. Categories of Attribution on Parts I and I I ............  57
4. Means and t Values for Cognitive Tasks..................  63
5. Number of Subjects Showing Conservation and
Concrete Reasoning ....................................  64
6. Mean Number of Responses by Vision Group on Verbal
and Tactual Attribution Tasks ........................  67
7. Mean Number of Responses by Blind and Sighted in
Combined Attribute Categories on Verbal and
Tactual Tasks ........................................  68
8. Total Number of Attributes Assigned on Each Task by
Matching A g e s ........................................  70
9. Mean Number of Responses on Verbal and Tactual
Attribution Tasks by Older Blind and Sighted ..........  72
10. Mean Number of Responses in Combined Attribute
Categories by Older Blind and Sighted ................  73
11. Mean Number of Responses on Verbal and Tactual
Attribution Tasks by Younger Blind and Sighted ........  74
12. Mean Number of Responses in Combined Attribute
Categories by Younger Blind and Sighted ..............  75
13. Mean Number of Responses by Conservation Group on
Verbal and Tactual Attribution Tasks ..................  77
14. Mean Number of Responses in Combined Attribute
Categories by Conservation Group ......................  78
15. Mean Number of Responses on Verbal and Tactual
Attribution for Younger and Older Blind ..............  80
16. Mean Number of Responses in Combined Attribute
Categories Between Younger and Older Blind Children . . 81
vi
17. Mean Number of Responses on Verbal and Tactual
Attribution by Younger and Older Sighted ..............  83
18. Mean Number of Responses in Combined Attribute
Categories by Younger and Older Sighted Children . . . .  84
19. Mean Number of Responses for More Tangible and Less
Tangible Objects ......................................  86
20. Mean Number of Responses by Blind Subjects on Verbal
and Tactual Attribution Tasks ........................  88
21. Mean Number of Verbal and Tactual Responses in
Combined Attribute Categories by Blind Children . . . .  89
22. Mean Number of Responses by Sighted Subjects on
Verbal and Tactual Attribution Tasks ..................  91
23. Mean Number of Verbal and Tactual Responses in
Combined Attribute Categories by Sighted Children . . .  92
24. Selected Responses on Verbal Attribution Task by
Blind Children........................................  93
25. Selected Responses on Verbal Attribution Task by
Sighted Children ......................................  97
26. Selected Responses on Tactual Attribution Task
by Blind Children...................................... 103
27. Selected Responses on Tactual Attribution Task
by Sighted Children ..................................  105
28. Examples of Responses to Origin of Name Question
"Why Is It Called a _____? " .......................... 109
29. Examples of Responses to Nominal Realism Question
"Can We Change the N a m e ? " .............................. Ill
30. Means and t Values on Manual Expression T a s k ................114
31. Number of Correct Responses to Receptive
Comprehension of Dimension Adjectives .................  118
32. Mean Number of Responses on Expressive Use of
Comparatives T a s k ...................................... 119
33. Mean Number of Correct Responses on Verbal
Comparison T a s k .............. .......................122
34. Chi Square Analysis of Forced-Choice D a t a ................ 125
vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author would like to express his sincere thanks to the mem­
bers of his graduate advisory committee— Dr. Myrna Olson, chairperson, 
Dr. Steven Harlow, Mr. Maurice Lucas, Dr. Richard Hill, and Dr. Carla 
Hess for their help and encouragement in this study. Recognition must 
also be given to the Graduate School of the University of North Dakota 
for the award of a student research grant which helped to defray the 
travel expenses incurred while interviewing the children.
Further recognition must be given to those who assisted in 
locating subjects for the study: Mr. Thomas Dosch, St. Paul Public 
Schools, St. Paul, Minnesota; Ms. Arlene Gable, Hennepin Technical 
Centers, Hopkins, Minnesota; Mr. Allen Eliason, State Services for 
the Blind, St. Cloud, Minnesota; Mr. John Freeman, Duluth Public 
Schools, Duluth, Minnesota; Mr. Charles Borchert, North Dakota State 
School for the Blind, Grand Forks, North Dakota; Mrs. Marge Gabrielson, 
United Day Nursery, Grand Forks, North Dakota. And a special thanks 
is given to the parents and children who consented to be a part of 
this study.
Finally, the author wishes to express his sincere appreciation 
and thanks to his wife, Honey, and to his daughters, Jennifer, Melissa, 
and Amy, for their loving support and patience.
viii
ABSTRACT
Purpose
This study was designed as an investigation of the semantic and 
cognitive functioning of congenitally blind children within the age 
range of 3 through 9 years, to help fill the gap in the existing 
research concerning the early development of the visually handicapped.
Delays in cognitive development among school age congenitally 
blind children have been attributed to the limitations imposed by 
blindness on mobility and interaction with objects and events in the 
environment. It has been assumed that blind children must rely on 
less efficient sensory perception and discrimination processes result­
ing in a conceptualization of the world which may be inconsistent, 
incomplete, or significantly different from that of sighted children.
If the object concept differs for blind children, the meaning of words 
used to refer to those objects could be expected to differ from the 
meanings assigned by sighted children.
Problems in word meaning and concept development— and hence, in 
communication— are an important consideration in mainstreaming efforts 
in the public schools. Consequently, the present study sought to 
explore linguistic and cognitive representation of common objects among 
blind children, along with their understanding and use of dimensional 
concepts in dealing with those objects.
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Procedure
Ten totally and congenitally blind children and ten sighted chil­
dren of matching age, sex, and socioeconomic status were interviewed 
individually following a prescribed format. By means of these struc­
tured interviews, information was gathered concerning the cognitive 
functioning of each child, and responses were secured to the lexical 
semantic tasks. These tasks focused on verbally and tactually derived 
attributions for selected objects defined as "more tangible" and "less 
tangible," as well as measures of receptive and expressive use of com­
parative adjectives of dimension.
Conclusions
1. This analysis suggested that the information gained through 
tactual means does not differ significantly from that gained through 
vision. The meaning of common words, and the underlying object con­
cept reflected through the children's attributions, did not appear to 
be significantly altered by the absence of vision. The younger blind 
children were found to have an accurate, albeit shallow conception of 
the "less tangible" objects, probably as a result of reduced opportunity 
for meaningful interaction/exploration with those objects.
2. The total number of attributions by the sighted children was 
not significantly larger than that of the blind children. Much similar­
ity in the kind of attributes used was noted between vision groups. The 
number of visually oriented attributes mentioned by the blind children 
was extremely small compared to the total number of attributes used.
It was concluded, therefore, that the language of the blind children
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was based on the object concept they had developed through tactual expe­
rience, rather than being a reflection of the language of sighted children.
3. Cognitive delay was evident among the older blind children, 
leading to the observation that the entire group was functioning at a 
preoperational level of cognitive development. The blind children's 
attributions revealed a tactually based conceptualization of the world 
that was related to their personal experience, but which was not found 
to differ significantly from the visually based conceptualization of the 
sighted children. In fact, the mental image/object concepts for both 
vision groups appeared to draw heavily on egocentric and functional 
characteristics of the objects.
4. Communication between blind and sighted children regarding the 
objects used in this study did not appear to be seriously disrupted by the 
absence of vision. However, the importance of assisting blind children to 
develop effective and systematic methods for gathering and organizing 
information through tactual means was underscored. The results of this 
study emphasize the need for blind children to experience objects and 
events first hand.
xi
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Background
Piagetian research has been described as providing one of the 
most comprehensive analyses of the acquisition and development of cog­
nitive structures (Gottesman 1976). A thorough understanding of the 
stages of intellectual development in the "normal" child, including the 
characteristics and attainments of thought at each level of development, 
is believed necessary in order to assess the cognitive development of 
handicapped children. Though Piaget himself has never sought to apply 
his theories and techniques to handicapped individuals, his notion of 
developmental stages and the achievements and sequence of those stages, 
have provided a framework for much research into the development and 
functioning of handicapped children (e.g., Furth 1966; Gottesman 1971, 
1973, 1976; Higgins 1973; Inhelder 1968; Simpkins & Stephens 1974; 
Stephens, Miller, & McLaughlin 1969; Swallow 1976). These studies have 
confirmed that handicapped children develop through the game sequence of 
stages as non-handicapped children, though the rate of progress differs.
Piaget's theory (Piaget & Inhelder 1969) suggests that cognitive 
development proceeds as a result of the child's interaction with his 
social and physical environment. As a consequence of these interactions, 
the child constructs his physical and logical-mathematical knowledge 
about objects and the relationships between objects. These cognitive
1
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structures are the individual’s way of organizing his world, but undergo 
continual reorganization and restructuring with continued alterations 
(Wadsworth 1971). The thought of the young child, hence, is recognised 
as being qualitatively different from that of the adult.
Lowenfeld (1973) suggested that blindness imposes three basic 
limitations on the individual in terms of (a) the range and variety of 
experiences, (b) mobility, and (c) interactions with the environment.
The severity of these limitations becomes clear in the light of Piaget's 
theory— these are among the very factors which contribute to cognitive 
growth. Indeed, general delays in cognitive development have been 
reported with school age congenitally blind children (e.g., Gottesman 
1971; Stephens 1972; Stephens & Simpkins 1974; Tobin 1972).
Delays have also been observed in the physical and motor devel­
opment of blind children in such areas as balance and posture, locomo­
tion, reaching, grasping, manipulating, and releasing objects (DuBose 
1976; Swallow 1976). Such delays have been attributed to the absence 
of visual stimulation which would normally cause the child to direct his 
attention to objects or events in the environment, thereby encouraging 
interaction and imitation which would foster cognitive development. 
Consequently, the visually handicapped child appears to be at a dis­
advantage in the areas of sensory stimulation, concept development, 
and, ultimately, communication (Scholl 1973).
The lack of mobility and interaction with objects, events, and 
persons in his environment, coupled with the absence of vision as a 
means of unifying and organizing sensory information, suggests that the 
totally and congenitally blind child's conceptualization of the world
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will be different from that of his sighted peers (Santin & Simmons 
1977; Wills 1965). Being forced to construct a model of the world from 
relatively inconsistent and fragmented bits of information (Santin & 
Simmons 1977), the blind child operates upon a different "data base" in 
deriving word and concept meanings. It is possible that the mental 
image of the object or concept signified by words may be different for 
the blind child due to the limited and more restricted information 
gathered through his experiences (Warren 1977). It is also likely that 
the language used by sighted persons to describe objects or events may 
not match the ideas generated through the blind child's experience via 
touch, taste, smell, or hearing (Foulke 1964; Santin & Simmons 1977).
Urwin (1977) further suggested that problems of early language 
development may be related to hindrances blindness imposes on the devel­
opment of social relations. Communicative exchanges between the blind 
child and the sighted parent may be less frequent than for sighted chil­
dren or may be somewhat shallow because of difficulty focusing on the 
same object.
Cutsforth (1951) felt that blindness gives rise to verbal unreal 
ity, by which he meant that the speech of the visually impaired was char 
acterized by the use of "meaningless visual terminology" which resulted 
in "incoherent and loose thinking" (p. 69). This assumption has been 
challenged (Harley 1963; Nolan 1960), however, leading Dokecki (1966) 
to conclude that visually oriented words used by blind children— words 
not based on direct sensory experience— need not disrupt their thinking 
processes. The effect of a blind child's use of the "terminology of 
the seeing" (Maxfield 1936) continues to be an area for study.
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The frequency of "verbalisms" in the language of blind children 
has been related to the lack of early experiences (Swallow 1976). 
Because of blindness, the visually handicapped child has greater 
dependence upon verbally transmitted information (Warren 1977). Yet, 
the insufficiency of language to compensate for the lack of concrete 
experience has been asserted (Stephens 1972). Simply because a blind 
child uses the same word as the sighted child does not mean that the 
understanding (meaning) of the concept is the same. Lloyd (1972) gave 
the example of a class of blind children discussing the size of a lion 
they had encountered in a story being read to them. The children sug­
gested that the lion was from three inches to two feet in length. One 
child was reported to believe that the picture of the lion given in the 
book (which he could not see) was life-size, and that the lion's size 
could be determined by having the teacher trace the children's hands 
over the outline of the picture (p. 19).
These considerations have led Santin and Simmons (1977) to con­
clude that the problem of establishing concept-defining attributes and 
relations is great for congenitally blind children. Possible differ­
ences in word and concept meaning between blind and sighted children 
must be considered for effective verbal communication to ensue, partic­
ularly in view of the trend toward mainstreaming (Zweilbelson & Barg 
1967). For those instances where integration of blind and sighted 
children is the case, Tait (1974) has cautioned teachers not to assume 
that blind children know the meaning of many common words, and to be 
sure that the blind child is using language which is meaningful to 
him, not simply parroting the language of others.
5Purpose of the Study
The present study was designed to investigate the semantic and 
cognitive functioning of congenitally blind children within the age 
range of 3 through 9 years. This age range was selected in order to be 
representative of the preoperational period of cognitive development as 
defined by Piaget (Piaget & Inhelder 1969). Previous research (e.g., 
Stephens & Simpkins 1974) has indicated a significant delay in cogni­
tive development among school age congenitally blind children which has 
been attributed to the effects of the lack of vision. The present study 
has sought to explore certain aspects of cognitive development in younger 
blind children through an analysis of the meanings and attributes 
assigned to common lexical terms and their conceptualization of the 
referrents for those terms.
Owing to the limitations imposed by blindness on interaction, 
mobility, etc., it was suggested that many of the words and/or concepts 
used by these children may possess idiosyncratic meanings based on sig­
nificantly different experiences and mental representations of their 
referrents. This study proposed to examine and describe linguistic 
and cognitive representation of common objects felt to be within the 
experience of the subjects involved. Interest was in the type and 
quantity of attributes assigned to the objects and on the children's 
conception of selected dimensional adjectives in dealing with those 
objects. An attempt was made to relate these findings to the chil­
dren's cognitive functioning as measured by selected Piagetian assess­
ment techniques. The quality and quantity of attributions by blind and 
sighted children was also compared and contrasted.
6Research Questions
When Maxfield (1936) set out to investigate functional and struc­
tural aspects of language in preschool visually handicapped children (a 
previously unexplored area), he maintained that the formulation of 
hypotheses was unwise, stating that "the establishment of an hypothesis 
can lead to a -justifying attitude of mind rather than to an interrogat­
ing one" (p. 10). Similarly, specific hypotheses were not developed for 
the present, exploratory study. It was generally assumed, however, that 
differences in the description of the specified objects would be evident 
between blind and sighted children.
The absence of prior study into this area of semantics and cog­
nition with blind children necessitated the open-ended, descriptive study 
that is reported herein. Data was gathered and analyzed with reference 
to the following research questions:
1. Does the absence of vision affect the child's understanding 
of common words/concepts?
2. What is the nature of the blind child's representational 
thought?
(a) Does the language of congenitally blind children 
reflect their unique experience and means of men­
tal representation?
(b) Does the language of congenitally blind children 
reflect their knowledge of the language of sighted 
persons?
3. What is revealed in their understanding of common words/ 
concepts regarding the congenitally blind child's con­
ceptualization of the world?
Procedure
Subjects for this study were ten congenitally blind and ten
sighted children ranging in age from 3 years 8 months to 9 years
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11 months. Subjects were matched on the bases of sex, age, and socio­
economic status. All children were determined to be developing normally, 
except for vision, on the basis of parental responses on the Develop­
mental Profile (Alpern & Boll 1972).
Each child was interviewed individually following a prescribed 
format. Definitions and descriptions were solicited for ten "more 
tangible" and ten "less tangible" objects with which it was assumed 
than the children would have had some experience. This portion of the 
interview was entirely verbal. For each object specified, the children 
were required to make a forced-choice between five pairs of dimensional 
(polar) adjectives as a means of gaining further insight into their men­
tal representation of the object and their understanding of the dimen­
sional concepts themselves. Subjects were also asked to demonstrate 
the use of the "more tangible" objects (in the absence of the actual 
object). For ten of the objects, the children were questioned as to 
the origin of the name of the object, whether the name could be changed 
without correspondingly altering the object itself, and whether human 
characteristics were attributed to the objects by the children.
A second section of the interview required the subjects to tac­
tually identify ten objects corresponding to the "more tangible" group, 
and to describe those objects now in their possession. In this way, 
comparison between descriptive attribution based on verbal recall and 
on tactual/visual exploration was made possible.
A third section of the interview pertained to the subjects' com­
prehension and use of the dimensional adjectives, receptively and 
expressively. A fourth part involved the comparative form of the
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polar adjectives. Subjects were required to choose between two of the 
"less tangible" objects, that which the comparative adjective named.
General cognitive functioning was assessed using Piagetian tech­
niques measuring conservation, classification, and mental imagery. These 
assessments were used primarily to ascertain whether the subjects were 
functioning within the preoperational or concrete operational period of 
cognitive development as defined by Piaget.
Limitations of the Study
Fortunately, the incidence of total, congenital blindness is 
small. Adding the requirement that the subjects be "normal" in other 
aspects of development, therefore, precluded the selection of a ran­
domly chosen sample. Subjects were included on the basis of availabil­
ity and their meeting the criteria of total blindness, congenital blind­
ness, estimated "normal" intelligence, and age. Sighted subjects were 
selected to match the sex, age, and socioeconomic status of the blind 
children.
The relatively small sample and lack of randomness in selection 
of subjects may prohibit generalization of the results. However, the 
present study was designed to explore these areas of semantic/cognitive 
functioning among congenitally blind children within this age range to 
help fill the gap in existing research. It was anticipated that areas 
for further investigation would be highlighted as a result of this study.
Definition of Terms
Definitions of specific terminology used in this study are as
follows:
9
Congenital blindness. During the planning stage of this study, 
congenital blindness was defined as blindness from birth or occurring 
within the first 12 months of life. All visually handicapped children 
actually involved in the research were blind from birth.
Total blindness. Total blindness was defined as light perception 
or less. Seven of the blind children were entirely without vision since 
birth, two had some light perception, and one was able to distinguish 
some color.
"More tangible" objects. These were operationally defined as 
objects which could be completely encompassed tactually and held within 
the hand. Included within this category were: ball, pencil, spoon, 
block, rope, key, doll, comb, cup, and brush.
"Less tangible" objects. These were operationally defined as 
objects which could be experienced tactually, but could not be com­
pletely encompassed nor held within the hand. These objects were: 
tree, car, house, yard, bush, street, bus, wall, door, and building.
Attribution. This term refers to the assigning of descriptors 
(functional, perceptual, etc.) to the objects used in the verbal and 
tactual attribution tasks.
Dimensional adjectives. The five pair of polar adjectives of 
dimension were: big/small, long/short, tall/short, wide/narrow, and 
thick/thin.
Unmarked adjectives. The positive-pole adjectives (big, tall, 
long, wide, thick) were referred to as unmarked adjectives (E. Clark 
1972; H. Clark 1970). These adjectives can be used in a nominal sense 
to infer the presence of an attribute (e.g., "long" = presence of 
length) or in a contrastive sense (e.g., "X" is longer than "Y").
Marked adjectives. The negative-pole adjectives (small, short, 
narrow, thin) were referred to as marked adjectives (E. Clark 1972;
H. Clark 1970) in that they are generally used only in the contrastive 
sense (e.g., "X" is shorter than "Y"). Marked adjectives infer the 
absence of some attribute (e.g., "short" = absence of length).
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The present study proposed to explore the semantic and cognitive
functioning of congenitally and totally blind children in an attempt to
gain insight into how such children conceptualize the world. Interest
was not in language development per se, but with the semantic aspects
of language as related to cognitive development in the child. Both
terms— cognition and semantics— are understood as referring to meaning.
Their distinction is taken from Beilin (1975) who referred cognition to
"the processes and structures by which meaning is known, represented,
and created" (p. 347). Such meaning occurs within the context of action,
play, imagery, or language. The cognitive aspects of meaning that exist
in language are identified as semantics. Dale (1976) further underscored
the relationship between semantics and cognition:
The question of How do children express ther ideas? cannot 
be neatly separated from the question What kinds of ideas 
do children have to express? Therefore understanding of 
semantic development requires a deeper understanding of 
cognitive development (p. 166).
Hence, the review of literature which follows will initially 
seek to establish the relationship between language and thought. The 
development of word and concept meanings will be explicated within the 
broader view of cognitive development which has provided the framework 
within which the present study was undertaken. Research relative to
11
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the cognitive and conceptual development of congenitally blind children 
will then be reviewed.
Language and Thought
The Basis for Meaning
Bloom and Lahey (1978) suggested three major components of lan­
guage: content, form, and use. The present study was concerned with the 
content of language, i.e., its meaning or semantics, "the linguistic repre­
sentation of what persons know about the world of objects, events, and 
relations" (Bloom & Lahey 1978, p. 14). The three primary categories 
of language content delineated by these authors were object knowledge, 
object relations, and event relations. Object knowledge included knowl­
edge of particular objects and classes of objects. Included within the 
object relations category are (a) reflexive object relations, which have 
to do with the relation of the object to itself; (b) intraclass relations 
consisting of the attributions or properties that discriminate among 
objects of the same class; and (c) interclass relations which express 
the locative, action, and/or possession relationships between objects.
The third category, event relations, includes both intraevent and inter­
event relations expressing such relationships as time, sequence, causal­
ity, and mood (Bloom & Lahey 1978, pp. 11-15). When the content of lan­
guage is understood in these terms, it becomes apparent that any discus­
sion of the origin or basis for meaning must center on the underlying 
cognitive structures of the individual.
The question of whether the knowledge of objects, events, and 
relations which contribute to language content arises as a mere copy 
of reality or results from an individual’s unique construction of
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reality has been extensively investigated by Piaget and others in the 
field of child development. Piaget's studies of the problem of epis­
temology have led him to conclude, "The essential functions of intel­
ligence consist in understanding and inventing, in other words of 
building up structures by structuring reality" (Piaget 1969, p. 27). 
Knowledge of an object is derived from acting upon, or transforming 
it. Such manipulation of reality is initially carried out through 
direct sensorimotor actions performed with or upon the object. Older 
children are able to transform reality via internalized mental opera­
tions. As a result of these transformations children discover prop­
erties and relations of objects and events in reality (Morehead &
Morehead 1974, p. 157).
The elements involved in the content of language as described by 
Bloom and Lahey relate to the three types of knowledge discussed in 
Piagetian theory: physical knowledge, logical-mathematical knowledge, 
and social-arbitrary knowledge. Wadsworth (1978) explained that physi­
cal knowledge is derived directly from objects as a result of the child's 
actions upon them, and relates to the physical characteristics of the 
objects themselves (e.g., size, shape, weight, etc.). Logical- 
mathematical knowledge, on the other hand, is constructed from the 
actions which are performed on objects; i.e., knowledge which is 
"invented" by the child, irrespective of the properties or character­
istics of particular objects. One-to-one correspondence and conserva­
tion of substance are examples of logical-mathematical knowledge. 
Social-arbitrary knowledge differs from the above in that it is 
abstracted from the child's interactions ("actions upon") other
people. Moral values, rules, and language itself are examples of social- 
arbitrary knowledge.
Knowledge, so considered, is rooted in the actions and coordina­
tions of the sensorimotor period of development (Sinclair 1975), and it 
is upon those basic structures that "superstructures" such as language 
are built (Oleron 1977). The coordination of sensorimotor schemes is 
viewed as a necessary precondition for the acquisition of language 
(King 1975; Sinclair-de-Zwart 1969).
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Contributions of Sensorimotor 
Intelligence
The relationship of linguistic content to cognitive structures 
originating during the sensorimotor period of development is under­
scored by Piaget and Inhelder (1969) who stated:
The system of sensori-motor schemes of assimilation cul­
minates in a kind of logic of action involving the estab­
lishment of relationships and correspondences (functions) 
and classification of schemes (cf. the logic of action); 
in short, structures for ordering and assembling that con­
stitute a substructure for the future operations of thought.
But sensori-motor intelligence has an equally important 
result as regards the structuring of the subject's universe 
. . .  it organizes reality by constructing the broad cate­
gories of action which are the schemes of the permanent 
object, space, time, and causality, substructures of the 
notions that will later correspond to them (p. 13).
Verbal language usually develops toward the end of the sensori­
motor period and builds upon those cognitive structures which result 
from the accomplishments of that period, principally the formation of 
the object concept, achievement of object permanence, and the develop­
ment of the symbolic function (Beilin 1975; Corrigan 1978; Cromer 1974; 
Furth 1966; Morehead & Morehead 1974; Sinclair 1975, 1976; Sinclair- 
de-Zwart 1969).
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The Importance of the object concept and object permanence was
well stated by Beilin (1975) and by Furth (1966):
Although objects appear at first to have no permanence, the 
conception of object permanence becomes the first conceptual 
invariant in the child's cognitive repertoire. It also marks 
the clear differentiation of the child himself from the world 
of objects. Out of this differentiation come three major 
classes, the self (the agent of action), objects (the objects 
of action), and the action relation between them (Beilin 1975, 
p. 340).
To learn to name a thing presupposes the kind of basic knowl­
edge of the permanence of things which was described as 
object-constancy or object-formation. Once the child has 
acquired this intellectual skill of regarding objects-as- 
being-out-there and not merely as objects-to-react-to, then 
he can assimilate the name to the object-as-known (Furth 
1966, p. 193).
Corrigan's (1978) empirical examination of language development and 
object permanence evidenced some relationship between the beginnings 
of stage six of object permanence (roughly 12 months of age in that 
study) and the onset of single-word utterances. Corrigan also reported 
that her subjects did not use words signifying the semantic category 
nonexistence ("allgone") until after they demonstrated that the concept 
of object permanence had begun to develop.
Moerk (1975) considered the development of the action concept in 
which the infant learns means-ends sequences, as also being a basic sub­
structure for language development. As the child uses locomotion to 
approach the object(s) of attention, and becomes involved in actions 
which affect objects (e.g., dropping the spoon on the floor), the action 
concept develops. This basic concept iB furthered as the child begins 
to imitate the actions of others and to attempt to motivate others to 
action. Moerk related the action concept to the linguistic development 
of the use of transitive and intransitive verbs.
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In the same article, Moerk discussed the concepts of relations 
between persons and objects, and relations between objects and events. 
Considered as contributory to the development of such concepts are the 
actions of reaching, grasping, and locomotion leading to the coordina­
tion of means and ends by the end of the sensorimotor period, and the 
development of spatial, causal, and temporal relations. Moerk applied 
these relational concepts to the linguistic realm in terms of verb- 
object, subject-object, and subject-verb constructions, and the use 
of adverbs and prepositions.
The Symbolic Function
The symbolic, or semiotic, function originates during the latter 
part of the sensorimotor period (Piaget & Inhelder 1969). This ability 
to symbolize refers to the ability to make something stand for or repre­
sent an object or event not perceptually present (Bowerman 1974). This 
is accomplished by means of a signifier which is differentiated from 
the actual object or event. Piaget listed five behaviors characteris­
tic of the symbolic function: deferred imitation, symbolic play, draw­
ing, mental image, and language.
Deferred imitation, or imitations of actions or events in the 
absence of the original, marks the beginning of symbolic functioning 
and is evidenced after the establishment of the object concept (Furth 
1970). Language stands as the most advanced form of symbolic function­
ing and makes use of arbitrary and conventional (socially shared) signs—  
words— to represent objects and events. Language thus becomes a means 
of communicating and representing what is known as well as being an 
object to be known in itself (Sinclair 1975).
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As a psycholinguist working within a Piagetian framework,
Sinclair (1976) concluded that the capacity for symbolic representa­
tion of absent objects or events is essential to thought. She qual­
ified this statement by adding that language per se. is not necessary 
for thought, merely some form of representation or symbolization.
The studies of Furth (1966) and Oleron (1977) with deaf individuals 
amply support this view regarding thought without language. The 
advantage of symbolic representation is that it enables thought to 
be detached from action, thereby increasing the range and rapidity 
of thought (Cromer 1974; Piaget & Inhelder 1969; Wadsworth 1978).
Language Acquisition
Sinclair (1976) suggested that the action patterns acquired
during the sensorimotor period provide the child with "the necessary
assumptions to start language learning" (p. 212). She drex? a parallel
between language acquisition and the development of physical and
logical-mathematical knowledge:
It can be supposed that the two poles of human knowledge are 
also reflected in language behavior; a parallel can be drawn 
between the acquisition of lexical items and knowledge of 
properties of physical reality, on the one hand, and between 
syntactic structure and logical organization of action and 
thought on the other (Sinclair 1976, p. 212).
Furth (1966) held that symbolic thinking of the preoperational 
stage is actually a period of transition between the pre-representationa.l 
thinking of the sensorimotor period of action, and the formal thinking 
characteristic of operational intelligence (p. 184). The preschool child 
is typically functioning at the preoperational level of cognitive develop­
ment and, when confronted with ready-made verbal signs (words which have 
no inherent meaning or similarity to that for which they stand) must
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assimilate those signs into his own thought structures by assigning mean­
ing based on his own experience. The essentially arbitrary nature of 
these signs frequently makes it difficult for children to grasp and use 
(share) them appropriately (Voyat 1972).
Edmonds (1979) asserted that children acquire words via "the 
process of imitating adult words as children perceive them" (p. 31).
She explained that this means that the child attempts to match his use 
of the words with his own internal image of the adult word. However, 
since children's organization (construction) of the world is qualita­
tively different from the adult's, Edmonds concluded that, though the 
child may produce the same word as the adult, the meaning of the word 
for the individual child may be idiosyncratic and personal, or shared 
only by the immediate family.
Initially, therefore, words will lack specificity of meaning
(from an adult standpoint). At the onset of the preoperational period
the child's symbols— imitation, play, imagery, and/or words— will be of
a highly personal nature and will be tied closely to the actions of the
sensorimotor period. It is only through repeated verbal interaction
with others and continuous reorganization and development of cognitive
structures (leading to the development of social-arbitrary knowledge),
that socially shared meanings for verbal signs increases.
The child's first verbal productions in the sense of recog­
nized words are far from signs in the sense of belonging to 
a linguistic system. They are more like symbols which are 
isolated representations of a scheme; for example, "cup" may 
mean a container or "I want a drink" (King 1975, p. 294).
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Preoperational Stage
Just as there are many developmental changes occurring in the 
sensorimotor and preoperational levels of functioning which contribute 
to linguistic-semantic growth, there are also certain characteristics of 
the preoperational period which get in the way of development. The 
child's reasoning during this stage is characterized by egocentrism 
which causes the child to "assume that everyone thinks as he does, and 
that the whole world shares his feelings and desires" (Pulaski 1971, 
p. 40). Such reasoning makes it impossible for the child to under­
stand the meanings of words used by others (even his peers) if their 
experience with objects or events has been significantly different.
The child will apply his meaning of the word, or interpret events of 
the basis of his experience, thereby limiting true communcation. It 
is only gradually that his linguistic and cognitive understanding 
improves to the point that words and concepts hold the socially 
accepted meaning.
In addition, egocentrism causes the child to regard his per­
spective as immediately objective and absolute, causing him to believe 
all things to be equally real, e.g., words, pictures, dreams, feelings 
(Pulaski 1971). This attitude of realism convinces the child that what 
is real for him must exist in the objective world. When applied to 
words which name objects, Piaget (1967) referred to this notion as 
nominal realism. Recent studies (Williams 1976, 1977) have confirmed 
that this belief that the name of an object is intrinsic to the object 
and not changeable can be observed in children 6 to 7 years of age.
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The cognitive functioning of children during the preoperational 
stage is further characterized by reliance on perceptual information and 
transductive reasoning. Judgments tend to be made on the basis of how 
things appear and, generally, the child's attention is focused on a per­
ceptually dominant feature. Such perceptual centration appears to pre­
vent the preoperational child from realizing that an object can possess 
more than one property at the same time (Stephens & Simpkins 1974). As 
a result, concept development at the preoperational stage remains immature.
The Role of Language in Thought
From a Piagetian perspective, some form of representational skill 
is necessary for cognitive development to proceed during the preopera­
tional period, but that skill need not be verbal language (Wadsworth 
1978). Rather than being the source of logical reasoning, language is 
viewed as being structured by logic (Sinclair-de-Zwart 1969; Voyat 1972).
In discussing the cognitive basis for language learning in infants 
Macnamara (1972) asserted that "the infant uses meaning as a clue to lan­
guage, rather than language as a clue to meaning" (p. 1). Basing his 
conclusion on the work of Piaget and Sinclair, Macnamara observed that 
at the time infants begin to learn verbal language, cognitive ability 
is already evident. Although language plays a role in thought, "the 
basic process of cognition seems to be a function of an active organiza­
tional mechanism, deriving from actions that the child brings to his 
experience" (Voyat 1972, p. 250). Of course, the child is not equipped 
with a complete set of cognitive structures at the time when language 
begins, but language does not play a direct role in the acquisition of 
knowledge until the development of formal operations. Wadsworth (1978)
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concluded: "Language is never the source of knowledge. Physical knowl­
edge and logical-mathematical knowledge cannot be acquired through lan­
guage (reading, listening); they are acquired through active experience 
with objects" (p. 71).
Sinclair-de-Zwart (1969) suggested that language be studied as a 
part of the symbolic function, within the framework of the child's total 
cognitive activity rather than as an autonomous object of knowing (p. 
335). Poulsen (1977) further posited that an evaluation of the child's 
understanding of his world is made possible by assessing the presence 
and quality of his symbolic functioning. The present research has 
sought to explore the linguistic and cognitive functioning of con­
genitally blind youngsters from this perspective.
Development of Word and Concept Meaning
Bloom and Lahey's (1978) discussion of the three major components 
of language (content, form, use) stressed the interaction of the three 
in expressing the full meaning of verbal pronouncements. Present con­
cern, however, was with "lexical semantics" (Perfetti 1972)— the meaning 
attributed to individual words, and what this reveals of the congenitally 
blind child's conception of his world. Grammatical and syntactical rela­
tionships were not considered in the analysis of the data.
In his discussion of concept formation, Elkind (1969) specified 
two kinds of content. Extensive content refers to the realm of objects 
that a concept denotes and includes all the exemplars of the concept.
An example is the concept category "DOGS" which includes Terriers, 
Beagles, Great Danes, Dachshunds, etc. Intensive content refers to
the common feature(s) connoted by all the exemplars of the concept;
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e.g., "DOGS" are furry animals, have four legs, etc. In distinguishing 
between these two kinds of content, Elkind suggested that intensive con­
tent is what is being assessed in verbal definition procedures, which 
was the approach used in the present study.
Semantics and Cognition
Bierwisch's (1970) discussion of semantics highlighted the rela­
tionship of components of linguistic meaning to the individual’s mental 
representation of physical objects and events. According to Bierwisch, 
the world is perceived and organized in accord with the cognitive and 
perceptual abilities of the individual; the semantic features by which 
the object or event is "known" would then correspond to the individual's 
perception, which may or may not be an exact representation of reality.
The semantic features do not represent, however, external 
physical properties, but rather the psychological conditions 
according to which human beings process their physical and 
social environment. Thus they are not symbols for physical 
properties and relations outside the human organism, but 
rather for the internal mechanisms by means of which such 
phenomena are perceived and conceptualized (Bierwisch 1970,
p. 181).
Thus, the manner in which a child perceives and mentally represents 
objects or events gives structure to the lexical meanings of words for 
that child (Bloom 1975).
In the view of theorists such as Bloom, Piaget, and Sinclair, 
language acquisition can be described as "a matter of mapping linguis­
tic structures on previously acquired averbal cognitive concepts" (Blank 
& Allen 1976, p. 260). The infant first determines the meaning a speaker 
intends to convey, independent of language, and then works out the rela­
tionship between the meaning and the words (Macnamara 1972). Consequently,
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cognitive concepts which initially develop during the sensorimotor 
period form the basis for the acquisition of the child's first words 
(linguistic concepts). Dale (1976) theorized that there is an ongoing, 
complex interaction between the development of semantic and cognitive 
concepts.
Semantic Features Hypothesis
The notion that the meaning of individual words consists in a 
list of semantic features or components has been suggested by a number 
of theorists (e.g., Bierwisch 1970; Katz 1972; Nida 1975). E. Clark 
(1972, 1973, 1974, 1977a, 1977b) built upon this idea and developed the 
semantic features hypothesis according to which the meaning of individ­
ual lexical units (words) is acquired by successively adding semantic 
features.
Clark (1977b) stated that it is "the child's cognitive, nonlin- 
guistic knowledge that provides him with his first hypotheses about 
what words might mean— what the mapping is between what he knows and 
the words that others use" (p. 147). She identified the cognitive basis 
for language as consisting primarily of perceptual information gathered 
through the various sense modalities, particularly perceptual attributes 
involving shape, movement, size, sound, and texture (1974; 1977b). The 
first meanings a child attaches to words is founded upon the perceptually 
based knowledge he has of objects in the world and their relation to one 
another and to himself (1977a; 1977b).
When confronted with a new word, the child makes an hypothesis 
as to what that word might mean: "A word refers to some identifiable 
(perceptually salient) characteristic of the object" (Clark 1974,
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p. 116). On the basis of this hypothesis the child then employs the 
following strategy:
Pick out whatever seems to be the most salient characteris­
tic (s) perceptually, and assume (until given counter-evidence) 
that that is what the word refers to. Act on this assumption 
whenever you want to name, request, or call attention to some­
thing (1974, p. 116).
On occasion the meaning of a word, so assigned, will correspond 
to the adult's meaning of the term. In many instances, however, this 
will not be the case; the child's initial use of the word will reflect 
less than the full, adult meaning because the child has not acquired 
all of the features, or components, that make up the meaning of the 
word. The tendency will be for the child to learn general features 
first, with more specific features being added over time. Clark (1973) 
stated: "The acquisition of semantic features, then, will consist of 
adding more features of meaning to the lexical entry of the word until 
the child's combination of features in the entry for that word corre­
sponds to the adult's" (p. 72).
In stressing the perceptual basis for the acquisition of word 
meanings, Clark's theory differs from theories based on Piaget's con­
cepts (e.g., Sinclair 1975, 1976; Sinclair-de-Zwart 1969) which stress 
the child's actions as the groundwork for meaning. As discussed ear­
lier, basic cognitive concepts of object, agent, space, time, and 
causality develop as a consequence of the child's continued interac­
tion with the environment. A parallel can be seen In the child's 
early verbal productions which contain the semantic roles of agent, 
object, action, and location. Such a view suggests that concepts are 
formed on the basis of functional rather than perceptual characteristics
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"Those things are similar that can be acted upon in the same way" 
(Nelson 1974, p. 274).
Functional Core Concepts
Nelson (1974, 1977) rejected the semantic features hypothesis 
for the acquisition of meaning and proposed that children’s concepts 
are built up through interactions with people and things: "The child 
is never in a position of having to construct relationships among 
static objects; he lives in, interacts with, and utilizes information 
from a world of dynamic relations from the onset" (1974, p. 280).
From this perspective, concern is not with the accumulation of
invariant common attributes, as in the semantic features hypothesis,
but with the individual function and identity. The functional core
concept presents a model which:
. . . emphasizes that an object is first identified as having 
important functional relations; that these relate the object 
to self and other people through a set of acts; and that per­
ceptual analysis is derivative of the functional concept, not 
a priori essential to it (1974, p. 284).
Hence, the central meaning of a concept will be functional, reflecting 
the action-relationship between the child, the object, and other indi­
viduals as experienced by the child. Consequently, the functional core 
will vary from child to child and from child to adult (Nelson 1974). 
Later, perceptual-descriptive information relating to the invariant 
identifying characteristics of "members" of the concept-group will be 
added to the core meaning. A word-name will ultimately be assigned to 
the concept, but the definition of that word will be determined by its 
functional core meaning for the individual (Nelson 1974). Blank and 
Allen (1976) labeled Nelson's model a "concept-matching" scheme in
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which the child learns to match words he hears with objects and rela­
tions already understood on a nonverbal level (p. 275).
Words, Meanings, Concepts
The semantic theories reviewed herein are consistent in suggest­
ing that the concept exists prior to the learning of a word-name to label 
the concept. The major distinction between theories is in regard to the 
basis upon which meaning is derived: perceptually gathered features 
(Clark), information gathered from action (Sinclair), or functional- 
relational information (Nelson). It is probable that the distinction 
between theories is not that significant or real, that they are not 
mutually exclusive (Dale 1976). Rather, it is here suggested that they 
can be considered as one by reasoning that perceptual information is 
gathered as a result of the sensorimotor actions upon the objects 
within a functional-relational context.
The theories also have in common the notion that concepts are 
initially individualistic. As Carroll (1964) stated, "Concepts are, 
after all, essentially idiosyncratic in the sense that they reside in 
particular individuals with particular histories of experiences that 
lead them to classify those experiences in particular ways" (pp. 183- 
184). The "true" meaning of a word is socially-standardized (Carroll) 
and, for communication among individuals to be effective, the initial 
idiosyncratic concept must conform to societal usage. Nelson (1977) 
explained:
We have two levels of conceptual organization, one social and 
linguistic, the other personal and cognitive. There are, in 
addition, two layers of concepts at each level— one stable and 
defining, the other flexible and inclusive. To learn the
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meaning of a word, the child must eventually match his own 
core concept meaning to the narrow linguistic concept. If 
these do not match, the word may be used inappropriately 
(p. 132).
Semantic Growth
Semantic growth can be viewed as a progression from the general 
to the specific, broad to narrow, simple to complex. As the child's 
experience with objects, events, people, and language continues, his 
conception of the world and its elements and relationships also under­
goes change. With linguistic and cognitive development, concepts become 
more complex, "more loaded with significant aspects" (Carroll 1964, p. 
183). Discrimination of the features or critical attributes of objects, 
and the learning of lexical terms to identify them, leads to more pre­
cise and specifiable concepts. At the same time, the child becomes more 
able to differentiate likenesses and differences in objects or events 
and to form classifications accordingly. Hierarchical and multiple 
classification results from cognitive growth and adds structure to 
linguistic (semantic) development.
Dimensional Adjectives
As stated previously, the semantic features hypothesis predicts 
that the most common features of a word will be acquired first. This 
will result in a period during which antonyms are regarded by the young 
child as synonomous. Donaldson and Balfour (1968) found this to be the 
case in meanings assigned to the words/concepts "more" and "less" by a 
group of 3 and 4 year old children. They reported that the children 
recognized that both terms had reference to quantity (the general, com­
mon feature) but that the children assigned to both terms the meaning of 
"more. It
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The semantic features hypothesis has particular value in that it 
provides a framework in which to examine and interpret data regarding 
the acquisition of word meanings (Dale 1976; Eilers, Oiler, & Ellington 
1974). The acquisition of spatial-comparative adjectives such as big/ 
little, long/short, tall/short, wide/narrow, and thick/thin, has been 
studied repeatedly from this perspective (Brewer & Stone 1975; Donaldson 
& Wales 1970; E. Clark 1972, 1974, 1977b; H. Clark 1970; Eilers et al. 
1974). H. Clark (1970) submitted that polar adjectives can be described 
as being either positive or negative, depending on the extent of dimen­
sion implied. The positive, or unmarked member of the pair indicates 
physical extension along a dimension, e.g., big, tall, long, wide, 
thick. According to H. Clark, such terms have two possible uses: (a) 
nominal, in which the term refers to the existence of the dimension 
itself— as in "long" meaning "of the dimension length"; and (b) con­
trastive, in which comparison against a standard is implied— as in 
"long" meaning "longer than average" (p. 270).
Negative, or marked adjectives (little, short, narrow, thin), 
however, have only the contrastive meaning; they cannot be used in the 
neutral (nominal) sense. The question "How long is that board?" is 
semantically comparable to "What is the length of the board?" In this 
example, long is used in the nominal sense; the negative pole, short, 
could not be used similarly (e.g., "What is the shortness of the 
board?"). In H. Clark's view,
The nominal long is semantically prior to both the contrastive 
long and the contrastive short. We must posit the dimension 
length before we can speak of measurement on the dimension 
- long (= "much length") and short (= "little length"). We 
might characterize the nominal long as superordinate to the 
contrastive long and the contrastive short (p. 271).
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E. Clark's (1972, 1974, 1977b) application of the semantic fea­
tures hypothesis to the acquisition of polar adjectives of dimension was 
based upon H. Clark's reasoning. She concluded from her work with young 
children that children "consistently learn to use and understand posi­
tive terms before negative ones" (1974, p. 120). This is so, she sur­
mised, because the child has an a priori preference— a sort of inborn 
attraction— for objects representative of greater extent, thus making 
it easier to map positive terms than negative (1974, 1977b).
The semantic features hypothesis holds that meaning increases as 
additional features are linked with words. The acquisition of spatial 
dimensional adjectives will follow an order from the simplest to the 
most complex; i.e., those with the fewest conditions or features will 
be acquired first. Clark (1972) hypothesized that children group words 
that share common features of meaning into a "semantic field." She fur­
ther hypothesized that children will substitute words based on these 
shared features. Such substitutions will frequently be incorrect from 
an adult standpoint because the child's meaning for more specific terms 
may be shy some of the significant features. As a result, words may be 
overgeneralized in the child's usage. On this basis, Clark predicted 
the following order for the acquisition of dimensional adjectives: 
big/small before tall/short and long/short; long/short before thick/ 
thin and wide/narrow. Using a word game involving verbal opposites, 
Clark (1972) tested 30 children ranging in age from 4 years 0 months 
to 5 years 5 months and found support for this hypothesis. She con­
cluded that the order of acquisition was accurately predicted by rela­
tive semantic complexity.
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Brewer and Stone (.1975) tested 28 children (CA 3 years 6 months 
to 5 years 3 months) as to their understanding of spatial dimensional 
adjectives by having them choose from four objects that one which repre­
sented the test word. Brewer and Stone found the same order of acquisi­
tion for adjective pairs as Clark (1972) had reported. Also, the unmarked, 
positive adjective tended to be acquired before its marked antonym. They 
reported, however, that the most common error made by the children was to 
select the object representing the same polarity (marked or unmarked) as 
the word requested, rather than an error on the dimension itself (e.g., 
long for tall). They concluded that polarity is acquired before dimen­
sion, making polarity the more common feature.
Eilers, Oiler, and Ellington (1974) attempted to evaluate the 
acquisition of word meaning for dimensional adjectives in children 
younger than previously studied, i.e., 2 and 3 year old children. In 
the first of their experiments, children were asked to give the examiner
the _____ object (filling in the blank with one of the polar adjectives).
The second experiment had two parts: (a) subjects received more elabo­
rate instructions similar to those of the first experiment; e.g., "Here 
are two cans. One is big and one is little. Give me the little one"
(p. 199); (b) evaluation was made of the non-semantic size preferences 
of the children by giving simple instructions such as "Here are two cans. 
Give me one" (p. 200). Eilers et al. found support for the prediction of 
the semantic features hypothesis that the trend in understanding dimen­
sional adjectives is from general to complex (specific) terms. But 
their findings did not support the belief that marked antonyms (nega­
tive pole) are interpreted as having the same meaning as unmarked
31
(positive pole) antonyms in their early development. The second experi­
ment conducted by Eilers et al. indicated that spontaneous size prefer­
ences of the children may interfere with the "purity" of this type of 
research and that semantically irrelevant factors (such as a natural 
attraction to the big or small object) cannot be ignored in the inter­
pretation of results.
As useful as the semantic features hypothesis may be in setting 
up research to investigate the acquisition of certain terms, it is far 
from perfect. In trying to comprehend semantic development, this 
review has considered only a small representation of the research into 
the acquisition or development of word meanings; just enough to estab­
lish a base from which the present research was built. The following 
lengthy quotation from Dale (1976) summarizes:
There is no single framework that covers all children, all 
word meanings, and all patterns of development. . . . Some 
words are usefully described as bundles of semantic features 
(the dimensional terms, before and after), whereas others 
have to be discussed in terms of focal concepts (the color 
words) or relations among components (verbs of possession).
And finally, in some instances development is the acquisition, 
gradual or sudden, of features and relations that permit per­
formance more nearly approximating the adult norm, whereas in 
other instances (big) performance may actually deteriorate for 
a time. In some instances semantic development is tied rather 
closely to the child's level of cognitive maturity (left/right, 
the articles), whereas in others cognitive factors do not seem 
to play a role in determining the point of mastery. . . .
Semantic development is as varied as the concepts that lan­
guage encodes (p. 189).
Studies with Congenitally Blind Children 
Cognitive Development
Lowenfeld (1973) suggested that blindness imposes three basic 
limitations on the individual in terms of (a) the range and variety of
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experiences available, (b) mobility, and (c) interaction with the envi­
ronment. Piagetian theory holds that social and physical interaction 
are key elements in cognitive growth. As a result of interacting with 
the environment, information gathered through the child's sensory and 
motor avenues is "stored" in representational form (symbolic play, men­
tal image, language). The blind child, however, lacks the "integrating, 
instantaneous, and simultaneous provision of information" that vision 
allows, such that "information comes to a blind child in fragmented 
fashion and is difficult to verify" (Davidson 1976, p. 18). Conse­
quently, the blind child must rely on less sophisticated sensory dis­
crimination processes (Gottesman 1976). Warren (1977) observed:
The totally blind child must, of course, build up concepts of 
the world on the basis of other than visual information, while 
visual information is extremely useful in building concepts for 
the sighted child. Hearing is of more limited value than vision, 
and touch is inappropriate for the experience of distant, very 
large, very small, fragile, or dangerous objects. Color cannot 
be directly experienced at all. These various limitations make 
the total experience of the blind child more restricted (p. 83).
Delays have been observed in the physical and motor development 
of blind children involving balance and posture, locomotion, reaching, 
grasping, manipulating, and releasing objects (DuBose 1976; Swallow 
1976). These delays are attributed to the lack of visual stimulation 
which would call the child's attention to events or objects in his 
environment and thus encourage interaction and imitation. Scholl 
(1973) concluded that the child's "visual impairment places him at a 
disadvantage in the areas of sensory stimulation, concept formation, 
and communication" (p. 81). Thus, it has been hypothesized that the 
cognitive development of the congenitally blind, as defined and mea­
sured by Piagetian theory, will be delayed.
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Studies of Cognitive Development
The development of cognitive functioning in congenitally blind 
children has been repeatedly studied using measures adapted from those 
developed by Piaget to assess the major concepts of conservation, clas­
sification, and seriation (e.g., Brekke, Williams, & Tait 1974; Fried­
man & Pasnak 1973; Gottesman 1973, 1976; Higgins 1973; Miller 1969; 
Stephens & Simpkins 1974; Tobin 1972). The findings of these studies 
have confirmed that congenitally blind children follow the same devel­
opmental pattern as sighted children but at a slower rate. While vision 
is not essential for the development of these operations (Gottesman 1973), 
delays in their development occur because tactual experience alone is 
not sufficient to overcome the deficit in cognitive visual functioning 
(Miller 1969). Underscoring the importance of the kind, quality, and 
number of concrete experiences provided for blind children as a means 
of stimulating interaction with the environment and fostering cognitive 
growth, several of the studies reported differences in performance in 
favor of blind subjects chosen from a non-residential setting over 
against those selected from a residential school (Brekke et al. 1974; 
Gottesman 1976; Tobin 1972).
A major study of the cognitive development of blind children was 
that undertaken by Stephens and Simpkins (1974; also reported in Simpkins 
& Stephens 1974). Subjects for this study consisted of 75 congenitally 
blind children ranging in age from 6 to 18 years. The researchers 
administered 26 reasoning tasks designed to measure conservation, clas­
sification, symbolic imagery, and formal operations. The results 
obtained from this research were compared with previously collected
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data from sighted children of the same ages (Stephens, Hiller, & 
McLaughlin 1969). Analysis of the results confirmed the findings of 
other researchers that cognitive growth in congenitally blind children 
occurs at a slower rate than in sighted children. Stephens and Simpkins 
interpreted their results as suggesting a severe deficit in cognitive 
functioning among blind children. Significant differences were obtained 
on 19 of the 26 reasoning variables, all in favor of the sighted sub­
jects. It was concluded that logical thought involving spatial orien­
tation, mental imagery, class inclusion, and classification were areas 
of particular difficulty for the visually handicapped.
Construction of Reality
The totally blind child's lack of mobility and consequent depriv­
ation of experiences and interactions with his environment impedes the 
development of physical and logical-mathematical knowledge (Swallow 
1976). It follows, then, that such children will understand and orga­
nize their world differently than will sighted children (Wills 1965). 
Wills (1965), writing from a psychoanalytic viewpoint, described young 
blind children as experiencing difficulty in distinguishing reality from 
fantasy and as being inclined to animistic thinking (assigning life to 
inanimate objects). She further reported that a partial understanding 
of common objects based on limited direct experience with the objects 
is common among blind children; typically, her subjects based their 
judgments upon insufficient or incomplete perceptual clues.
Santin and Simmons (1977) argued that the congenitally blind 
child develops and organizes his perception of the world differently 
than the sighted child. They held that the blind child is forced to
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construct a model of the world based on "inconsistent, discrete, and 
generally unverified fragments of information" (p. 427) which form a 
different "data base" than that from which sighted children work,
Stephens, Smith, Fitzgerald, Grube, Hitt, and Daly (1977) dis­
cussed in detail the effect of the absence of vision on cognitive devel­
opment during the sensorimotor and preoperational periods, basing their 
implications on the research of Stephens and Simpkins (1974) and Adelson 
and Fraiberg (1974). They concluded that because of limited interaction 
with objects, blind children will display poor understanding of the con­
sequences of behavior, delays in the differentiation of self from the 
environment (cf. Fraiberg 1977), a lack of incidental learning, a delay 
in the development of purposeful behavior, and limited self-initiated 
experimentation and active exploration of the properties of objects and 
events. Stephens et al. (1977) concluded:
The cumulative effect that visual impairment has on the cog­
nitive growth and development of the child becomes increas­
ingly evident during the preoperational stage. . . . The 
ability to use language as a means of promoting the under­
standing of concepts develops slowly because the visually 
impaired child has not yet had ample opportunity to engage 
in concrete experience. . . . Consequently, the visually 
impaired child may become more reliant on existing schemas 
and tend to retain an egocentric view of his experiences 
longer than his sighted peers. . . . Because of his visual 
deficit the child relies more heavily on concrete physical 
experience than does the sighted child. As a consequence 
there is increased likelihood that concepts are tied more 
closely to action than to symbolic representation and men­
tal manipulation (p. 36).
Symbolic Functioning
The foregoing quotation from Stephens et al. (1977) suggests that 
symbolic representation in congenitally blind children is affected by 
blindness. Fraiberg (1977) also found blindness to be an impediment
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to the development of representational ingelligence.
Swallow (1976) suggested that qualitative and quantitative dif­
ferences in the thinking of blind children may be partly attributable 
to the symbolic function and language. She reasoned that the absence of 
vision would inhibit the development of deferred imitation which normally 
marks the beginning of symbolization. Symbolic play is said to be the 
means by which children adapt to the world of grown-ups, a bridge between 
concrete experiences and abstract thought (Swallow 1976). According to 
Piaget (1962), symbolic or make-believe play implies the representation 
of an object(s) no longer present, and is both imitative and imaginative. 
The congenitally blind child, however, is restricted in his observation 
of and encounters with others and is, therefore, "severely limited in 
the variety of living experiences which form the basis of play" (Swallow 
1976, p. 279). Investigations of the play behavior of blind children 
(Singer 1966; Singer & Streiner 1966; Tait 1972) have confirmed that 
their play behavior is less imaginative or creative and is more concrete 
and related to immediate personal experiences.
Mental imagery was found to be an area of weakness among con­
genitally blind school children (Stephens & Simpkins 1974). Kephart, 
Kephart, & Schwarz (1974) compared blind and sighted children aged 5 
to 7 years as to the range of information they had accumulated about 
themselves and their immediate environment (house, yard, street, and 
town). Their study revealed that the blind possess fragmented concepts 
and restrictive environmental information. The absence of vision as a 
means of gathering and unifying information about their body and envi­
ronment was cited as the reason for their limited or misinformation.
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Kephart et al. (1974) suggested that auditorily and tactually gathered 
information was not sufficient to compensate for the visual deficit.
Language is also a part of the symbolic function and allows an 
individual to represent reality through words that are distinct from 
that which they signify (Hampshire 1977-78). The concepts acquired 
during the sensorimotor period serve as roots for the beginnings of 
language. For the congenitally blind child, however, such "roots" may 
produce different "flowers of meaning" than those of the sighted child 
(a) because of the lack of mobility and interaction with objects, events, 
and persons in the blind child's environment, and (b) because the lan­
guage used by sighted persons to describe what the blind child experi­
ences through touch, smell, taste, or hearing may not match his sensory 
experience (Foulke 1964; Santin & Simmons 1977). Stephens (1972) empha­
sized that language is not sufficient to compensate for the lack of 
action and concrete experience.
Urwin (1977) reported that many blind children begin speaking 
slowly and that their speech is frequently restricted to their own body 
movements, familiar routines, or ready-made phrases "which they may or 
may not use appropriately to context" (p. 140). Urwin agreed that prob­
lems in early language development result from restricted opportunities 
for active exploration, but added that inadequate social exchanges 
between the blind child and his sighted parents also interferes with 
communication. For example, difficulty in focusing on the same object 
is possible because the child might not "know" the object or event to 
which the adult is making reference. Burlingham (1961, 1965) also felt 
that there was a tendency for blind children to use words which were
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meaningless or which had different meanings for them. She concluded, 
"concepts may be completely misunderstood or only partially understood; 
or words may be used merely to imitate or to parrot the sighted" (1961, 
p. 134). Likewise, Santin and Simmons (1977) hypothesized that blind 
chi-ldren may attend to the sounds which comprise the language but not 
grasp the meaning intended by a speaker. They suggested, "Early lan­
guage of the blind child does not seem to mirror his developing knowl­
edge of the world, but rather his knowledge of the language of others" 
(1977, p. 427).
Concept Development
A lack of recognition of the qualities of objects in isola­
tion prevents the child from forming a meaningful notion of 
the object and its purpose. Without realistic concepts 
about his environment, the blind child does not learn to 
predict, anticipate, or trust the physical world (Rogow 
1976, p, 314).
In so stating the problem, Rogow (1976) has emphasized the effects of 
blindness on concept development and cognitive development in general. 
Details regarding form, size, and spatial relationships of objects which 
are normally gathered through vision (Lowenfeld 1973) must be determined 
through tactual and kinesthetic examination by the blind child, which are 
generally viewed as being less efficient sense modalities (Santin & 
Simmons 1977; Warren 1977). Understanding the true nature of the envi­
ronment and its contents is of particular importance when providing 
orientation and mobility instruction to the blind children who, in 
Hapeman's (1967) description, tend "to lack the necessary concrete 
knowledge of their environments and the necessary basic concepts of 
distance, direction and environmental changes" (p. 41).
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Zweibelson and Barg (1967) posited three levels of concept forma­
tion which they applied to the analysis of word meaning:
"1. the term concrete level of concept formation is used where 
a specific characteristic of the object is considered to be 
the content;
"2. the functional level of concept formation stipulates the 
function the object performs, or what one does with it;
"3. the abstract level refers to the general term connoting
or summing up all the essential common characteristics of 
the object" (p. 218).
These researchers sought to determine differences in levels of concept 
formation between eight blind and eight sighted children between the 
ages of 11 and 13 years. Each child's response to items on the Sim­
ilarities and Vocabulary subtests of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale 
for Children were rated on the basis of whether the responses were 
concrete, functional, or abstract. Zweibelson and Barg reported that, 
as hypothesized, blind children did not use abstract concepts to the 
extent noted in the responses of the sighted children. Rather, the 
blind subjects' responses were primarily on a concrete and functional 
conceptual level. Given the trend toward mainstreaming visually handi­
capped children in the public schools, this difference in conceptual 
attainment must be considered in order for meaningful communication 
to ensue.
Boldt (1969) also examined conceptual development in blind and 
sighted children between the ages of 7 and 17 years. Boldt was concerned 
with the development of concept formation regarding "scientific and tech­
nical phenomena" (p. 5) related to the teaching of science to blind chil­
dren. Three general levels of concept formation were observed. Level I 
was described as a "naive subjective relation to the phenomena which are 
understood from the meaning received from their immediate experiential
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importance for the subject" (p. 6). Warren's (1977) review of Boldt's 
study drew a parallel between this level and the sensorimotor period of 
development in Piagetian theory. Boldt's Level II shows "a certain 
change of objectivity of the phenomena" (p. 6), but the child's explana­
tions are still closely tied to his subjective experience. Level III 
constitutes real scientific thinking: "In a truly causal sense, the 
phenomena are accepted in total objectivity" (p. 6). Boldt's analysis 
of the data suggested that the blind and sighted progress through the 
same stages but that the blind children, particularly the congenitally 
blind, show retarded conceptual development. These findings correspond 
to those of Stephens and Simpkins (1974) and others, reported earlier.
Verbal Unreality
Burlingham (1965) stated that in the language of blind children,
two kinds of words can be observed— those which have meaning for him
based on his personal experience, and those which are verbalizations
acquired from hearing others speak but which are without meaning for
him. Cutsforth (±951) used the term "verbalism" to refer to the use of
words or abstract concepts "not verified by concrete experience" (p. 48).
In Cutsforth's view, speech and language can broaden the blind child's
development through the social relationships they promote and because
language provides a means of controlling objects no longer present or
within reach. On the other hand, Cutsforth also suggested that the use
of sighted language leads to verbal unreality:
Names to things pass current between the blind child and his 
seeing associates as though they carried the same meaning for 
both. But the name of the thing seen, although it may be the 
same word, has a different meaning from the name of the thing 
felt or heard. To a far greater extent probably than in the
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seeing, words become a source of self-stimulation, turning the 
child again toward himself and making him, as do his touch 
experiences, almost exclusively his own environment. Thus the 
acquisition of speech serves both to objectify and to social­
ize the life of the blind child and at the same time to isolate 
him still further from the seeing world in which he lives.
This is the beginning of verbal unreality (Cutsforth 1951,
P. ID.
Cutsforth (1951) believed that this situation has profound negative con­
sequences, principally "the unwarranted use of meaningless visual termi­
nology" with the result that "nothing but incoherent and loose thinking 
is possible" (p. 69).
Cutsforth's conclusion was based on a study he conducted in 1932 
which grew out of his concern that blind children were being taught "to 
overvalue the non-experiential meaning of a socially acquired concept—  
to live by words rather than by reality" (1932, p. 86). He referred to 
this tendency as verbal-mindedness, and sought to investigate its pre­
valence in congenitally and adventitiously blind children (CA 9 to 21 
years). Subjects were asked to respond to the name of an object with 
some quality of that object. Their responses were classified under 
nine groupings: color, brightness or other visual characteristic, 
taste and smell, auditory aspects, abstract qualities, texture, size 
and shape, temperature, and weight. Cutsforth reported a high per­
centage of visual responses (color, brightness or other visual char­
acteristic) for congenitally blind (48.2%) and adventitiously blind 
(65%) children. Tactually based qualities (texture, size, shape, 
temperature, and weight) comprised the second largest group of 
responses— 35.7% for congenitally blind and 24.2% for adventitiously 
blind subjects. Cutsforth reasoned that the comparative lack of 
variety in responses from other-than-visual sensory modalities was
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indicative of a tendency among blind children to underestimate the value 
of their own experience (1932, p. 88).
The notion of verbal unreality has been challenged, however.
Nolan (1960) replicated some of Cutsforth's original work with verbal­
isms and concluded that a significant problem did not exist among the 
blind children he studied (CA 9 to 20 years). Harley (1963) tested 40 
blind children (CA 6 to 14 years) having light perception or less to 
explore the relationship of verbalisms to age, intelligence, experi­
ence, and personal adjustment. Harley differentiated between "visually 
oriented verbalisms" meaning the use of words referring to a visual 
quality of the object of concern (e.g., color), and a "verbalism" evi­
denced by the child's being able to give a verbal definition of the 
word but not being able to tactually identify the object. In this 
respect, Harley expanded the work of Cutsforth (1932, 1951) and Nolan 
(1960) who studied only the "visually oriented verbalisms." Harley 
found no significant evidence of a relationship between visually 
oriented verbalisms and any of the variables. However, he reported 
that verbalisms were related to age, intelligence, and experience as 
predicted. As each of these variables increased, verbalisms decreased, 
Harley submitted that this is so because with increased age comes a 
greater accumulation of experiences with common objects and, with con­
tinued experience comes increased familiarity and facility in tactually 
examining objects.
Dokecki (1966), from his review of the research regarding verbal­
isms, concluded that "There is no empirical evidence that would lead one 
to assume that nonsensory based language need disrupt the thinking 
process" (p. 529) as Cutsforth (1951) had proposed. Hampshire (1977-78)
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suggested that the tendency for blind children to show more concern for 
"things" in their speech than for people, and to ask more questions than 
seeing children (Maxfield 1936) is a means of compensating for the 
absence of visual experience. He further suggested that this compen­
satory use of language could be the reason for verbalisms.
DeMott (1972) studied the affective meaning of 15 concepts using 
a semantic differential technique in which the subjects were required to 
rate each concept along a 5-point continuum for 15 adjective combina­
tions (e.g., for the "slow/fast" adjective combination, subjects could 
respond: very slow, slow, neither slow nor fast, fast, very fast). A 
total of 143 blind, partially sighted, and sighted children ranging in 
age from 6 through 20 years were interviewed. The subjects were also 
given a verbalism test in which they were first required to define the 
words, then to tactually identify objects corresponding to those words 
(as had been done in Harley's work). Unfortunately, DeMott did not 
present the results of this portion of his work.
DeMott concluded from the semantic differential procedure that 
there were no significant differences between the blind and sighted 
groups in terms of affective meanings for the concepts measured.
DeMott posited that the blind derive sufficient clues from the context 
in which the words are used so as to assign affective meaning which is 
essentially equivalent to the affective meanings for the sighted.
Warren (1977) was critical in his review of DeMott's research. 
Warren cited two qualifications in the interpretation of DeMott's 
results: (a) the differences in affective meaning which were observed
for some of the concepts may have been dismissed too lightly; (b) the
44
differences DeMott reported in the blind children’s use of the 5-point 
rating scale may be significant. DeMott's study showed that the blind 
subjects tended to give more neutral, midscale ("neither X nor Y") 
responses than their sighted peers. Warren suggested that this may 
indicate that the concepts were "less strongly invested with affective 
meaning" (p. 160) for the blind subjects, even though an averaging of 
responses showed no significant differences according to DeMott. Hence, 
Warren concluded that there is continued need for research into the ques­
tion of verbalisms among blind children.
Summary
The research has shown that the cognitive development of congen­
itally blind children is delayed as a result of the limitations imposed 
by blindness. It has been suggested that information about their envi­
ronment is gathered by the blind child via less efficient sensory means 
than is true for the sighted child, resulting in fragmented and/or 
restrictive concepts of objects and the world. Vision is believed to 
provide a unifying aspect to one’s experience enabling a more immediate 
integration and interpretation of that experience. Given the relation­
ship between experience, cognition, and language, the assumption has 
been made that congenitally blind children may use words that have 
little or no meaning for them (verbalisms), or for which they possess 
a significantly different meaning based on their unique experience and 
mental representation of objects or events. The present study has 
sought to investigate representational thought and language in the 
congenitally blind.
CHAPTER III
DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
Introduction
This chapter will explain the procedures undertaken in the present 
study. Topics to be discussed are: planning the investigation, the 
research population, the gathering of data, and treatment of the data.
Planning the Investigation
The review of the literature revealed that cognitive development 
among totally, congenitally blind children is delayed as a result of the 
limitations imposed by blindness on mobility' and interactive experiences 
with objects and events in the environment. It is generally assumed that 
information comes to blind children in fragmented fashion because of 
their reliance on less sophisticated sensory discrimination processes 
(e.g., Davidson 1976; Gottesman 1976; Kephart, Kephart, & Schwarz 1974; 
Santin & Simmons 1977). The ensuing difficulties in unifying and orga­
nizing experientially gained information may lead to the construction of 
a model of the world which is inconsistent, incomplete, and significantly 
different from that of sighted children. Given the relationship between 
language and cognition, differences in lexical semantics (meanings 
assigned to individual words) would be expected between blind and sighted 
children. Problems in the areas of word meaning and concept development—  
and hence, in communication— become an important consideration in the
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light of the current emphasis on integration and mainstreaming in the 
public schools.
If the blind child's experience with objects and events is sig­
nificantly different from that of sighted children, his interpretation 
of the experience and assignation of meaning to the object or event will 
be idiosyncratic and personal. Some inhibition or delay in the develop­
ment of socially-shared meanings for the words or concepts which repre­
sent those objects or events would follow. Cutsforth's (1932, 1951) 
proposal that blind children merely adopt the language of their sighted 
peers without fully grasping the meaning of that language would then 
seem plausible.
The present investigation was designed to explore the symbolic 
functioning of blind children. It was assumed that the children's 
attribution of descriptors to selected objects would reflect their men­
tal representation of those objects. By comparing the responses of 
blind and sighted children it was hoped that insight would be gained 
into the effect of the absence of vision on children's understanding 
of common words and concepts, and into the nature of blind children's 
representational thought.
The theoretical framework developed in Chapter II suggests that 
language is structured by cognition. Any differences in object concept 
caused by the absence of vision should be evidenced in the blind child's 
attribution of characteristics to the objects used in this study.
Absence of significant and numerous differences in attributions would 
indicate that the absence of vision does not significantly alter the 
object concept from that which the sighted child possesses. If, how­
ever, the language of totally, congenitally blind children is simply
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a reflection of their knowledge of the language of sighted children 
(Santin & Simmons 1977) then there should be little difference in 
attribution between vision groups and a high percentage of visually 
oriented terminology in the language of the blind. Through this exam­
ination of their understanding of common words and concepts, knowledge 
might be gained regarding the congenitally blind child's conceptualiza­
tion of the world.
Research Population
The ten blind subjects ranged in age from 3 years 8 months to 
9 years 11 months, with a mean age of 6 years 10 months. A breakdown 
by sex, age, degree and cause of blindness is presented in table 1.
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE DATA ON BLIND SUBJECTS
Subject Sex Age
Degree of 
Blindness
Cause of 
Blindness
it 006 F 3-8 Total Retinal blastoma
it 002 M 4-5 Total Retrolental fibroplasia
#007 F 5-4 Total Retrolental fibroplasia
#001 M 6-4 Total Retrolental fibroplasia
#008 F 6-11 Total Retrolental fibroplasia
#020 F 7-3 LP only Unknown
#010 F 7-4 Total Unknown
#018 F 8-0 LP only Unknown
#009 F 9-0 Color only Athalmos/scarring
it 003 F 9-11 Total Retrolental fibroplasia
Individuals in this group were gathered from Minnesota and North Dakota 
through the cooperation of the public schools, State Services for the 
Blind, and the North Dakota State School for the Blind. Criteria for
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inclusion in the study were that the children be: (a) congenitally blind, 
meaning blind from birth or by one year of age; (b) totally blind, meaning 
light perception or less; and (c) of estimated "normal'1 intelligence. All 
but three of the children were without any vision. Two had some light per­
ception, and one had some color vision. All subjects were blind from birth.
The sighted children were selected from the Grand Forks, North 
Dakota area to match the blind subjects on the bases of age, sex, and 
socioeconomic status. Sighted subjects ranged in age from 3 years 8 
months to 9 years 9 months, with a mean age of 6 years 10 months (see 
table 2 for breakdown by age and sex). The differences between ages 
for matched subjects in no case exceeded four months. Statistical com­
parison of the blind and sighted groups showed no significant difference 
for CA (t = 0.02, p >.05).
TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE DATA ON SIGHTED SUBJECTS 
Subject Sex Age
it 012 F 3-8
it 013 M 4-5
#011 F 5-3
#014 M 6-3
it 017 F 6-11
#021 F 7-3
#015 F 7-8
#019 F 8-2
it 016 F 9-0
it 004 F 9-9
All 20 children were rated by their parents on the Developmental
Profile (Alpern & Boll 1972). In this way, it was determined that the
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children were developing within normal ranges in the areas of self-help 
skills, social skills, academic skills, and communication skills despite 
the absence of vision in the blind subjects. The mean ages on the 
Developmental Profile ranged from 4 years 2 months to 9 years 6 months 
for the blind subjects, and from 4 years 9 months to 9 years 11 months 
for the sighted children. Statistical comparison of the groups showed 
no significant difference in Profile age (t = 1.19, p >.05).
Determination of socioeconomic status was based on parental occu­
pation, educational level of the father, and educational level of the 
mother. Statistical comparison of the blind and sighted groups (chi 
square technique) revealed no significant differences on any of the 
socioeconomic variables.
Gathering the Data
The Interviews
Each child was interviewed individually by the examiner. The 
interviews were conducted in a setting which was familiar to the chil­
dren, usually the child's home. Four of the sighted children were 
interviewed at the day nursery which they attended regularly. Suit­
able time was allowed to establish rapport with each child before 
beginning the actual interview. All data was gathered over one or 
two sessions, with "break times" provided as necessary for the younger 
children. Each interview was recorded on cassette tape and transcribed 
as soon after the interview as possible. A standard protocol was fol­
lowed during the interviews (see Appendix), although the clinical inter­
view approach allowed the examiner to expand upon the basic protocol in 
following the lead of the children's comments.
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The Instrument
Language assessment. That segment of the interview dealing with 
the assessment of language was divided into four basic parts. Part I was 
entirely verbal and was designed to elicit attribution and description of 
the ten "more tangible" (MT) and ten "less tangible" (LT) objects. Three 
basic questions were presented to the children, progressing from a gen­
eral level to a more specific level:
1. What is a ____? Tell me about a ____?
2. What is (does) a ____ for (do)? What can you do with (to) __?
3. What does a __ _ look like?
In all cases, children were encouraged to give as complete a response as
possible by asking "What else can you tell me about a ___ ? What else
can you do with ____?" or by prodding them to "Tell me more." For some
children, all three questions were answered spontaneously in response to 
question 1, so that it was not necessary to present each question in turn.
For each of the 20 objects the children were asked to respond to 
a forced-choice question involving polar adjectives of dimension ("Is it 
big or small? tall or short? wide or narrow? long or short? thick or 
thin?"). In addition, for each of the MT objects the children were asked
to demonstrate the use of the object ("Show me how you use a ____? or
"Show me what you do with a ____.") in similar fashion to the Manual
Expression subtest of the ITPA (Kirk, McCarthy, & Kirk 1968). These 
procedures were designed to further reveal the children's mental repre­
sentation (conceptualization) of the objects and concepts in question.
The children's understanding of the origin of object names, and 
their belief in nominal realism and animism were assessed by asking:
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1. Why is it called a ____? Where did that name come from?
2. Can we call it anything else? Can we call it a ____?
3. Can a ____ feel? hear? think?
This series of questions was asked for five of the MT and five of the 
LT objects: BALL, SPOON, DOLL, KEY, CUP, TREE, HOUSE, CAR, WALL, and 
BUSH. Responses to these questions provided additional insight into 
the children's conception of the objects and the world, as well as fur­
ther revealing their level of cognitive development.
Part II of the language assessment asked the children to tactually 
identify actual objects corresponding to the MT items described verbally 
in Part I. Sighted subjects were instructed to keep their eyes closed 
while tactually examining the objects for identification purposes. By 
comparing the number of objects the blind children could describe in 
Part I with the number of objects they could identify in Part II, any 
tendency toward verbalism could be determined (Harley 1963). Once the 
objects had been identified, the children were asked to tell everything 
they could about the items while still in their possession (sighted chil­
dren were permitted to use vision at this point). This enabled compari­
son of attribution based on verbal recall (Part I) with attribution based 
on tactual and/or visual examination (Part II).
Receptive and expressive use of dimensional adjectives were 
assessed in Part III. Subjects were presented with two objects that 
were identical along all dimensions but one, and were asked these 
questions:
1. Tell me about these two ___. What can you tell me about these?
2. This ____ ix X; this one is ?
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This portion of the interview was designed to measure expressive use of 
dimensional adjectives. Evaluation was made as to whether dimensional 
comparisons were made spontaneously (in response to question 1) or were 
elicited (question 2), and whether the terms were used correctly. If 
the correct comparatives were used spontaneously, question 2 was not 
asked.
Similarly, receptive comprehension of the polar adjectives of 
dimension was assessed by presenting the children with two objects, 
identical except along one dimension. Tactual examination of the items 
was permitted in order for the children to respond to standard questions 
such as "Which is the longer ____?" The comparative form of the adjec­
tives (" + er") was used in each instance. Thus it could be determined 
whether the children understood the basic meaning of the dimensional 
terms. The objects used in Part III were the same as those used in 
Part II, Tactual Identification and Attribution. The cups, balls, 
spoons, keys, etc. were common objects purchased in a local discount 
store and were assumed to be within the experience of the children 
tested.
In Part IV, subjects were verbally presented with a statement 
requiring them to choose between two of the LT objects the one which a 
comparative adjective named; for example, "Which is longer, a car or a 
bus?" This portion of the interview served to further define the chil­
dren's mental image of the objects in question and to yield additional
data regarding the meaning they assigned to the dimensional adjectives.
7 Cognitive assessment. Six Piagetian assessments were employed 
to evaluate the cognitive functioning of the 20 children. The procedures
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used were patterned after those normally employed in Piagetian-based 
research (e.g., Stephens & Simpkins 1974). Minimal adaptations were 
required for the blind subjects to assure that they could tactually 
observe the transformations or manipulations of the materials.
The reasoning experiments provided assessment of conservation 
and concrete reasoning, symbolic imagery, and logical-classification.
In the administration of the tasks, the children were first given an 
opportunity to become familiar with the materials used and each child 
was encouraged to explain his responses to the questions of judgment 
("Why? "How do you know?" "Tell me more." etc.) The basic protocol 
used in the assessment of cognitive ability is given in appendix A.
Conservation of substance was measured by presenting the child 
with two balls of clay. After the child had agreed that the balls con­
tained the same amount of clay, one was successively transformed into a 
hot dog shape, a pancake shape, and into a number of pieces. All trans­
formations were made by the children themselves. The question was then 
raised whether the amount of clay was still the same in each clay object, 
or if one had more or less than the other.
Conservation of length was measured by two procedures. In the 
first, children were asked to select the two rods of equal length from 
a group of four rods. The equal rods were then placed on the table 
parallel to one another and, with the blind child's hands on top of 
the rods to enable tactual observation of the movement, one rod was 
moved a few inches to the right and the subjects were asked whether 
they believed the rods to be still of equal length. This procedure 
was repeated with movement of one rod to the left, then with
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simultaneous movement of both rods in opposite directions. The rods 
were slightly flattened on one side to prevent rolling so that the 
blind children were better able to examine the materials.
The second procedure to measure conservation of length made use 
of two ropes of equal length and thickness. The ropes were placed on 
the table, parallel to each other as had been done with the rods. The 
children were given the opportunity to tactually examine the ropes and 
agree that they were of equal length. Following this, one of the ropes 
was successively transformed into an "M" shape, a "W" shape, and a 
—v/" shape and the child was asked whether the two ropes were still 
of equal length or if one was longer than the other.
Concrete reasoning was further assessed via an adaptation of the 
term-to-term correspondence procedure (Wadsworth 1978) . Six buttons were 
arranged in a straight line, each separated by a one-inch space. The 
children were instructed to select from a group of nine blocks enough 
blocks to "go with" the buttons; i.e., the subjects were told to place 
a block in front of each button. Some assistance was required from the 
examiner as the blind children attempted to match the items. After the 
children agreed that there were the same number of buttons as blocks, 
the row of buttons was moved closer together and the question posed,
"Now are there as many buttons as there are blocks? Or are there more 
buttons or more blocks?" A second transformation involved moving the 
blocks close together while the buttons remained spread out and asking 
the question as before. The examiner manipulated the blind children's 
hands as the transformations were made and in the tactual examination
of the materials.
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Symbolic imagery was assessed by using three differently shaped 
wooden beads strung on a stiff wire. The shapes were examined by the 
children and assigned names of their choosing (e.g., round, square, etc.). 
Assistance was provided as necessary in inserting the beads into a hollow 
tube. The task required that the children maintain an image of the beads 
(i.e., their position on the wire) through a series of transformations 
(rotations) in order to predict which of the three beads would emerge 
first from the other end of the tube, and to explain why. The rotation 
of beads task was repeated several times with the tube being rotated 180 
degrees and/or 360 degrees to the right or left and the prediction made. 
The blind children held the tube during these transformations in order 
to follow the rotations.
Logical-classification was measured by two similar procedures 
involving square-shapes and circle-shapes. In the first, the children 
were presented with five round and three square shapes, all of which 
were covered with rough sandpaper to facilitate tactual examination.
The task required that the children determine whether there were more 
round or more rough shapes. The second experiment involved five round, 
rough shapes and three round, smooth shapes. The children were again 
asked whether there were more rough or more round shapes, and to explain 
the basis for their judgment.
All of the materials used in the reasoning experiments were 
gathered and/or constructed by the examiner. Adaptations in procedure 
or materials to accommodate the visually handicapped were adopted from 
Stephens and Simpkins (1974).
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Treatment of the Data
Scoring Procedures
Parts I and II of the language assessment were coded in terms of 
the type of attributes ascribed to the objects. Thirteen possible cate­
gories for creditable responses were delineated; table 3 lists those 
attribute categories and defines their content. Incorrect responses and 
the total number of correct responses were also tallied. The means of 
classifying responses was patterned after the Verbal Expression subtest 
of the ITPA (Kirk, McCarthy, & Kirk 1968). For each subject, the total 
number of creditable attributes mentioned in each category was deter­
mined for the MT objects, the LT objects, and for the combined group of 
20 objects used in Part I.
The manual expression portion of Part I was evaluated in terms 
of whether or not appropriate gestural responses were made, and whether 
or not these were accompanied by verbal explanation. The forced-choice 
responses (dimensional adjectives) were coded as to whether an unmarked 
adjective (score = 0) or a marked adjective (score = 1) was selected as 
characteristic of the object. If no choice was made, or if the child 
indicated that both adjectives could apply to the object, a score of 
2 was coded.
Expressive use of comparatives (Part III) was evaluated with 
reference to the number of spontaneous comparisons made (correct and 
incorrect) and the dimension specified (size, length, height, width, 
or thickness), and as to the number of correct comparisons made to 
elicitation. The receptive comprehension of comparatives was simply
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TABLE 3
CATEGORIES OF ATTRIBUTION ON PARTS I AND II
Category Criteria for Inclusion
1. Label
2. Color
3. Shape
4. Composition
5. Function
6. Action
7. Major Parts
Naming the common class to which the object 
belongs (e.g., "toy" for block or ball) or 
a specific object within a class (e.g., 
"Pine" or "Spruce" for tree).
Any reference to the specific color of the 
object or to the fact that it has color.
For multi-colored objects, credit is 
received for each color specified (e.g.,
"the ball is white with red and blue stars" 
= 3 points).
Any response making references to the gen­
eral shape of the object (e.g., round, 
curved, etc.) or to the shape of a major 
part of the object (e.g., "round cup with 
a curved handle").
Any statement as to the composition of the 
object that is not grossly incorrect (e.g., 
"a rubber ball, filled with air").
Any reference to the major purpose of the 
object (e.g., "a cup is to drink out of") 
or a generalization (e.g., "a ball is to 
play with"). Creditable responses will 
generally be expressed as a verb or a 
derivation thereof.
Reference to actions which can be performed 
upon or with the object (e.g., "climb a 
tree") secondarily to its major function 
(e.g., "pour sand with a cup"). Creditable 
responses will generally be expressed as a 
verb or a derivation thereof.
Labeling or otherwise identifying or refer- 
ting to a part of the object (e.g., "eraser, 
metal thing around it"). Any clear refer­
ence to a part of the object is acceptable 
whether or not it is named by the child.
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TABLE 3— Continued
Category Criteria for Inclusion
8. Numerosity Use of a number in describing an object or 
some part of an object (e.g., "4 corners,
1, 2, 3, bedrooms"), or the implication of 
number (e.g., "a house has lots of windows")
9. Dimension Use of one or more of the dimensional terms 
(polar adjectives) in describing the object 
or a major part of the object (e.g., "the 
ball is big; the pencil is long and thin").
10. Other Physical 
Characteristic
Any reference to texture, weight, brightness, 
or other miscellaneous characteristic of the 
object or its parts not creditable in another 
category (e.g., "the pencil has words on it").
11. Comparison Any response comparing the object to another 
object having some similarity of color, 
shape, function, composition, etc. (e.g.,
"a ball is like an orange").
12. Person, Place, 
or Thing
Any response making reference to a person, 
place, or thing commonly associated with 
the stimulus object, or which the child 
logically associates with the object because 
of his experience (e.g., "you use a pencil 
with paper; eat ice cream with a spoon").
13. Negative Responses Any response negatively stated (e.g., "it's 
not too big; I don't play with dolls").
scored as correct or incorrect and the total number of correct responses 
tallied. Part IV (verbal comparison of the LT objects) was also scored 
dichotomously and totaled.
The Piagetian reasoning tasks received both a dichotomous score 
(pass/fail) and a scale score relative to the level of concept attain­
ment (based on Stephens, Smith, Fitzgerald, Grube, Hitt, & Daly 1977).
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Point-scale scores for all but the symbolic imagery task (rotation of 
beads) were as follows:
1 = concept absent
2 = concept in transition
3 = concept attained
The symbolic imagery task was coded as follows:
1 = incorrect response
2 = correct response with no reason given
3 = correct response with reason given
Statistical Analysis
The small sample size (n = 20) precluded the use of advanced sta­
tistical procedures to analyze the data. Statistical analysis was limited 
to a series of t tests to determine differences between the blind and 
sighted groups. Vision groups were compared for differences on:
1. the Piagetian reasoning tasks
2. verbal and tactual attribution/description (Parts I and II)
a. between groups
b. between older blind and sighted
c. between younger blind and sighted
d. between younger and older blind
e. between younger and older sighted
f. between MT and LT objects for the blind and sighted
3. manual expression for the MT objects
4. expressive and receptive use of comparatives (Part III)
5. verbal comparison on the LT objects (Part IV)
On the basis of the children's performance on the conservation of 
substance task, subjects were grouped as "conservers" and "non-conservers." 
These groups were then compared (t tests) to determine if differences
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existed, as in tests #2a, 3, 4, and 5, above. In addition, t tests were 
made to compare the verbal attribution and description for the MT objects 
(Part I) with the tactual attribution and description (Part II) among the 
blind subjects and the sighted subjects.
The literature review suggested that concepts can be formed on 
several bases. Consequently, the 13 attribute categories in this study 
were combined to form three groups: (a) egocentric, combining the Com­
parisons category and the Person-Place-Thing category; (b) functional, 
comprised of the Function and Action categories; and (c) perceptual, 
representing the sum of the attributes in the Color, Shape, Major Parts, 
Numerosity, Dimension, and Physical Characteristics categories. The 
egocentric group was formed on the basis that comparisons and the men­
tion of a person, place, or thing associated with the objects would be 
more personal and related to the individual's experience. Such 
responses would, therefore, be more egocentric than references to 
functional or perceptual characteristics. Comparison across vision 
and conservation groups on these combined attribute categories were 
made (t tests) as in tests #2a, 2d, and 2e, above. Comparisons of 
verbal and tactual attribution (Parts I and II) on the basis of these 
combined attribute groups were also made.
The children's responses to the forced-choice questions of 
dimension (Part I) were subjected to analysis using the chi square 
statistic. This enabled analysis of interrelationships among the 
subjects' choices of dimensional adjectives in describing the 20
objects.
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Descriptive Analysis
Because of the essentially exploratory nature of the present 
study, the data was analyzed descriptively with regard to the type and 
quality of attribution. Any tendency toward verbalisms was noted. The 
children's responses were narratively discussed in relation to their 
performance on the Piagetian reasoning tasks. Note was also taken of 
any suggestion of nominal realism and/or animism on the part of the 
blind or sighted children.
CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
The present study was regarded as exploratory in nature owing to 
the relative lack of data regarding the early cognitive and semantic 
development of visually handicapped children. Consequently, specific 
hypotheses were not formulated at the outset, other than the general 
assumption that differences would be observed between the blind and 
sighted children on the cognitive tasks and attribution tasks as a 
result of the limitations imposed by blindness. In the absence of 
directional hypotheses, two-tailed tests of significance were used in 
all statistical procedures. Unless otherwise stated, all statistical 
comparisons were made via t tests. This chapter presents (a) a statis­
tical and descriptive analysis of the performance of the blind and 
sighted children on the cognitive tasks, and (b) statistical and 
descriptive comparisons of the blind and sighted children on the 
lexical-semantic tasks.
Cognitive Functioning
From the review of the literature on cognitive development of 
visually handicapped children, differences between the blind and the 
sighted children were expected on the reasoning tasks used in this 
study. A comparison of the group means on the dichotomous (pass/fail) 
score and the poir.t-scale score related to the level of concept
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attainment showed this to be the case. Table 4 presents the means and 
related t values for the two groups on the six cognitive variables.
TABLE 4
MEANS AND t VALUES FOR COGNITIVE TASKS
Dichotomous Score Level of Concept Attainment
Variable Group Mean t P Mean t P
Cons. Substance
Blind 0.3 2.06 .05 1.2 2.06 .05
Sighted 1.5 2.0
Term-to-term Corr.
Blind 0.7 1.13 NS 1.7 1.13 NS
Sighted 1.2 2.2
Cons. Length (Rods)
Blind 0.1 2.20 .05 1.0 2.45 .05
Sighted 1.2 1.8
Cons. Length (Ropes)
Blind 0.0 3.00 .01 1.0 3.00 .01
Sighted 1.5 2.0
Rotation of Beads
Blind 2.9 2.90 .01 8.6 3.51 .01
Sighted 4.3 12.7
Class Inclusion
Blind 0.2 2.05 NS 1.1 2.42 .05
Sighted 0.9 1.9
NOTE: n of each group ==10; 18 df for each test.
As indicated in table 4, significant differences in favor of the 
sighted group appear on the dichotomous scoring for all but two of the 
cognitive variables (term-to-term correspondence and class inclusion). 
When the groups are compared with respect to the level of concept attain­
ment, a significant difference also occurs for the class inclusion task.
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This may be explained by the fact that two of the blind children responded 
correctly to one part of the task, but on an apparently intuitive basis.
In comparison, five sighted children responded correctly to the tasks 
and indicated a genuine understanding of the classification concept by 
the explanation given for their responses.
Conservation and Concrete Reasoning
By listing the actual number of children who "passed" the assess­
ments of conservation and concrete reasoning, the group differences 
revealed by the t tests become more clear. Table 5 shows the number of 
blind and sighted children who evidenced achievement of the concepts mea­
sured.
TABLE 5
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS SHOWING CONSERVATION AND CONCRETE REASONING
Cons. of Sub. Term-to-Term Cons. Length Cons. Length
Group (Rods) (Ropes)
Blind 1 4 0 0
Sighted 5 6 4 5
Correlation of the data contained in table 5 with the ages of 
the children shows that no child from either group under 6 years of age 
is represented. This is consistent with previous research (Stephens, 
MaHaney, & McLaughlin 1972; Wadsworth 1978) which indicates that the 
average age at which these concepts are attained is 6 or 7 years. The 
sighted children, therefore, give evidence of "normal" cognitive devel­
opment along Piagetian lines: those under CA 7 years appear to be
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functioning at a preoperational level; those over CA 7 years appear to 
be operating at a concrete stage. On the other hand, when considered 
as a group, the blind children are seemingly functioning at a preopera­
tional level of development. As table 5 indicates, only one blind child 
(the oldest— CA 9 years 11 months) demonstrated conservation of sub­
stance, although this child failed to give evidence of concrete reason­
ing on the remaining conservation tasks. These findings are consistent 
with previous research showing cognitive delays in school age congeni­
tally blind children. The blind group's performance on the term-to- 
term correspondence task approximated that of the sighted group.
For purposes of analyzing the attribution data in relation to 
cognitive development, the 20 subjects were grouped as "conservers" and 
"nonconservers." This division was made on the basis of the children's 
performance on the conservation of substance task only, a classic mea­
sure of conservation. By this criteria, 6 conservers (one blind and 
five sighted children) and 14 nonconservers were identified.
Symbolic Imagery
A statistically significant difference between the groups on the 
rotation of beads task was obtained (table 4). Out of a possible 50 
responses, the blind children responded correctly 29 times whereas the 
sighted children responded correctly 43 times. When matching subjects 
were compared, the sighted child in all but two pairs had more correct 
responses than the blind child. In the remaining two instances, the 
blind and sighted partners had an identical number of correct responses. 
The data suggests that the blind children may have some difficulty
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establishing a valid mental image of novel objects and/or in maintain­
ing and mentally manipulating that image through a series of transforma­
tions .
Verbal and Tactual Attribution 
Blind Group vs. Sighted Group
Overall comparison. Table 6 presents the mean number of responses 
by the blind and sighted groups in each of the attribute categories for 
the verbal and tactual attribution tasks (protocol Parts I and II). Data 
from the verbal attribution task is broken down in this, and all subse­
quent analyses, to show the number of responses per attribute category 
for the "more tangible" (MT) objects, the "less tangible" (LT) objects, 
and the total number of verbal attributes (TVA) in each category that 
were assigned to the 20 objects.
The analysis shows a significant difference between the blind and 
sighted groups on the attribute category Color. On both the verbal (MT, 
LT, TVA) and tactual attribution tasks, the sighted children made more 
references to the color of the objects than the blind. Given the visual 
limitations of the blind children this result is not surprising. Table 6 
also shows that in describing the MT objects, the blind group made sig­
nificantly more responses than their sighted peers in the attribute 
category Person-Place-Thing.
When this data is considered with regard to the combined attribute 
groups— egocentric, functional, and perceptual attributes— the results are 
as shown in table 7. Statistical comparison of the groups revealed a sig­
nificant difference between the blind and sighted groups in the number of
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TABLE 7
MEAN NUMBER OF RESPONSES BY BLIND AND SIGHTED IN COMBINED ATTRIBUTE 
CATEGORIES ON VERBAL AND TACTUAL TASKS
Group3 Egocentric Functional Perceptual
MORE TANGIBLE
Blind 13.3* 19.6 22.6
Sighted 8.0 18.3 24.2
LESS TANGIBLE
Blind 10.1 16.9 19.5
Sighted 13.3 19.9 25.6
TOTAL VERB. ATTR.
Blind 23.4 36.5 42.3
Sighted 21.3 38.2 49.8
TACTUAL ATTR.
Blind 4.0 12.9 29.3
Sighted 5.6 13.5 45.2
an = 10 for each group 
*P £.05
egocentric attributions made to the MT objects, the blind having a higher 
group mean than the sighted. As defined in Chapter III, the egocentric 
attribute group is comprised of Comparisons and references to a Person- 
Place-Thing which the child associates with the object in question.
Since the blind group made significantly more Person-Place-Thing responses 
in their description of the MT objects (table 6), it was not surprising to 
find a similar difference for the broader egocentric attribute group. The 
blind children also used more functional attributes in their discussion of 
the objects, while the sighted group used more perceptual attributes.
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In their description of the LT objects alone, the sighted children used 
more attributes in each of the combined categories than did the blind 
group.
Other response trends evident from tables 6 and 7 (not statis­
tically significant) are as follows. The blind group made more Label, 
Dimension, and Negative Response attributions in their verbal descrip­
tions of the objects in contrast to the sighted children's greater num­
ber of responses in the attribute categories Shape, Composition, Func­
tion, and Major Parts in describing the MT and LT objects.
Certain response trends on the tactual attribution task are evi­
dent, although statistical significance is not shown. The sighted chil­
dren have higher means scores in the attribute categories Label, Shape, 
Function, Major Parts, Numerosity, Physical Characteristics, Comparisons, 
Person-Place-Thing, and in the total number of attributes. The three 
combined attribute groups (egocentric, functional, perceptual) all have 
higher mean scores for the sighted children (table 7). The blind chil­
dren, on the other hand, suggested a higher number of responses in the 
categories Composition, Action, and Dimension, and made more negative 
and incorrect responses than the sighted.
Statistically significant differences in the total number of 
attributes mentioned on each part of the verbal attribution and on the 
tactual attribution tasks between the blind group and the sighted group 
did not occur (table 6). However, it is informative to consider the 
differences in these figures between the matching age-pairs, as is 
presented in table 8. Several observations can be made from that data: 
The two oldest blind children consistently attributed more characteris­
tics to the objects than their sighted age mates. For the MT objects,
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TABLE 8
TOTAL NUMBER OF ATTRIBUTES ASSIGNED ON EACH TASK BY MATCHING AGES
Age Vision Group
Verbal
MT
Attribution 
LT TVA
Tactual Attribution
3-8 Blind 21 22 43 58
3-8 Sighted 20 23 43 46
4-5 Blind 32 16 48 32
4-5 Sighted 31 38 69 51
5-4 Blind 55 27 82 43
5-3 Sighted 24 45 69 44
6-4 Blind 78 52 130 60
6-3 Sighted 79 108 187 104
6-11 Blind 50 53 103 60
6-11 Sighted 65 76 141 82
7-3 Blind 64 44 108 67
7-3 Sighted 55 59 114 81
7-4 Blind 61 47 108 70
7-8 Sighted 60 63 123 94
8-0 Blind 69 60 129 62
8-2 Sighted 102 87 189 104
9-0 Blind 88 102 190 91
9-0 Sighted 49 69 118 90
9-11 Blind 77 93 170 83
9-9 Sighted 53 58 111 71
the differences in the number of attributes mentioned do not show a con­
sistent pattern in favor of the blind or the sighted children, but for 
the LT objects the differences per age level favor the sighted partner 
for all but the oldest two sets of children. Examination of the totals 
listed in the TVA and Tactual Attribution columns reveals a tendency
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for the sighted partner to assign more attributes to the objects than 
the blind partner.
Older blind vs. older sighted subjects. For purposes of com­
parison, the two vision groups were divided into younger and older sub­
jects, the division point being a CA of 7 years. Each subgroup, there­
fore, contained five subjects. This enabled comparison across vision 
groups by age, and across age groups by vision (see below).
Comparison of the mean scores in each attribute category for the 
older blind and sighted subjects (table 9) again shows a significantly 
greater number of references to Color by the sighted children. Also, 
the older blind children referred to an associated Person-Place-Thing 
more often than the older sighted children, the differences attaining 
statistical significance in their discussion of the MT objects. None 
of the remaining differences in mean scores achieved significance.
Table 10 shows the mean number of responses by the older blind 
and older sighted children for each of the combined attribute groups.
As indicated thereon, no statistically significant differences in the 
number of responses were found between the two groups on the verbal 
attribution tasks. The older blind children responded with more ego­
centric attributes than the older sighted, particularly for the MT 
objects. Little difference between older blind and sighted groups 
was found for the perceptual attributes for the verbal attribution 
tasks. However, on the tactual attribution task, the older sighted 
children suggested significantly more perceptual attributes for the 
objects than the older blind children.
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MEAN NUMBER OF RESPONSES IN COMBINED ATTRIBUTE CATEGORIES BY
OLDER BLIND AND SIGHTED
TABLE 10
Group3 Egocentric Functional Perceptual
MORE TANGIBLE
Blind 13.8 20.A 32.8
Sighted 7.6 21.0 32.0
LESS TANGIBLE
Blind 13.2 18.0 30.2
Sighted 11.0 22.0 29.4
TOTAL VERB. ATTR.
Blind 27.0 38.4 63.4
Sighted 18.6 43.0 61.4
TACTUAL ATTR.
Blind 3.8 11.4 42.8
Sighted 3.2 7.8 63.6*
an = 5 for each group
*p <_. 05
Younger blind vs . younger sighted subjects. The mean number of
responses on the verbal and tactual attribution tasks by the younger 
blind and sighted children is presented in table 11. A significant dif­
ference between the group means occurs on the TVA for the category Label 
indicating that the younger blind children tended to respond with an 
object or class name more often than their sighted peers. All other 
differences between the younger vision groups on the verbal attribution 
tasks are not statistically significant. It should be noted, however, 
that the sighted children responded with a larger total number of 
attributes for the LT objects and for the TVA.
5 for each group
H H f 3> o w O
O H C/3 fl> C/3 w od n
cn  w > 03 w 03 w g cn w H o
P » M F< P* P*< P* P* P » P* > c
OQ P* 00 H* w 00 P - 00 P*
& 3 > cr*3 po cr 2 o cr 3 O (3)
r t  C L H r t C L oo r t CL M rr C L PI(D H fl> (D W (D CO
C L CL CL r< C L r* [j
§ w w I
p
P*
O  VO O U> o P* O P* Label00 00ro o P> 00 oo»
Ln O Lno U>o P*o Colord* d ON ON ON P*o
p* o P-ro o o P - ro ShapeO 00 00 O ' p-o P - ON
o o XNo roo P*o Composition■P- K) o ON roro 00-o
P» P*O -fN P'Ln ON -o 0000 Functiono ro ON P^ o o ON p-
P* M P* p * P* p »U> O 00 NO P* 00 •oo Actionro ro 00ro 0000 o p*
P* P* P* P* Major Parts00 o LnO M ON p*p*
■P' o rooo O o ro oo
P* O P* o P*o o o Numerosityo ro 00p- ON p* rod
p» ro 00Ln P*P* u> p*
• Dimensionro ro P*oo 0000 ON o
no ro U>p» o o ro p * Physical
0 0  O'* d o d ON d Characteristic
P* O roro P* o P* ro Comparisonro on ON p - ON d O p*
ro P* P* p * Person
ON LO P* P» •o o
• • • • • • • • Place
0 0  ON P' P * O o P* P -
* Thing
P* On M P* o o o p* NegativeV* -*> P * 00 ON 00 00o Response
M
O n Ln O OO L n CO p* P'
O i O P* P » 00p* U ) 'O TOTAL•P- oo 00ro d o 00ro
O  O P » P* P » o o o Incorrect• •■P* P* roro O 00 ro p*
t7L
MEAN NUMBER OF RESPONSES ON VERBAL AND TACTUAL ATTRIBUTION TASKS BY YOUNGER BLIND AND SIGHTED
75
Two statistically significant differences occur on the tactual 
attribution data. The tendency for the sighted children to make greater 
reference to the Color of the objects is repeated, and the younger sighted 
children also made more responses in the Person-Place-Thing category than 
the younger blind subjects. The average for the total number of attrib­
utes assigned by the younger sighted subjects is higher than that of the 
younger blind children, though not to a statistically significant degree.
Table 12 shows the mean number of responses by the younger blind 
and younger sighted children in the three combined attribute categories.
TABLE 12
M E M  NUMBER OF RESPONSES IN COMBINED ATTRIBUTE CATEGORIES BY 
YOUNGER BLIND AND SIGHTED
Group2 Egocentric Functional Perceptual
MORE TMGIBLE
Blind 12.8 18.8 12.4
Sighted 8.4 15.6 16.4
LESS TMGIBLE
Blind 7.0 15.8 8.8
Sighted 15.6 17.8 21.8
TOTAL VERB. ATTR.
Blind 19.8 34.6 21.2
Sighted 24.0 33.4 38.2
TACTUAL ATTR.
Blind 4.2 14.4 15.8
Sighted 8.0 19.2 26.8
an = 5 for each group
No statistically significant differences between younger vision groups 
were found for the verbal or tactual attribution tasks, although the 
difference between means is large in some cases. For the MT objects,
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the younger blind children described a larger number of egocentric and 
functional attributes than their sighted peers, but fewer perceptual 
attributes. For the LT objects, however, the younger blind children 
used fewer of all three classes of attributes than the younger sighted 
children, especially egocentric and perceptual attributes. The differ­
ence in the number of perceptual attributes mentioned on the tactual 
attribution task approached significance (p = .06), favoring the 
sighted children.
Conservers vs. Nonconservers
Table 13 presents the mean number of responses on the verbal and 
tactual attribution tasks for the conservers and nonconservers. As indi­
cated thereon, the only statistically significant difference in attribu­
tion for the MT objects is in the category Major Parts: Conservers made 
significantly more references to parts of the objects than nonconservers. 
This difference is also statistically significant (in the same direction) 
for the TVA and the tactual attribution task. For the LT objects, the 
conservers again made more responses of this nature, but not to a sta­
tistically significant degree. A significant difference in favor of the 
conservers was found on the tactual attribution task for the Physical 
Characteristics category.
Conservers also responded with significantly more color attributes 
on the TVA and tactual attribution tasks. However, since five of the six 
conservers were sighted children, this finding is probably attributable 
to vision rather than to conservation.
The total number of responses to the tactual attribution task 
differs significantly between conservers and nonconservers, the
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conservers having the higher number. Similarly, on each part of the ver 
bal attribution task (MT, LT, TVA), the total number of responses was 
higher for the conservers, although the differences were not significant 
Table 13 also shows a significantly higher number of incorrect attribu­
tions by the nonconservers on the verbal attribution task (TVA).
Comparison of conservers and nonconservers on the combined 
attribute groups (egocentric, functional, and perceptual) is shown in 
table 14. A statistically significant difference is found on the tac­
tual attribution task in the perceptual attribute group, conservers
TABLE 14
MEAN NUMBER OF RESPONSES IN COMBINED ATTRIBUTE CATEGORIES
BY CONSERVATION GROUP
Group n Egocentric Functional Perceptual
MORE TANGIBLE
Conserv. 6 8.5 21.5 32.3
Noncons. 14 11.6 17.9 19.4
LESS TANGIBLE
Conserv. 6 10.7 21.7 31.5
Noncons. 14 12.1 17.0 18.7
TOTAL VERB. ATTR. 
Conserv. 6 19.2 43.2 63.8
Noncons. 14 23.7 38.9 38.4
TACTUAL ATTR.
Conserv. 6 3.2 9.8 59.7*
Noncons. 14 5.5 14.6 24.6
*p £.01
having the higher mean. As the table indicates, the conservers had 
higher mean scores in the functional and perceptual attribute groups
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on each portion of the verbal attribution task (MT, LT, TVA). Noncon- 
servers, however, gave more functional attribute responses on the tac­
tual attribution task than conservers. Nonconservers also gave more 
egocentric attribute responses for both the verbal and the tactual 
attribution tasks, but not to a statistically significant degree.
Comparisons over Age
Younger vs older blind children. The mean number of responses 
for the verbal and tactual attribution tasks for the two age groups of 
blind children (CA less than 7 years; CA greater than 7 years) are given 
in table 15. Statistical comparison of the groups revealed several sig­
nificant differences, all in favor of the older blind children. For the 
MT objects, the number of responses by the older blind children is sig­
nificantly higher in the categories Composition and Dimension. In addi­
tion, the difference in total number of attributes assigned to the MT 
objects approached significance (p =* .06). The difference between age 
groups in the total number of attributes used does attain statistical 
significance for the LT, TVA, and tactual attribution tasks; in each 
instance, the older blind children have the higher number of responses.
Although statistically significant differences did not occur in 
each attribute category, there is a definite trend for the older blind 
to ascribe a greater variety of attributes to the objects. The number 
of attributions by the older blind children exceeded that of the younger 
blind in the categories Color, Shape, Composition, Action, Major Parts, 
Numerosity, Dimension, Physical Characteristics, and Person-Place-Thing 
for both the MT and LT objects.
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On the TVA, significant differences between the older and younger 
blind children were found in the categories Shape, Composition, Dimen­
sion, all in favor of the older group. Significant differences in the 
same direction were found on the tactual attribution task in the cate­
gories Shape, Composition, and Physical Characteristics.
Table 16 lists the means for the younger and older blind children 
for the three combined attribute groups. The older blind children show a 
higher mean score in all three attribute groups on the verbal attribution
TABLE 16
MEAN NUMBER OF RESPONSES IN COMBINED ATTRIBUTE CATEGORIES BETWEEN
YOUNGER AND OLDER BLIND CHILDREN
Group3 Egocentric Functional Perceptual
MORE TANGIBLE
Younger 12.8 18.8 12.4
Older 13.8 20.4 32.8**
LESS TANGIBLE
Younger 7.0 15.8 8.8
Older 13.2* * 18.0 30.2
TOTAL VERB. ATTR.
Younger 19.8 34.6 21.2
Older 27.0 38.4 63.4*
TACTUAL ATTR.
Younger 4.2 14.4 15.8
Older 3.8 11.4 42.8**
an = 5 for each group
*p <_. 05
**p <_.01
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task (MT, LT, TVA). The differences between means is statistically 
significant in the egocentric attribute group for the LT objects, and 
in the perceptual attribute group for the MT objects and the TVA. The 
older blind children also have a significantly higher number of percep­
tual attribute responses on the tactual attribution task. The younger 
blind children have a higher, but not statistically different, number 
of responses on the tactual attribution task in the egocentric and func­
tional attribute groups.
Younger vs. older sighted children. Table 17 lists the mean 
number of responses to the verbal and tactual attribution tasks by the 
younger and older sighted children. The number of attributes ascribed 
to the MT objects by the older group in the Action and Major Parts cate­
gories was significantly different from that of the younger sighted 
children, in favor of the older subjects. For the LT objects, the dif­
ference between groups was significant in the Label and Physical Charac­
teristics categories (also in favor of the older children). No statis­
tically significant differences were found for the TVA. The total number 
of attributes assigned to the objects on the verbal attribution task (MT, 
LT, TVA) and on the tactual attribution task was higher for the older 
sighted children.
Comparison of the groups on the tactual attribution task revealed 
a statistically significant difference in several attribute categories. 
The older sighted children made significantly more responses in the 
Color, Major Parts, and Dimension categories. Significant differences 
in favor of the younger sighted children occurred in the categories 
Function, Action, and Person-Place-Thing.
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Table 18 lists the means for the younger and older sighted chilr- 
dren for the three combined attribute categories. No statistically sig­
nificant differences were found for any of the verbal attribution data 
(MT, LT, TVA). However, the younger sighted children had a higher number 
of egocentric attributes on the verbal attribution task than the older 
children. This pattern is reversed for the functional and perceptual 
attribute groups in which the older sighted had a higher number of 
responses.
TABLE 18
MEAN NUMBER OF RESPONSES IN COMBINED ATTRIBUTE CATEGORIES BY YOUNGER
AND OLDER SIGHTED CHILDREN
Group3 Egocentric Functional Perceptual
MORE TANGIBLE
Younger 8.4 15.6 16.4
Older 7.6 21.0 32.0
LESS TANGIBLE
Younger 15.6 17.8 21.8
Older 11.0 22.0 22.0
TOTAL VERB. ATTR.
Younger 24.0 33.4 38.2
Older 18.6 43.0 61.4
TACTUAL ATTR.
Younger 8.0** 19.2** 26.8
Older 3.2 7.8 63.6**
an = 5 for each group
**p £.01
Statistically significant differences for the three combined 
attribute groups on the tactual attribution task were found (table 18). 
For the egocentric and functional attribute groups, the younger sighted
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children had a significantly higher number of responses. The older 
sighted children, on the other hand, had a significantly higher number 
of perceptual attribute responses.
More Tangible vs. Less Tangible 
Object Attribution
Table 19 compares the mean number of attribution responses by 
the blind and the sighted children to the MT and LT objects. Also listed 
are the means for the older blind and sighted groups and for the younger 
blind and sighted groups. As indicated thereon, both the blind and the 
sighted children made significantly more responses in the Shape category 
in their discussion of the MT objects than when describing the LT objects. 
When the scores are compared by age groups, it becomes evident that it was 
the older blind and sighted children who contributed most to this differ­
ence.
Also shown in table 19 is the fact that the younger blind chil­
dren made significantly more Comparisons when dealing with the MT objects 
than they did with the LT objects. In addition, the MT objects drew more 
attributions by the blind in the categories Composition, Function, Action, 
Dimension, Physical Characteristics, Person-Place-Thing, and the total 
number of attributes. The LT objects drew more attributions from the 
categories Label, Color, Major Parts, and Numerosity, as well as more 
negative and incorrect responses.
The older sighted children remarked about the Physical Character­
istics of the MT objects significantly more than they did for the LT 
objects. The sighted group as a whole made significantly more references 
to a Person-Place-Thing in association with the LT objects than with the 
MT objects, however.
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Although the differences between the total number of attributes 
did not reach statistical significance, the blind children made a higher 
number of attributions to the MT objects than they did to the LT objects. 
Contrariwise, the sighted children had a higher total number of attribu­
tions for the LT than MT objects.
Verbal Attribution vs.
Tactual Attribution
Blind subjects. One purpose of the present study was to compare 
and contrast attribution based on verbal recall with attribution based on 
tactual exploration. Table 20 shows the mean number of responses by the 
blind children on the verbal attribution— more tangible task (protocol 
Part I) and on the tactual attribution task (protocol Part II). Also 
presented in Table 20 is a breakdown of this data by age groups (younger 
and older blind). In each instance, a statistically significant differ­
ence was obtained in the Label, Function, and Person-Place-Thing cate­
gories. However, the fact that the blind children of both age groups 
referred more often to the class to which the object belonged during 
the tactual attribution task is the result of their having to identify 
the object, and can be dismissed as incidental to the task itself. On 
the other hand, more frequent reference was made to the specific func­
tion or purpose of the object and to a person, place, or thing which 
they associated with the object, during the verbal task than was the 
case during tactual exploration. Also, when considering the entire 
group of blind children, a statistically significant difference was 
found in the Comparison category, more responses of this nature being 
made during the verbal task.
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Table 21 translates this data into the three combined attribute 
groups. The number of egocentric attributes differs significantly in 
favor of verbal attribution for both age levels of blind children.
TABLE 21
MEAN NUMBER OF VERBAL AND TACTUAL RESPONSES IN COMBINED ATTRIBUTE
CATEGORIES BY BLIND CHILDREN
Task n Egocentric Functional Perceptual
ALL BLIND SUBJECTS
Verbal 10 13.3*** 19.6** 22.6
Tactual 10 4.0 12.9 29.3
OLDER BLIND SUBJ.
Verbal 5 13.8** 20.4 32.8
Tactual 5 3.8 11.4 42.8
YOUNGER BLIND SUBJ.
Verbal 5 12.8* * 18.8 12.4
Tactual 5 4.2 14.4 15.8
*p £.05
**p <,.01
***p <,.001
Also, a significant difference in the mean number of functional attributes 
used during the verbal task was evident when the group is considered as a 
whole. The mean number of functional attributes given by the younger
J J
blind subjects was higher for the verbal recall portion than for the tac­
tual examination portion of the interview, though the difference does not 
achieve statistical significance. A greater number of perceptual attrib­
utes was shown for the tactual attribution task for both age levels, but 
this, too, was not statistically significant.
90
Sighted subjects. Similar observations can be made from the data 
on the sighted children shown in tables 22 and 23. The significantly 
higher number of Label attributes mentioned during the tactual attribu­
tion task is the result of their having to identify the objects, and can 
be dismissed as being incidental to the task itself. Table 22 shows that 
the older sighted children remarked about the Color of the objects sig­
nificantly more often during the tactual exploration than during verbal 
recall (tactual examination of the objects was, of course, accompanied 
by visual examination by the sighted subjects).
The number of Function and Action responses by the older sighted 
children during the verbal recall portion of the interview was signifi­
cantly higher than the number made during tactual exploration. The 
younger sighted children, on the other hand, showed a significantly dif­
ferent number of Action responses during tactual exploration. Further 
significant differences in favor of tactual exploration were obtained 
for the older sighted children in the categories Major Parts, Numerosity, 
and Physical Characteristics. Finally, the total number of attributes 
assigned to the objects by all the sighted children was significantly 
different on the cactual attribution than on the verbal attribution task, 
the higher number being for tactual attribution.
Table 23 shows a significant difference in the number of percep­
tual attributes mentioned by the older sighted children between tactual 
and verbal tasks. The younger sighted children gave more perceptual 
attribute responses on the tactual task also, but not to a significant 
degree. The older sighted children showed a significantly higher num­
ber of functional responses on the verbal attribution task than on the
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tactual task. A large number of egocentric attributes for the verbal 
task was shown for both age groups of sighted children.
TABLE 23
MEAN NUMBER OF VERBAL AND TACTUAL RESPONSES IN COMBINED ATTRIBUTE
CATEGORIES BY SIGHTED CHILDREN
Group n Egocentric Functional Perceptual
ALL SIGHTED SUBJ.
Verbal 10 8.0 18.3 24.2
Tactual 10 5.6 13.5 45.2*
OLDER SIGHTED SUBJ.
Verbal 5 7.6 21.0** 32.0
Tactual 5 3.2 7.8 63.6**
YOUNGER SIGHTED SUBJ.
Verbal 5 8.4 15.6 16.4
Tactual 5 8.0 19.2 26.8
*p 1.05
**p 1.01
Qualitative Analysis of Verbal 
Attribution Data
Table 24 lists examples of the responses in the major attribute 
categories made by the blind children on the verbal attribution and 
description task (protocol Part I). When compared with the examples of 
responses by the sighted children given in table 25, obvious similar­
ities are evident. Many of the descriptive attributes are identical 
for both vision groups. A common experience among the blind and sighted 
is reflected by the descriptors in the Function and Action categories, 
for both MT and LT objects. The duplication of Action responses for 
BALL, ROPE, SPOON, YARD, and HOUSE provide examples of this trend.
TABLE 24
SELECTED RESPONSES ON VERBAL ATTRIBUTION TASK BY BLIND CHILDREN
Object Label Color Shape Composition Function Action
Major
Parts
Physical
Character­
istic Comparison
Person-Place 
or Thing
BLOCK bristle
blocks
street
colors square
round
circle
"bridge"
shapes
wood
plastic
cordoroy
play with 
build
fall down 
pound 
stand up 
lay down 
sleep on 
kiss
make things 
put together 
set things on
corners hard 
holes 
su»otn 
rough 
8of t
chimney
2-legged
table
towers
baby
nail
buildings
PENCIL round
straight
wood
rubber
writing
erase
sharpen 
make things 
stand up 
roll
point
eraser
sharp
thing
sharp
hard
crayons 
ink pen 
leg
drawings
hand
paper
BALL baseball
hardball
round rubber
air
inside
play with dribble 
roll hit 
throw 
bounce 
catch 
break 
windows
holes
bell
inside
hard
soft
oranges basketball
clay
players
windows
ROPE jump
rope
straight
round
play with jump tie 
swing 
climb 
pull
ends bends
soft
wire bad guys 
dog
SPOON round
flat
metal eat with scoop 
play stir 
drop 
dish up 
pick up 
make toy
handle 
round point 
stick 
end
David 
ice cream 
silverware 
drawer 
soup food 
dirt Jello
DOLL toy
Cl Joe 
Snuggles 
baby dolly 
Drowsy
play with push dress 
change hold 
put in doll 
house 
put in 
cradle 
feed
pull string
feet
head
hair
body
eyes
nose
mouth
arms'
person toybox
jammies
girls
batteries
doll house
cradle
bottle
clothes
TABLE 2A— Continued
Object
KEY
BRUSH
CUP
COMB
TREE
HOUSE
Physical
Major Character­ Person-Place
Label Color Shape Composition Function Action Parts istics Comparison or Thing
housekey 
car key
silver pointed
round
flat
different
shapes
metal lock/unlock
open
start cars 
put it in 
turn it 
play with 
get in house
round point 
lo.ig point 
hole 
end
pointy
things
tip
bottom
"sounds" spoon
pole
"head"
cars doors
house truck
Benji-Bug
key ring
chain string
rope
trunk
tooth­
brush
hair­
brush
flat brush hair 
brush floor 
brush teeth 
brush off 
comb hair
hold it 
whip
bristles
handle
prickles
pointy
things
stick
pointed combs
bristle
patch
hair floor 
shampooer 
teeth kids 
windows 
doll's teeth
round drink put stuff in 
tips over 
pour into 
scoop play
handle
bottom
"thing"
(inside)
sides
smooth water milk 
Juice coffee 
ice sand 
rootbeer float 
covers
straight comb hair makes hair 
flat
put water on 
get snarls 
out
teeth 
handle 
prickles 
stick 
straight 
things 
top side 
bottom
pointy
curvy
rough
smooth
brush hair
water
brush
Spruce
Pine
Evergreen
Christmas
tree
green
brown
round it grows climb saw 
pick apples 
put decor­
ations on 
cut down 
look at 
live on 
make fire­
wood
seeds
apples
branches
bark
leaves
needles
pine
cones
smells garden
hose
Christmas 
decorations 
presents 
ground 
bird's nest 
tree house 
outside 
squirrels
haunted
house
farm
house
colors wood living in sleep in 
be warm in 
paint cook 
hide in 
sit in
siding 
roof LR 
bedrooms 
kitchen 
hallway 
rooms
pretty cage stairs tables 
couches rugs 
beds toys 
Stacy's
TABLE 2U— Continued
Physical
Major Character­ Person-Place
Object Libel Color Shape Composition Function Action Parts istics Comparison or Thing
CAR machine colors rectangle metal drive in 
ride in
sit in 
paint 
go places
seat belt 
wheels tires 
motor door 
windows 
lights
steering wheels 
battery heaters
hoi*?e gas people 
keys
YARD backdoor square wooden to go in 
and out 
keep rain 
out
keep it 
warm
going inside 
and outside
close
break
shutting
swinging
locking
stop
handle
knob
hinge
screw
painted screen closet 
bedroom 
bathroom 
Janet's room
BUS schoolbus color
black
yellow
ride in 
drive 
take to 
school
sit in
pick up kids 
open and 
close 
windows
steps
seats
windows
door
wheel
painted car
van
school people 
Grover (story) 
bus driver 
kids
WALL white
colors
wood
plaster
hold up 
roof, house 
keeps house 
together 
keeps it warm 
so rain won't 
come in 
so won't fall 
into other's 
house
put paper on 
put smoke 
alarms on 
trail along 
stand by 
lean on
hard
painted
door wallpaper 
smoke alarm 
house 
roof
BUILD­
ING
house
store
apartment
building
church
building
brick buy stuff 
live in 
go into 
look around 
walk in 
eat in 
check out 
groceries
doors
walls
roof
upstairs
basement
celling
bathroom
floor
hard house chairs
TABLE 24— Continued
Object Label Color Shape Composition Function Action
BUSH green it grows pricks you 
scratch you 
get stuck In 
pick berries 
pull up
STREET road square concrete drive on 
walk on
go across 
play in
Major
Parts
Physical
Character­
istics Comparison
Person-Place 
or Thing
brambles
leaves
stem
branches
prickles
heavy tree garden
plants
flowers
berries
snow
lilacs
side rough driveway people
comers bumpy yard cars trucks 
house 
buses 
railroads
TABLE 25
SELECTED RESPONSES ON VERBAL ATTRIBUTION TASK BY SIGHTED CHILDREN
Physical
Major Character­ Person-Place
Object Label Color Shape Composition Function Action Parts istics Comparison or Thing
BLOCK toy colorful
green
colored
square
round
triangle
rectangle
shapes
wooden play with 
build
make things 
pretend with 
gets painted
sides
corners
hard
some have 
letters or 
numbers on
tower
towns
garage
buildings
PENCIL orange 
black 
yellow 
red blue 
colors
round
flat
wood
metal
write
erase
draw
sharpen 
take home 
write and 
remember 
can break
eraser
lead
pointed end 
top
pointed paper 
bad marks
BALL pink
different
colors
circle
round
rubber play with bounce 
throw roll 
catch hit
decorated foot ball 
air
ROPE Jump rope 
skipping 
rope 
lasso
brown
different
colors
round strings
together
make lasso pulling 
Jump skip 
make loops 
twirl tie 
twist cut 
hold things 
together 
climb
strings
ends
(handles)
strong cowboys 
Indians 
tree branches 
horses
SPOON silver round 
curved 
half way 
like a 
ball
metal eat with pounding 
dig scoop 
play bend 
dish up
handle 
end to 
dish up 
stick
smooth
"hump"
"bowl" food
dirt
sand
DOLL dummy 
rag doll
plastic play with dress walk 
put in 
cradle 
hug throw 
pretend 
cuddle 
sleep with
eyes legs 
nose feet 
ears head 
arms face 
stomach
welded
together
happy
face
person
people
baby
"us"
cradle
Heidi
batteries
girls
KEY gold
brown
silver
round metal lock
unlock
fit into door 
and turn 
play with 
start car
"shapes" 
stick part 
top
bottom
weird
designs
grooves
shiny
doors house 
windows car 
key hole 
people
TABLE 25— Continued
Object Label Color Shape Composition Function
LRUSK tooth
brush
paint
brush
pink
white
black
"woody"
colors
plastic
metal
brush hair 
brush clothes 
scrub 
paint
CUP colors round 
circle 
goes way 
down
plastic
glass
drink
COMB silver
black
straight
round
slanted
plastic combing
TREE brown
green
wood it grows 
makes house 
pretty
make beauti­
ful
HOUSE colors
green
white
yellow
brown
square bricks
wood
glass
cement
rocks
live in 
gets people 
nice & warm 
stay in 
when cold
CAR yellow
green
colored
metal driving 
riding in
steer sit 
sleep 
go places 
it can move 
fool around
Physical
Major Character- Person-Place
Action Parts istlcs Comparison or Thing
get tangles 
out
stick in 
paint 
stick in 
toothpaste
bristles 
handle 
hairy things 
plastic 
around
"face" on it
decorations
soft
hard
comb
fork
hair teeth
bathtub
clothes
paint plctrre
toothpaste
dog
hold it 
put stuff in 
dig pour 
fill with 
water
handles
top
bottom
pictures 
"things" 
on it 
"hole" in 
top
bowl water dirt 
milk Juice 
paintbrush
get tangles 
out
bristles 
sticks 
prickles 
pointy things 
edge end
sharp
curved
pointy
brush
fork
hair 
Jason's 
Pud (a dog)
sit in 
climb 
chop down 
get apples 
look at 
have picnic 
under
birds in it 
swing play
leaves
stump
roots
bark
trunk
branches
shade plants
"hair"
(leaves)
apples birds 
houses nest 
fire bugs 
tree house
play sleep 
watch TV 
cook, eat in 
paint 
get into 
mischief
windows
door
roof
upstairs
downstairs
rooms
walls
cold or 
hot inside
people TV 
toys sofa 
furniture 
dishes table 
lamps pictures
engine 
steering 
wheel 
fan radio 
seats doors 
glove com­
partment 
muffler
box people trips
groceries
Grandma's
VOoo
TABLE 25— Continued
O b je c t
YARD
DOOR
BUS
WALL
BUILD­
ING
BUSH
STREET
Physical
Label Color Shape Composition Function Action
Major
Parts
Character­
istics Comparison
Person-Place 
or Thing
acres
space
backyard
frontyard
green play in run walk 
drive on 
planting 
bushes 
ride horse 
slide rake
grass weeds 
dirt hills
sidewalk house trees 
football golf 
flowers bushes 
gate swing set 
rabbits table 
spri.ikler slide
brown rectangle
long
wood
glass
going In and 
out
getting into 
a house 
walk through 
keep out cold
opening and 
closing 
swing slam 
put stuff on 
lock paint
knob
handle
window
designs 
on it
house
kids
color
black
yellow
long
square
metal ride in 
drive
take you to 
school 
getting 
around
sit in 
holds kids 
pay to get on
seats
windows
doors
wheels
numbers 
on it 
"B-U-S" 
on it 
horrible 
horn
car
truck
people driver 
uptown school 
cities home 
kids
orange
yellow
green
blue
shapes
square
cement
wood
bricks
privacy 
keep out 
bad guys 
keeps house 
from house 
divides 
places 
keeps house 
together
painting 
bang on 
hang things 
hammer 
lean against 
put phone on
inside on each 
side of 
room
paper school house 
chalkboard 
wallpaper 
phone clock 
pictures room
clinic
place
metal
brick
live, work, 
play, walk in 
go school in 
sleep in 
stay over in
windows
offices painted house
"eyes"
(windows)
school
people doctors 
storages 
Grandma's 
Day Care
green
brown
grows 
to look 
pretty 
for "looks" 
to make 
yard pretty
hide
pull
berries off 
birds climb 
& make nest 
play around 
pick flowers 
bump into & 
get hurt
branches 
leaves 
stems 
bark 
flovers
pretty
prickly
trees cherries 
birds nest 
weeds roses 
flowers 
yard 
cats
highway graybrown
blackyellowwhite
any shape flat tarcement
rocks
riding on driving on 
cars go on
walk over play in 
ride bikes play catch Jump rope
lines sidewalk trafficcars
bikes
Job
cross
VOVO
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Similar concepts regarding the purpose of the objects is also evident, 
as illustrated by these responses regarding WALL:
Sighted: "to keep house from house"
"divides places"
Blind: "so you won't fall into another person's house"
The description of the Major Parts of some of the objects is also more 
alike than dissimilar between vision groups. This fact is quite evident 
in the responses to the words PENCIL, CAR, TREE, and DOLL.
An obvious difference between the blind and the sighted is in 
the reference to Color. The difference in the number of such responses 
was found to be statistically significant in favor of the sighted. 
Examination of the actual responses nade by the blind children reveals 
that their Color responses were primarily references to the fact that 
the object has color, rather than mention of the specific colors as was 
the case with the sighted children. In those instances when a specific 
color was attributed to an object by the blind group, the color term 
was most often given by the one blind child who had some color vision.
The blind group gave more responses in the Label category, sev­
eral of which appear to reflect their personal experience; for example, 
the mention of "bristle blocks," "Christmas trees," "farm house," and 
specific dolls. One blind child recognized that BLOCK and YARD have 
more than one meaning and offered both. None of the sighted children 
made similar observations.
The tendency of the blind children to relate the stimulus objects 
to their personal experience is also seen in their reference to siblings 
("David," "Janet"), to particular toys (the "cordoroy and foam" block one 
child used "to sleep with" and "to kiss"), and in the comment that a WALL
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can be used for trailing. Such personal touches were not altogether 
absent from the responses of the sighted children, but occurred more 
frequently in the comments of the blind children.
The Physical Characteristics of the various objects suggested by 
the blind children were primarily of a textural nature: "hard," "soft," 
"rough," "smooth," "bumpy," "curvy," etc. By contrast, the sighted chil­
dren not only U3ed such textural terms but also mentioned visual charac­
teristics such as "decorations," "designs," "happy face," "letters," etc. 
One blind child also referred to the "smell" of a TREE, a characteristic 
which was not mentioned by any of the sighted children. The influence 
of vision on the sighted children's concept of some of the objects can 
be seen in such responses as these for TREE and BUSH: "for looks," "to 
make the yard pretty," "to make the house beautiful."
The blind children made more Comparisons in describing the objects 
than the sighted children. Evaluation of the comparisons shows that they 
tended to be made on the basis of the shape and/or function of the objects, 
as in the following examples:
BALL: "an orange"
PENCIL: "crayons," "an ink pen," "a leg"
HOUSE: "a cage"
WALL; "a door"
CAR: "a house"
TREE: "a garden hose" (presumably 
branch or to a young tree)
a reference to a tree
The sighted children's reference to using a DOLL and BLOCK for 
"pretend" play was not paralleled in the responses of the blind children. 
This may correspond to the findings of other research that the play 
behavior of congenitally blind children is less imaginative and more 
concrete.
\
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In all, the number of "visual" responses by the blind children 
formed a very small percentage of their total number of attributions 
(3%). These responses include the references to color and the visually 
oriented attributions "pretty," "stays green," and "painted."
Qualitative Analysis of Tactual 
Attribution Data
Table 26 presents examples of the responses by the blind children 
in selected attribute categories on the tactual attribution task for com­
parison with responses by the sighted children as presented in table 27. 
When these responses are contrasted, similar observations can be made as 
those discussed above for the verbal attribution data. Similarities of 
experiences between vision groups are reflected in many of the Actions 
and Major Parts suggested by the children. Aside from the duplication 
of responses in the Action category, there appears to be a subtle differ­
ence between vision groups. The actions mentioned by the blind group can 
be considered more concrete, often actions which can be performed with or 
upon the objects. For example,
BLOCK: "twirl it," "turn it," "it can slip across the table"
PENCIL: "roll it," "it can make noise"
CUP: "it can turn over," "you can hit the table with it"
COMB: "twirl it," "push it," "takes out snarls"
In contrast, the responses of the sighted children, where they differed
from those of the blind, seemed to be more abstract:
BLOCK: "saw it up," "make holes in it"
COMB: "put it in the bathroom," "trap things"
ROPE: "put it in the house," "pretend it's a snake"
SPOON: "bend it"
The influence or vision was also evident in the Action responses of the 
sighted children. For example,
t
TABLE 26
SELECTED RESPONSES ON TACTUAL ATTRIBUTION TASK BY BLIND CHILDREN
Object Label Color Shape Composition Function Action
Major
Parts
Physical
Character­
istics Comparison
Person-Place 
or Thing
BLOCK block brown square wood
plastic
build 
play with
makes noise 
twirl turn 
can slip 
across table 
put in box
sides
edges
top
points
corners
hard
slippery
sharp
pointy
smooth
like a board
SPOON spoon
tool
silver round
flat
tin
metal
eat with scoop play 
make noise 
hit with it 
dig with it 
put stuff on 
stir hold
handle
top
end
pointed
smooth
bends
rough
"goes in a little 
things punched 
in it
David
porridge
food
PENCIL pencil yellow wood draw
erase
write
mark
carry in 
pocket 
make noise 
roll hit 
tickle it
eraser
point
lead
"corners"
hard rolls 
pointy 
sharp flat 
flat (side) 
lines (edges) 
name on it
like a 
spoon
books
school
KEY key silver round
"heart"
metal lock stick in door 
make noise 
hit table 
drive with it 
start things
hole
side
teeth
top
hard
rough
smooth
curvy
pointy
stick door
car
doorknob
DOLL doll
girl
baby
round plastic
cotton
walk stand 
brush hair 
pull
feet head 
hair legs 
hands arms 
shirt
shoes neck 
tummy toes 
ears mouth 
clothes
dressed 
falling 
apart 
hard soft 
arms move 
wiggles
CUP cup
glass
white circle
round
plastic drink put tea in 
make noise 
turn over 
hit table
handle
inside
back
bottom
hole
hard
clean
hollowed
tea
milk
juice
water
spill pour 
echoes
stand
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TABLE 26— Continued
Physical
Major Character- Person-Plac2Object Label Color Shape Composition Function Action Parts Istlcs Comparison or Thing
BALL ball white round rubber 
air filled
play with throw roll 
bounce spin 
dribble 
catch kick
crack
thing
(seam)
80f t 
hard 
striped 
stuffed
orange
COMB comb blue plastic comb hair 
brush
make noise 
take out 
snarls 
twirl push
teeth
points
bristles
platform
"line"
(back)
pointy
curved
braille
line
rough
smooth
hair
BRUSH brush
big
comb
black
white
plastic brush
hair
make hair 
flat
put water on 
make noise 
beat
prickles 
bristles 
handle 
back top 
platform
sharp
hard
smooth
rough
says
something
curvy
hair
ROPE rope
jumping
rope
make knots 
tie it 
make loops 
jump it
tape
ends
smooth
soft
furry
bends
"lines"
people
104
TABLE 27
SELECTED RESPONSES ON TACTUAL ATTRIBUTION TASK BY SIGHTED CHILDREN
Object Label Color Shape Composition Function
BLOCK block tan
"woody"
square
diamond
wood build 
play with 
make
something
SPOON spoon silver
light
color
round
circle
oval
straight
curved
metal eat with
PENCIL pencil black
silver
yellow
tan
reddish
woody
round
straight
wood
metal
write
draw
KEY key silver
light
color
"flower" metal unlock
DOLL Barbie
Marie
dummy
doll
red
brown
yellow
peach
kind of 
rubber 
like
play with
Physical
Action
Major
Parts
Character­
istics Comparison
Person-Place 
or Thing
saw up 
make holes 
paint
make noise 
make grooves
corners
sides
bottom
top
edges
sharp
smooth
half circles 
(grain) 
spots
rough hard 
straight
tower 
garages 
houses 
pet ants
wash it 
scoop soup 
bend hold 
dig
bottom 
part you 
eat with 
part you 
hold
curved part
shiny bump 
words on it 
decorations 
smooth 
see self in
80Up
sand
meatballs
put in 
drawer 
make things 
make stuff 
disappear
eraser 
lead end 
metal part 
bottom 
top
painted 
words on it 
numbers on it 
smooth pretty 
sharpened
open door 
put around 
neck 
turn
start cars 
stick In 
door
hole
grooves
lines
bumps
sides
back
sharp
shiny
see self in 
designs 
smooth 
words on it 
bumpy 
different 
shapes
mountain
leaf
door windows
latch
house
moves 
bring 
outside 
can smile 
eyes open 
and shut 
rattles 
can make her 
walk
nose hair
mouth
eyes feet
lips arms
legs
blouse
skirt
sweater
eyelashes
80f t 
bright 
smooth 
arms move 
pretty
human
person
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TABLE 27— Continued
Object Label Color Shape Composition Function Action
Major
Parts
Physical
Character­
istic!: Comparison
Person-Place 
or Thing
CUP cup
mug
Snoopy
Cup
white
black
round
square
plastic drink wash play 
po.ur
put coffee 
In
handle
holes
side
top
Snoony
Woodstock
pictures
deep words on
smooth
shiny
milk
coffee
water
BALL ball colors
red
blue
white
round rubber play with bounce 
throw roll 
catch golf 
juggle 
put Inside 
house
crack
line
(seam)
top
bottom 
spot for air 
to go In
sunshines on 
it
lightnings on 
It
words on it
smooth
decorations
air
house
wall
floor
COMB co mb black curved comb hair 
brush 
hair
wash It 
put It In 
bathroom 
scratch 
"trap" 
things
teeth
bristles
prickles
sticks
front
line
unbreakable 
words on it 
circles on it 
one tooth is 
broken 
smooth 
painted
fork hair
bathroom
BRUSH brush
ladles
conb
black
blue
white
orange
gold red
colors
roundish plastic brush 
comb hair
bristles 
points 
sticks 
pad back 
black 
things 
bottom top
designs 
flowers 
missing a 
bristle 
smooth 
pretty 
words on it 
hump
spoon hair
ROPE rope
skipping
rope
white strings can tape It 
Jump tie 
put In house 
skip swing 
make loops 
pretend smake
tape
"ropes"
tight
smooth
shiny
bumps
puffy
(ends)
snake
"washer"
house
horses
BLOCK: "paint it"
DOLL: "she can smile," "her eyes open and shut"
The blind children's reliance on tactual input could be seen in 
their responses in the categories Physical Characteristics and Comparison. 
As on the verbal attribution task, these responses related primarily to 
textural characteristics ("smooth," "pointy," "goes in a little") and to 
shape (BLOCK: "like a board"; BALL: "an orange"). The reference by one 
blind child to the PENCIL'S having a "name on it" was also based on tac­
tual examination, although it is possible that the child may have been 
told at some time that a pencil often has words imprinted on it.
In contrast, the domination of visual input for the sighted was 
profoundly evident in their responses in several categories. For example:
Label: "Snoopy cup," "Marie doll," "Barbie doll"
Shape: "flower," "leaf," "mountain"
Physical Characteristics: "shiny," "words on it,"
"decorations," "see self in it," "missing bristles"
The use of visual terminology by the blind was minimal on the 
tactual attribution task (2%). Such terms were limited to Color and 
the Physical Characteristics "clean" and "striped." The blind child 
who had some color vision was responsible for many of the visually 
oriented responses.
Nominal Realism and Animism
In seeking to assess the children's concept of the objects during 
the verbal attribution portion of the interview, the subjects were asked 
to respond to a series of questions dealing with the origin and meaning 
of the object's name, nominal realism, and animism. Five MT and five LT 
objects were included in this analysis. The type of data gathered did 
not lend itself to statistical analysis; therefore, examples of the
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responses are listed in tables 28 and 29, and the following summary dis­
cussion is presented.
Origin of Names
Table 28 shows some of the responses the blind and sighted chil­
dren made to the question "Why is it called a _____?" Many of the chil­
dren from both vision groups simply replied, "I don't know" or made no 
response at all. Of the responses that were obtained, there appeared 
to be little difference between the thinking of the blind and the 
sighted children.
The types of responses given can be classified according to the 
same attribute categories used in scoring the verbal and tactual attribu­
tion data. The most frequent response made for the blind children was 
to express the reason for an object's name in terms of its Function or 
an Action involving the object. For example,
BALL: "so you can play with it"
KEY: "because it unlocks doors"
TREE: "cause you plant it"
CAR: "so you can ride in it"
Mention of the Major Parts as the reason for the object's name was also 
common for the blind children (HOUSE: "because it has rooms"), as was 
attributing the name to a Physical Characteristic of the object CTREE:
"it means tall and pretty") or to its Shape (BALL: "because it's round"). 
Dimension, Comparison, and Label were also used by the blind in explain­
ing the origin of an object's name.
A distinct tendency among some of the sighted children was to 
respond to the question with the statement, "because it looks like a 
_____." Function and Action as an explanation for object names appeared
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EXAMPLES OF RESPONSES TO ORIGIN OF NAME QUESTION "WHY IS IT
CALLED A ___ ?"
TABLE 28
Obj ect Blind Sighted
BALL it’s round it's round and bounces
so you can play with it if you want to play with it
SPOON you eat with it it's sort of like a bowl
it's round like a spoon it looks like a spoon
DOLL so you can play with it a doll is a person that’s not real
it's a play thing it's a dummy
it's cute like a doll it looks like a doll
it's a toy it doesn't look like a real baby
KEY it unlocks things it looks like a key
it opens a door means to open a door
it's a thing to start things it's small
CUP you drink out of it it looks like a cup
it's a glass
means drink water out of it
it's circled
TREE you plant it it has bark on it
you put decorations on it it looks like a tree
it's very fat and high... someone discovered the name...I
I think up to the sky 
it means tall and pretty
think in a forest
HOUSE it has rooms you live in it
it's a place where you live then people will get warm and com­
you live in it and it has 
hard walls
a house is to play in
fortable and they can sleep
CAR so you can ride in it you want to go somewhere
it moves and has four tires it looks like a car
you drive it it has wheels
WALL it's a big tall board you don't want people to come in
you hear things out of it 
it used to be called a fence
it looks like a wall
BUSH it grows in a garden it's a short tree
it has prickly things on it 
it has leaves 
you get stuck in it 
it's heavy and you can't jump 
on top 'cause it's very high
it looks like a bush
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less frequently in the responses of the sighted children. Explanations 
for the objects' names that were given by the sighted children related 
to such attributes as Shape, Dimension, and Comparison.
Nominal Realism
Table 29 lists exemplary responses of the blind and sighted chil­
dren to the question "Can we change the name of the object?" Again, 
there was no generalized tendency in either group to respond positively, 
indicating recognition that the name is not a part of the object itself 
but is a socially agreed upon symbol, or negatively, indicating a belief 
in nominal realism.
Frequently, no response at all was given to the question. Some 
of the younger children, both blind and sighted, indicated that changing 
the object's name was acceptable, but when a new name was suggested by 
the examiner, that name was rejected as inappropriate or the child stated 
that in so changing the name "we would get in trouble." As Table 29 sug­
gests, there was less of a tendency among the blind than among the 
sighted to dissociate the name from the object; i.e., to allow that 
changing the name of the object does not alter the object itself. Occa­
sionally, a blind child would permit a name change provided that the new 
name was a. synonym (HOUSE: "home") or that the new name connoted an 
object that was similar to the original (TREE: "bush").
The sighted group, considered as a whole, was more ready to accept 
a name change, stating that the object would still serve its intended 
function or would still be the same even though the name was different.
Even in some instances when a sighted child refused to allow a name change,
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EXAMPLES OF RESPONSES TO NOMINAL REALISM QUESTION "CAN WE 
CHANGE THE NAME?"
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Object Blind Sighted
TABLE 29
BALL no; not be a ball anymore no; my mom will get mad 
no; people won't know what you're 
talking about
no; wouldn't be shaped like a ball 
yes, but it wouldn't be the right name
SPOON yes; you can still eat with it 
no; can't eat with it if not a 
spoon
no; that's the way it's supposed to be 
maybe, but you'd get them all mixed up 
no, 'cause be a different shape 
doesn't sound right, but you can still 
eat off of it
DOLL no; would look like something 
else
no; then can't play with it
no; would be something else...would 
be in a different shape 
yes; still be a doll; still be some­
thing to cuddle
KEY yes, but that would be dumb 
no; wouldn't be a key no more 
no; not open doors 
yes, call it whatever you like
no; already has a name 
no; not open doors if call it some­
thing else
yes; still open doors
CUP yes; still drink out of it 
no; can't diink out of it if 
you change the name
no; already has a name
no; can't drink out of it
OK; we'd drink out of PUCS instead
TREE no; wouldn't be a tree no more 
yes; a bush
no; been called tree for a long time 
no; already has a name 
yes; still be a tree
HOUSE no; not nice to the people 
yes; a home 
yes; still live in it 
no; not be a house no more
no; already has a name 
no; the people would die 
yes; but house is the best name 
no; wouldn't look like a house
CAR no; wouldn't be a car no; people wouldn't know what we're 
talking about
OK; people still get places 
yes; still drive it
WALL yes; call it anything you want no; if change, people can get in 
no; would look like something else
BUSH yes; a tree no; it would look like something 
else
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the reason given implied a recognition of the social aspect of language, 
as in these examples:
BALL: "no; people would not know what you're talking about"
SPOON: "no; because that's the way it's supposed to be"
HOUSE: "r.o; it already has a name"
Comparison with the ages of the children showed that it was largely the 
older sighted children who would permit the name to be changed. When 
the data regarding nominal realism was examined in the light of whether 
concrete reasoning was demonstrated by the children on the Piagetian 
tasks, it became evident that those who would allow the name to be 
changed tended to be those who were functioning at a concrete opera­
tional level of cognitive development. The one blind child who "passed" 
the conservation of substance task, however, showed nominal realism in 
her discussion of the objects. This finding helps to explain why there 
were more responses in the sighted group affirming that object names can 
be changed. Nominal realism appears to be related to preoperational 
thought in the blind and sighted children involved in this study.
Animism
In response to the question "Can a ____ feel, hear, think?" most
of the blind and sighted children replied negatively, denying humanistic 
qualities to the objects. The most common reason for this denial was the 
affirmation that the object has "no hands, no ears, no brains." Thought 
was, for some of the blind children, associated with speech and was 
denied to an object because "it has no mouth" or because "it can't talk."
An exception to this general trend was found among the responses 
of both the blind and the sighted children regarding the object's ability 
to feel things. Some of the children (up to and including a sighted
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child of CA 7 years 8 months) attributed feeling to some of the objects.
Examples of this type of response are:
BALL: "can feel rolling down the stairs" (blind)
"can touch (feel) the ground" (sighted)
SPOON: "feels soup" (blind)
"feels the plate" (sighted)
KEY: "can feel if it's opening the door" (blind)
"can feel when you put it in the engine" (sighted)
CUP: "can tell if it's getting water in it" (blind)
TREE: "can feel it when you climb it" (sighted)
HOUSE: "can feel kids playing inside" (sighted)
In addition, all three animistic qualities were attributed to the
DOLL by three of the blind children "because the doll has a mouth, ears,
and eyes." This response was not noted among any of the sighted children.
Whether or not an individual was classed as a conserver did not appear to
be related to the answers given on this part of the interview. For the
most part, animism was not strongly accepted by the blind or the sighted.
Manual Expression
Blind vs. Sighted Group
During the verbal attribution portion of the interview (Part I) 
the subjects were asked to demonstrate how they would use the MT objects 
(without the actual object being present). Appropriate gestural responses 
were recorded along with any tendency to respond verbally to the manual 
expression task. Table 30 displays the mean number of verbal and gestural 
responses and the related t values for the blind and sighted groups, and 
for the conservation/nonconservation groups. Comparison of the means for 
the blind and sighted groups shows a statistically significant difference 
for both types of response, but in different directions. The blind group 
tended to respond verbally more than the sighted group; the sighted group, 
on the other hand, made more gestural responses than the blind children.
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TABLE 30
MEANS AND t VALUES ON MANUAL EXPRESSION TASK
Group n
Verbal Response 
Mean t p
Gestural Response 
Mean t p
Blind 10 5.9 3.12 .01 5.7 2.12 .05
Sighted 10 2.2 8.4
Older Blind 5 6.0 0.10 NS 7.0 1.17 NS
Younger Blind 5 5.8 4.4
Older Sighted 5 3.0 1.21 NS 8.8 0.67 NS
Younger Sighted 5 1.4 8.0
Older Blind 5 6.0 1.52 NS 7.0 1.00 NS
Older Sighted 5 3.0 8.8
Younger Blind 5 5.8 3.04 .05 4.4 2.03 NS
Younger Sighted 5 1.4 8.0
Conservers 6 3.3 0.64 NS 8.8 1.78 NS
Nonconservers 14 4.4 6.3
Comparisons over age. Comparisons of the mean number of responses 
of the older blind children with the younger blind children showed no sta­
tistically significant differences between the groups. Similarly, compari­
son of younger and older sighted children revealed no significant differ­
ences .
Comparisons by age across vision groups. Table 30 shows that 
there is no significant difference in the number of verbal or gestural 
responses between the older blind and the older sighted children. Never­
theless, the number of verbal responses was higher for the blind children, 
while the blind children made fewer gestural responses than their sighted 
peers. A significant difference was found, however, between the number
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of verbal responses made by the younger blind children and those of the 
younger sighted children, indicating a tendency for the younger blind 
children to respond verbally to the task. A reverse direction in the 
number of gestural responses is evident— the younger sighted outnumbered 
the younger blind children— but not to a statistically significant 
degree (p = .08).
Conservers vs. Nonconservers
Table 30 also shows the mean number of verbal and gestural 
responses and related t values for conservers and nonconservers. No 
statistically significant differences were revealed by this compari­
son, although it can be seen that the conservers gave fewer verbal and 
more gestural responses than the nonconservers.
Quality of Manual Expression
In those instances when the blind children did respond gestur- 
ally, the quality or appropriateness of the gestures did not appear to 
differ from the manual responses of the sighted children to any appreci­
able degree. Four blind children responded neither verbally nor gestur- 
ally a total of 13 times. These children ranged in age from 3 years 8 
months to 7 years 3 months. On the other hand, four sighted children 
failed to make any response 10 times. These children ranged in age 
from 4 years 5 months to 9 years 0 months.
Items to which no response was given included the BLOCK, PENCIL, 
BALL, and ROPE for both vision groups; KEY, SPOON, COMB, CUP, and BRUSH 
for the blind children; and DOLL for the sighted children. The statis­
tical difference between vision groups described above may suggest a
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lack of understanding on the part of the blind children of the concept 
"show me" rather than a deficiency in object concept itself. Such lack 
of understanding can be attributed to the absence of vision.
Object Identification
Part II of the structured interview required the children to 
tactually identify the ten objects before describing them. By subtract­
ing the number of objects identified from the number of objects the 
children were able to describe in Part I (verbal attribution— more tang­
ible objects), determination could be made of any tendency toward verbal­
ism among the blind. Statistical comparison of the number of objects 
correctly identified by the blind and sighted groups showed no signifi­
cant difference between vision group (t = 1.12, p >.05).
Qualitative Analysis
In only one instance was a child completely unable to identify 
through tactual examination an object which had been described during 
the verbal attribution segment of the interview: the youngest blind 
child (CA 3 years 8 months) was unable to name the ROPE. This child 
also identified the DOLL as "baby" and the BRUSH as "a big comb." A 
second blind child (CA 4 years 5 months) labeled the CUP as a "glass."
One sighted child (CA 4 years 5 months) described the BRUSH as a 
"ladies comb." These responses were considered incorrect when tally­
ing the number of objects identified, but it is recognized that the 
children's labels for the objects fall within the same general class 
as the stimulus objects. Consequently, verbalism did not appear to 
be a significant problem for these children, at least in terms of the 
objects used in the present study.
117
Receptive and Expressive Use of Comparatives 
Receptive Comprehension
Blind vs. sighted groups. No significant differences between the 
blind and sighted groups were evident following comparison of the groups 
for receptive comprehension of comparative adjectives of dimension.
Table 31 shows the number of correct responses for each comparative 
adjective by the two vision groups. As is evident from table 31, both 
the blind and the sighted groups had minor difficulty with "thicker."
The blind children also experienced some difficulty with "thinner" and 
"narrower."
Conservers vs. nonconservers. Table 31 also shows the number of 
correct responses made by the conservers and nonconservers. Statistical 
comparison of the groups did not indicate significant differences for 
any single dimensional adjective. However, the difference between group 
means for the total number of correct responses was statistically sig­
nificant, with the conservers showing the higher number of responses.
Only one conserver— the blind child— responded incorrectly to one of 
the questions ("narrower"). Conversely, the nonconservers had diffi­
culty with the terms "wider," "smaller," "thicker," "thinner," and 
"narrower."
Expressive Use of Comparatives
Blind vs. sighted children. Table 32 lists the mean number of 
responses by the blind and sighted children to the questions on the 
expressive use of comparatives task. As shown on the table, the sighted 
children made significantly more spontaneous comparisons than the blind.
NUMBER OF CORRECT RESPONSES TO RECEPTIVE COMPREHENSION OF DIMENSION ADJECTIVES
TABLE 31
Group n Longer
Shorter
Length Bigger Wider Smaller Thicker Thinner Taller
Shorter
Narrower Height
TOTAL
CORRECT
Blind 10 10 10 10 9 9 8 7 10 7 10 90
Sighted 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 10 10 9 10 96
Conserv. 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 59*
Noncons. 14 14 14 14 13 13 9 11 14 11 14 127
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MEAN NUMBER OF RESPONSES ON EXPRESSIVE USE OF COMPARATIVES TASK
TABLE 32
Number of Correct Spontaneous Comparisons Number of
Group n
Spontaneous
Comparisons
Spontaneous
Comparisons
by
Length
by
Thickness
by
Size
by
Height
by
Width
Elicitations
Required
Response to 
Elicitation
Blind 10 3.1 1.2 0.2 0.6 2.0 0.3 0. 0 4.0 2.6
Sighted 10 5.4* 2.6* 0. 1 1.4* 3.1 0.2 0.6** 3.5 2.4
Conserv. 6 6.2** 2.7* 0.2 2.0*** 3.0 0.5 0.5 3.0 2.5
Noncons. 14 3.4 1.6 0.1 0.6 2.4 0.4 0.2 4.1* 2.5
*p <.05
**p £.01
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Also, in making those comparisons, the sighted children responded with 
the more appropriate (precise) dimensional term significantly more often 
than the blind children. Examination of the data indicates that, for 
both vision groups, the greatest tendency in making spontaneous compari­
sons was to refer to the general size of the object (i.e., big or small). 
Also, sighted children responded with terms along the dimensions "thick­
ness" and "width" more readily than the blind children. No significant 
differences between groups were noted in the number of times comparisons 
had to be elicited, nor in the number of correct responses to elicitation.
Conservers vs. nonconservers. Also shown in table 32 are the 
group means for conservers and nonconservers on these tasks. Statis­
tically significant differences in favor of the conservers are shown 
in the table for the number of spontaneous comparisons made, and for 
the number of correct spontaneous comparisons. Again, the means indi­
cate that both groups tended to spontaneously compare the objects on 
the basis of general size. Conservers also were found to compare 
objects by thickness significantly more often than nonconservers. The 
close parallel between these findings and those discussed above (blind 
vs. sighted) probably relate to the fact that the conservation group 
was composed mainly of sighted children.
Table 32 shows that the nonconservers required significantly more
i
comparison-elicitations than the conservers. This corresponds to the 
finding that conservers made more spontaneous comparisons. Both groups 
responded equally well to the elicitation questions.
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Qualitative Analysis of Receptive 
and Expressive Data
As indicated by the statistical analysis, there was a decided 
trend when spontaneously comparing the objects as to their dimension 
for both vision groups to use terms denoting general size in reference 
to the dimensions height, width, length, and thickness. When the blind 
children were presented with the objects and instructed to "Tell me 
about these two ____the tendency was for them to center their atten­
tion on one of the objects and to describe it in terms of its physical 
characteristics, specific function, or possible uses. The sighted chil­
dren, on the other hand, more readily compared the objects on the basis 
of dimensional differences which were, of course, immediately apparent 
upon visual inspection. Hence, Table 32 shows a statistically signifi­
cant difference between vision groups in the number of spontaneous com­
parisons of dimension. Dimensional distinctions were, apparently, less 
obvious to the blind children who had to rely on tactual examination of 
the objects.
Of the blind children's responses to the elicitation question 
designed to encourage dimensional comparison and to determine whether 
the children used the correct dimensional term expressively (e.g.,
"This one is thick; this one is ____?"), 35% were incorrect. Of these,
five errors were along the dimension "height," three related to "thick­
ness," three were for "width," two were for "size," and one was for 
"length." Wide/narrow and thick/thin were also the dimensional con­
cepts for which the blind group had difficulty on the receptive com- 
prehension task. That these dimensional concepts were weakly understood
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by the blind group is suggested by this data. The sighted group also had 
some difficulty with the concepts of width and thickness.
Verbal Comparison of Less Tangible Objects 
Blind vs. Sighted
Table 33 presents the mean number of correct responses for the 
blind and sighted groups to the verbal comparison task for less tangi­
ble objects (protocol Part IV). As indicated by the table, no statis­
tically significant differences between groups were found.
TABLE 33
MEAN NUMBER OF CORRECT RESPONSES ON VERBAL COMPARISON TASK
Group n Lo
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Blind 10 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 7.1
Sighted 10 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.9 0.7 7.1
Conserv. 6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0* 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.0* 7.7
Noncons. 14 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.4 6.9
*p 1-05
Conservers vs. Nonconservers
The mean number of correct responses by conservers and noncon­
servers is also presented in table 33. Statistical comparison of the 
means showed a significant difference in favor of the conservers for 
the comparatives "thicker" and "thinner." It is likely that this is 
attributable to the predominance of sighted children in the conservation
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group, since the average number of responses to these terms was higher 
for the sighted than for the blind.
Qualitative Analysis of 
Verbal Comparison Data
Both vision groups performed equally well on the task in terms of 
the number of correct responses, as shown via statistical comparison. 
However, table 33 also shows that the blind group did not receive a "per­
fect" score on any single variable; i.e., on none of the verbal compari­
sons did all ten blind children respond correctly. By contrast, the 
sighted group received a "perfect" score for the comparisons "longer" 
and "smaller."
The largest number of errors by the blind children were for the 
comparisons "thicker" (five errors), "shorter-length" (six errors), 
"shorter-height" (four errors), and "thinner" (five errors). Taken at 
face value, this would indicate that at least some of the blind children 
conceived of a BUSH as thicker than a TREE, a STREET as shorter than a 
CAR, a TREE as shorter than a BUSH, and a HOUSE as thinner than a TREE.
An alternative explanation is that these errors might be the 
result of conceptual weaknesses regarding the dimensional terms them­
selves. From the analysis of the blind children's receptive comprehen­
sion of dimensional adjectives (cf. table 31), it was learned that the 
blind group did have some difficulty with the concepts "thick" and "thin." 
They did not appear to have receptive difficulty with the dimensions 
"length" or "height" on that task, however. Review of table 32 and the 
data from the expressive use of comparatives task shows that spontaneous 
use of terms signifying these dimensions was not pronounced. Also, the 
number of errors that were made in response to the elicitation questions
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shows that these dimensional concepts were not well established. It 
may be, therefore, that the errors on the verbal comparison task 
reflect shallow understanding of the dimensional terms, especially as 
they apply to the less tangible objects TREE, BUSH, CAR, STREET, and 
HOUSE. The same may be true for the sighted children who made fewer, 
but similar errors on this task.
Forced-Choice of Dimensional Adjectives
To determine whether or not a systematic relationship existed 
among the children's responses to the forced-choice task involving 
polar adjectives of dimension, a chi square analysis was done and con­
tingency coefficients calculated to assess the strength of the relation­
ships. Results of this analysis for the blind and the sighted children 
is presented in table 34.
As can be seen in table 34, a statistically significant relation­
ship exists for both vision groups among the response variables size x 
height, size x width, size x length, size x thickness, and height x 
length. In addition, for the blind children a significant relationship 
exists on the variables height x width. On the other hand, height x 
thickness and width x thickness were significantly related for the
I
sighted children. This indicates that for those variable combinations 
for which significant relationships were found, there was a tendency 
for the groups to select adjectives of the same polarity in describing 
the objects; e.g., "big and tall" or "small and short" rather than 
"big and short" or "tall and small." Since size was significantly 
related to the other four dimensions, it can be stated that if a 
child (from either vision group) initially replied that the object
TABLE 34
CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS OF FORCED-CHOICE DATA
Variables
Blind
Contingency 
X2 Significance Coefficient Rank3
Sighted
Contingency 
X2 Significance Coefficient Rank3
S x H 32.44 .001 0.44 1 39.40 .001 0.43 1
S x W 14.19 .001 0.31 2 10.16 .001 0.24 6
S x L 8.91 .01 0.26 5 29.75 .001 0.38 4
S x T 3.95 .05 0.18 6 18.11 .001 0.31 5
H x W 12.29 .001 0.27 4 0.38 NS 0.06
H x L 13.73 .001 0.28 3 34.46 .001 0.40 3
H x T 0.00 NS 0.02 7.29 .01 0.20 7
L x W 0.73 NS 0.08 3.31 NS 0.14
L x T 1.49 NS 0.11 0.00 NS 0.01
W x T 0.60 NS 0.07 38.80 .001 0.42 2
NOTE, df - 1 for all tests
Rank = in order of strength of relationship for significantly related variables
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Is "big," positive-pole adjectives would generally be selected in 
response to the remaining dimensional choices.
The strength of the relationships indicated by the contingency 
coefficient (C) varies. The strongest relationship for both vision 
groups was for size x height (C = 0.44 for the blind; C = 0.43 for the 
sighted). The results of this analysis suggest that both vision groups 
tend to relate the global terms of size ("big/small") to the dimensions 
"height," "width," "length," and "thickness." This corresponds to pre­
vious findings on the expressive use of comparatives task (protocol 
Part III).
Table 34 reveals a stronger relationship among the sighted sub­
jects for size x thickness and size x length than among the blind chil­
dren. Moreover, for the sighted group, a relationship existed for 
height x thickness and width x thickness— variables for which there 
was not a significant relationship among the blind. On the surface, 
this indicates a greater tendency for the sighted to respond with 
dimensional adjectives of the same polarity for these variables. It 
may also suggest a more adequate understanding of these dimensional 
concepts by the sighted children. In only one instance was there a 
significant relationship among variables for the blind children that 
was not also significant for the sighted: height x width.
The absence of a statistically significant relationship for 
height x thickness, length x width, length x thickness, and width x 
thickness among the blind may be a reflection of the difficulty 
revealed on the receptive and expressive use of comparative tasks. 
Altogether, these data suggest that for some of the blind children 
these concepts of dimension are not fully developed.
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Qualitative Analysis
For all but one variable combination in which there was a sig­
nificant relationship, the largest percentage of responses was the 
selection of the unmarked, positive-pole adjective (e.g., big and tall, 
big and wide, tall and long, etc.)* The single exception to this pat­
tern was by the blind children on the height x width correlation, for 
which the largest percentage of responses indicated the marked, 
negative-pole adjectives (short and narrow).
Although the children were encouraged to select one of the oppo­
site pole adjectives for each forced-choice question, on a number of 
occasions the children were unable to make a choice and responded 
"Both," "It could be either," or "Part of it is big and part of it is 
small," etc. Inspection of the data reveals that the blind children 
considerably outnumbered the sighted in the number of times a choice 
was not made. In both vision groups, the older children (CA greater 
than 7 years) responded in this manner more frequently than the younger 
children. Furthermore, for each vision group, comparisons by the gen­
eral attribute of size received the highest percentage of responses in 
which it was recognized that "some of them are big and some of them are 
small," etc. (i.e., 26X  for the blind; 6.5% for the sighted).
Chapter IV has presented an analysis of the performance of the 
blind and sighted children on the several cognitive and semantic tasks. 
The children's responses were statistically analyzed for comparison 
between vision groups and descriptively examined as to the quality of 
responses on the attribution/semantic tasks by the congenitally blind 
children. The concluding chapter will provide a summary discussion of
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the information gained through this study from the theoretical frame­
work developed in chapter II and some of the research reported therein. 
The present data will be considered in relation to the research ques­
tions posed at the outset. Areas for continued investigation will be 
raised and implications for the early education of visually handicapped 
children will be suggested.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS,
AND IMPLICATIONS
Summary
The present research was designed as an exploratory investigation 
of the semantic and cognitive functioning of congenitally blind children 
within the age range of 3 through 9 years. More specifically, this study 
proposed to explore and analyze the mental representation of selected 
objects common to the experience of all the children. This was accom­
plished through a study of the descriptors attributed by the children to 
the objects. Interest was in the type, number, and quality of attributes 
assigned to the objects, and of the children's conception of selected 
dimensional adjectives in dealing with those objects.
The literature has suggested that, owing to the limitations 
imposed by blindness, many of the words and/or concepts used by con­
genitally blind children may possess idiosyncratic meanings based on 
significantly different experiences and mental representations of their 
referrents. For this reason, a matching group of sighted children was 
included in the study in order to compare the responses across vision 
groups. In this way, it was hoped that insight would be gained into 
the effect of the absence of vision on children's understanding of 
common words and concepts, and into the nature of blind children's 
representational thought.
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The ten congenitally blind children involved in the study were 
gathered from North Dakota and Minnesota through the assistance of the 
public schools, the North Dakota State School for the" Blind, and State 
Services for the Blind in St. Cloud, Minnesota. The children were 
totally and congenitally blind, and were of estimated "normal" intel­
ligence. Parental responses on the Developmental Profile (Alpern &
Boll 1972) indicated that all the children were developing within nor­
mal ranges in the areas of self-help skills, social skills, academic 
skills, and communication skills.
All children were interviewed individually following a standard 
protocol. By means of these structured interviews, data was gathered 
relative to the cognitive functioning of each child and responses were 
secured to the various lexical semantic tasks. Cognitive assessment 
centered on Piagetian measures of conservation and concrete reasoning, 
symbolic imagery, and classification. The lexical semantic tasks 
focused on verbal attribution for selected objects defined as "more 
tangible" and "less tangible," and measures of receptive and expressive 
use of dimensional adjectives in dealing with those objects. Children’s 
responses to the semantic tasks were considered in the light of their 
cognitive functioning.
Summary and Discussion of Major Findings 
In this and the following section (Conclusions), the major findings 
of the study will be summarized and discussed within the theoretical frame­
work developed in chapter II and its relation to some of the literature
reviewed therein.
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Cognitive Development
The performance of the congenitally blind children on the cogni­
tive reasoning tasks used in the present study tends to support the con­
clusions of previous researchers (e.g., Brekke, Williams, & Tait 1974; 
Gottesman 1973, 1976; Stephens & Simpkins 1974) that cognitive delays 
are observed in visually handicapped children. The age range of the 
children included in this investigation extended into what would nor­
mally be considered the concrete operational period of development, the 
beginnings of which are usually associated with a CA of 7 years. This 
period of development is characterized by internalization of actions 
and ideas regarding objects, classes of objects, and the relationships 
between and among objects. The concepts of conservation and reversibil­
ity, and multiple classification can be observed in children functioning 
at a concrete operational stage of cognitive development.
Evidence of conservation and concrete reasoning was found among 
the older sighted children (those from CA 7 years 3 months through 9 
years 9 months) but not among the blind children. The oldest blind 
subject (CA 9 years 11 months) demonstrated conservation of substance 
but failed to show evidence of concrete reasoning on the remaining con­
servation tasks. It is likely that this child was in a period of transi­
tion at the time this data was collected, and that given appropriate 
structured experiences with objects could move swiftly into the concrete 
operational stage of development. On the basis of this child's having 
"passed" the conservation of substance task, she was included among the 
"conservers" for subsequent statistical comparisons. However, consider­
ing overall cognitive functioning as measured by the Piagetian experiments
i
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used in this study, it was concluded that the congenitally blind group 
was functioning at a preoperational level, thereby evidencing cognitive 
delay for the five older blind children.
Stephens and Simpkins (1974) found symbolic imagery to be an 
area of weakness among congenitally blind school age children. The 
blind subjects in the present study likewise demonstrated difficulty 
on the Piagetian assessment of mental imagery (rotation of beads).
Mental manipulation of the tactually based image of the objects used 
in the experiment proved troublesome for these subjects. This evalua­
tion yielded a statistically significant difference between vision 
groups on the mental imagery task.
Statistical comparison also showed a significant difference in 
the level of concept attainment for the class inclusion task. The 
sighted children showed a greater understanding of the multiple classi­
fication concept than their blind peers. These results further support 
the contention that the congenitally blind youngsters involved in this 
study were functioning at a preoperational level of cognitive develop­
ment, indicating some cognitive delay among the older subjects.
Verbal Attribution
As could be expected, the blind children made significantly less 
reference to Color of the various objects than the sighted children.
Most of the responses that were made by the blind group were references 
to the fact that the object has color rather than to specific colors. 
However, when specific colors were attributed to objects by the blind, 
appropriate color words were used.
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Aside from the attribution of color, there were but a few sta­
tistically significant differences between vision groups in the number 
of responses falling within the various attribute categories. The 
blind group did use significantly more egocentric attributes (Person- 
Place-Thing, Comparisons) in their description of the MT objects than 
the sighted children. The blind group also used more attributes of a 
functional nature (Function, Action), but fewer perceptual attributes 
(Color, Shape, Major Parts, Numerosity, Dimension, and Physical Char­
acteristics) than the sighted children. Although the difference was 
not statistically significant, the blind group assigned a greater num­
ber of attributes to the MT objects than the sighted group.
For the LT objects, the blind group ascribed fewer attributes 
to the objects. Moreover, the blind children used fewer egocentric, 
functional, and perceptual attributes in their discussion of the LT 
objects than the sighted children used.
Based on a comparison of the total number of attributes assigned 
to the objects by the congenitally blind children, it was found that they 
were better able to discuss the MT objects than the LT objects. A greater 
number of egocentric and functional attributes were used in their discus­
sion of the MT objects, as well as attributes in the categories Shape, 
Dimension, and Physical Characteristics. When discussing the LT objects, 
however, more mention was made of Color, Major Parts, and Numerosity 
attributes than was the case for the MT objects. Also, a larger number 
of incorrect responses were made by the blind in regard to the LT objects 
than were made for the MT objects.
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Differences over age in the number of attributes the blind used 
in several categories were found- For both the MT and LT objects, a 
greater total number of attributes were conferred by the older blind, 
the difference between age groups achieving statistical significance 
in the discussion of the LT objects. The older blind children also 
attributed significantly more Composition and Dimension attributes to 
the MT objects than the younger blind children. The general trend was 
for the older children to impart a greater variety of attributes to the 
objects. The same was found to be true when the younger and older 
sighted children were compared. If the attribute categories are equated 
with semantic features, this data may be considered as support for the 
semantic features hypothesis (E. Clark 1972, 1973, 1974, 1977a, 1977b) 
according to which word meaning is "built" by successively adding seman­
tic features to the child’s concept of the word/object.
More egocentric, functional, and perceptual attributes were used 
by the older blind children for both the MT and the LT objects. The dif­
ference in the number of perceptual attributes ascribed to the MT objects 
was statistically significant, as was the difference in the number of ego­
centric attributes for the LT objects. On the other hand, no significant 
differences in these combined attribute groups were found between the 
younger and older sighted children, although the total number of attrib­
utes used by the older sighted children was higher than that of the 
younger sighted children.
In contrast to the blind, it was the younger sighted children 
who had a higher number of responses in the egocentric group. This 
would appear to be the result of added experience for the older sighted
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children (enabling them to deal with the objects in a less egocentric 
manner), but may also relate to the fact that the blind children were 
functioning at a preoperational level which is characterized by ego­
centric thought. Support for this conclusion is found in the compari­
son of the number of responses made by conservers and nonconservers. 
Although these differences did not attain statistical significance, 
conservers used a higher number of functional and perceptual attributes, 
and a lesser number of egocentric attributes in discussing the MT and 
LT objects than the nonconservers used. The conservers group, it will 
be remembered, contained only one blind child.
The younger blind children assigned more egocentric and func­
tional attributes to the MT objects than the younger sighted children.
On the other hand, the younger sighted children assigned more egocen­
tric, functional, and perceptual attributes to the LT objects. This 
suggests that the younger sighted children have had more, or more 
meaningful, experiences with the LT objects, resulting in a more devel­
oped object concept for these items. Comparison of the older blind and 
older sighted children showed that the older blind mentioned more ego­
centric attributes for both MT and LT objects than the older sighted 
children, suggesting (a) that the blind children had benefited from 
the additional experience that accompanies age, and (b) that the blind 
children held a more "personalized" meaning for the objects based on 
their experiences and association with the objects. There was little 
difference between the older blind and sighted in the number of func­
tional and perceptual attributes assigned to the MT and LT objects, 
which is considered to be further evidence of increased experience 
with objects over age.
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Regarding the quality of responses, this study showed many simi­
larities between the blind and the sighted children suggestive of common 
experiences with the objects. Duplication of responses between vision 
groups was noted in the attribute categories Function, Action, and Major 
Parts. Evidence of egocentric attributions were found in the blind chil­
dren's responses in the Label and Person-Place-Thing categories where 
siblings, friends, personal toys and experiences were mentioned. This 
was not found to the same degree in the responses of the sighted children.
The blind children's reliance on tactually rather than visually 
acquired information was apparent in their responses describing the 
Physical Characteristics of objects. Such attributions were largely 
restricted to textural information, in contrast to the sighted chil­
dren's responses which included visually oriented characteristics. The 
blind group also made more Comparisons to other objects than the sighted, 
comparisons based upon the shape and/or function of the objects. These 
facts, plus the relative lack of visually oriented attributions, suggest 
that the blind children's conceptualization of the objects is based on 
their unique experience.
Less imaginative use of the MT objects by the blind was sug­
gested by the absence of references to "pretend" play such as were 
given by some of the sighted children. This corresponds to the find­
ings of previous studies carried out by Singer (1966), Singer and 
Streiner (1966), and Tait (1972).
Tactual Attribution
Similar results were obtained on the tactual attribution tasks 
as on the verbal attribution tasks. The blind made significantly less
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Color attributions than the sighted, and those that were made were basi­
cally references to the fact that the object has color. The total number 
of attributions was higher for the sighted than for the blind, and in 
each combined attribute group (egocentric, functional, and perceptual) 
fewer responses were made by the blind children than by the sighted chil­
dren. On the other hand, the blind children made more incorrect attribu­
tions and more negative responses to the objects.
Differences over age were apparent among the blind group. The 
younger blind children suggested a greater number of egocentric and 
functional attributes than the older blind; the older children, in turn, 
suggested more perceptual attributes. Significantly more attributes in 
the Shape, Composition, and Physical Characteristics categories were 
made by the older blind children. The total number of attributes 
assigned to the objects was also higher for the older blind subjects.
The total number of attributions by the conservers was signifi­
cantly greater than that of the nonconservers. A significantly higher 
number of perceptual attributes were mentioned by the conservers; non­
conservers described the objects more in terms of egocentric and func­
tional attributes. In addition, the nonconservers made more incorrect 
attributions.
With respect to the quality of attributions, similarities were 
again apparent between the blind and the sighted children, particularly 
with reference to the Action and Major Parts responses. A subtle dif­
ference was suggested between the Action responses given by the blind 
and sighted groups, however. The blind children's responses seemed to 
be more concrete in nature, often suggesting an action which could be
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performed with or upon the object. In contrast, the sighted children's 
responses were often of a more abstract nature and frequently revealed 
the influence of visual input.
The reliance upon tactual experience was apparent in the attri­
butions of the blind children in the categories Physical Characteristics 
and Comparisons. Such attributions were largely based on textural 
aspects and/or shape, as was the case on the verbal attribution task. 
Visually oriented terminology was at a minimum, restricted to the men­
tion of Color and such Physical Characteristics as "clean" and "striped." 
On the basis of the verbal and tactual attribution tasks used in this 
study, support is found for the conclusions of Harley (1963) and Dokecki 
(1966) that visually oriented verbalisms are not a significant problem 
for congenitally blind children.
No statistically significant differences between vision groups 
were found concerning the ability of the children to identify, via tac­
tual examination, the objects used in the testing. A single blind child 
was unable to identify the ROPE, although she had been able to discuss 
it on the verbal attribution task. Mislabeling of objects occurred 
three times among the blind group and once for the sighted, but the 
names that were suggested for the objects were within the same general 
class as the stimulus object. In each instance, the child who mis­
labeled an object was among the younger group of children. This paral­
lels Harley's (1963) observation that with increased age, and conse­
quently increased experience with common objects, comes a decrease in 
the number of verbalisms found in the language of blind children. It 
was concluded, therefore, that verbalism— the ability to describe but
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not identify an object— was not a significant problem for these children, 
at least in terms of the objects used in this study.
Verbal and Tactual Attribution
Because of the blind child's reliance upon tactually gained 
information about objects, differences in the number of attributes 
assigned on the basis of verbal recall and on the basis of tactual 
exploration would be expected. Indeed, statistically significant dif­
ferences did occur when the performance on the two tasks was compared. 
Significantly more Function, Person-Place-Thing, and Comparison 
responses were given on the verbal attribution task by the blind 
children. On the other hand, the number of Action responses and the 
total number of attributes assigned was higher for the tactual por­
tion of the interview (not to a statistically significant degree, 
however).
Egocentric and functional attributes were used more frequently 
during the verbal task, to a statistically significant degree. Greater 
attention was paid to the perceptual attribute categories during tactual 
examination, however. These same patterns were found in the responses 
of the sighted children, and are not in themselves indicative of defi­
ciencies in the mental representation of the congenitally blind.
Manual Expression
The children were asked to demonstrate the use of the MT objects 
(through pretense of having the object in their possession) in order to 
gather additional data regarding their mental representation and con­
ceptualization of the objects. It was found that the blind children
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tended to respond verbally rather than, or in addition to, gesturally to 
a significant degree. Conservers tended to respond with fewer verbal 
expressions and more gestural responses than nonconservers, although 
these differences were not statistically significant. The gestural 
responses the blind children did make were generally appropriate to the 
object specified. It is felt that the statistical differences between 
vision groups are suggestive of a lack of understanding by the blind 
children of the concept "show me" which can be attributed to the absence 
of vision. The younger blind children made significantly more verbal 
responses than the younger sighted children, though there was no statis­
tical difference in the number of gestural responses. This lends further 
support to the interpretation that the concept of showing something to 
another either has little meaning for young blind children or is inter­
preted by them as implying verbalization. It is also possible that the
prompt "pretend you have a ____ and show me how you use it" may be less
meaningful for blind children because of their reported lack of creative 
and imaginative play (Singer 1966; Singer & Streiner 1966; Tait 1972).
Nominal Realism
Explanations given by the blind children for the origin or mean­
ing of the names of the objects generally related to the specific Func­
tion of the object or to an Action involving the object. Major Parts 
were sometimes given as reasons for the name being what it is, as well 
as Physical Characteristics and Shape. The fact that the same attribute 
categories can be used to "classify" the children's responses to the 
origin of names question as were used in the verbal and tactual attri­
bution tasks, substantiates Bloom's (1975) assertion that the manner
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in which a child perceives and mentally represents objects or events 
gives structure to the lexical meaning of words for the child.
The blind children were less ready to allow a name change than 
the sighted, frequently asserting that to change the name would result 
in the object's no longer serving its function or being the same object. 
Those who would permit the name to be altered without subsequently 
altering the object itself, tended to be those who showed concrete 
operational thought. Consequently, the blind children, functioning at 
a preoperational level, generally showed a belief in nominal realism.
In addition, several of the blind children conferred the animistic 
attribute of feeling to many of the objects (cf. Wills 1965). Hearing 
and thinking, however, were denied to the objects with the exception of 
the DOLL. Nominal realism has been observed in sighted children of 
CA 6 to 7 years (Williams 1976, 1977). Its presence in the thinking 
of the older blind children involved in the present study provides fur­
ther evidence that these children were functioning at a preoperational 
level of development and demonstrated cognitive delay (Piaget 1967).
Receptive Comprehension of 
Comparative Adjectives
No significant differences between the blind and sighted groups 
were found in terms of the number of correct responses to the receptive 
use of comparatives task. A few of the blind children were unable to 
identify the "thicker," "thinner," and "narrower" objects when requested 
to do so. The sighted children also erred on "thicker" and "narrower." 
Comparison of conservers and nonconservers indicated that little diffi­
culty was had by the conservers on any of the comparative adjectives—
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a single error was made on "narrower." Nonconservers, on the contrary, 
made significantly more errors on this task. Difficulty was greatest 
among nonconservers for the concepts of "width" and "thickness."
Expressive Use of Comparatives
The blind children, when asked to compare two objects that were 
identical except along one dimension, tended not to compare the objects 
by dimension spontaneously. More frequently, the blind would focus 
their attention on a single object and describe it in terms of its 
function, use, or physical characteristics. The sighted children more 
readily compared the objects as to dimension. When dimensional compari­
sons were made by the blind children, general references to size (big/ 
small) were used to describe the dimensions height, width, length, and 
thickness. This tendency was also found among the sighted children.
Comparison of conservers and nonconservers revealed the same 
tendencies. The conservers group— primarily sighted children— made 
more spontaneous comparisons and specified the correct dimension sig­
nificantly more often than the nonconservers.
When specific comparisons were elicited from the blind children, 
errors were made along each dimension, but primarily for height, thick­
ness, and width. The latter two problem dimensions are those which were 
shown to be more weakly developed concepts on the receptive comprehen­
sion task.
Verbal Comparisons of Less 
Tangible Objects
No statistically significant differences occurred between vision 
groups in the number of correct responses to the verbal comparison
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questions involving less tangible objects. However, the blind children 
made a number of errors involving the comparatives "thicker," "thinner," 
and "shorter" (both height and length). The objects involved in these 
comparisons were BUSH, TREE, STREET, CAR, and HOUSE. The evidence sug­
gests that the blind group was at a disadvantage when applying these 
dimensional terms to objects that were not fully accessible to tactual 
examination. In general, this portion of the interview, when considered 
in conjunction with the results of the children's receptive and expres­
sive use of comparative adjectives, appears to agree with the order of 
acquisition of spatial-comparative adjectives predicted by Clark (1972): 
big/small before tall/short and long/short; long/short before thick/thin 
and wide/narrow.
Forced-Choice of Dimensional 
Adjectives
Statistically significant relationships were determined to exist 
for both vision groups among some of the polar adjectives of dimension. 
This analysis showed that the children tended to use general size adjec­
tives (big/small) to refer to the various dimensions (height, width, 
thickness, and length). This is possible confirmation of the idea that 
semantic growth proceeds from the general to the specific (Carroll 1964). 
A tendency to select adjectives of the same polarity was shown for those 
dimensions in which a significant relationship existed (cf. Brewer &
Stone 1975). The largest percentage of responses was in favor of the 
positive pole, unmarked adjectives. This finding seems related to 
H. Clark's (1970) contention that the nominal use of the adjective 
is semantically prior to the contrastive use, and to E. Clark's (1974)
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conclusion that children learn to use and understand the positive terms 
before the negative terms.
The blind children, more frequently than the sighted, refused 
to make a choice and apply one of the dimensional terms to an object, 
particularly with the adjectives referring to general size. This was 
true more for the older subjects (both vision groups) than for the 
younger, and may be explained as resulting from a more appropriate 
understanding of the relativity of size. Alternatively, the blind 
children's dependence on tactual examination may make the size of 
objects more conspicuous and foster the realization that objects come 
in different sizes, or that different parts of the same object may 
vary in size.
Conclusions
Based on the present study, the following conclusions can be 
drawn relative to the research questions posed at the outset of the 
project.
Does the Absence of Vision Affect the Child's Understand­
ing of Common Words or Concepts?
Absolute identity between individuals or groups in the number and 
kind of attributions made to the objects was, of course, not expected. 
Differences in cognitive development and individuality of experience 
argue against completely identical meanings being brought to words, 
objects, or situations by different persons. More precisely, the con­
cern expressed in the research question was with the degree to which 
the absence of vision affects the meaning assigned to common words or 
concepts, and whether such possible differences in meaning interfere
i
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with communication between congenitally blind and sighted individuals 
(Scholl 1973).
The idea has been forwarded that the world is perceived and 
organized in accordance with the cognitive and perceptual abilities of 
the individual (Bierwisch 1970), that the manner in which a child per­
ceives and mentally represents an object gives structure to the lexical 
meaning of the words the child uses to refer to the object (Bloom, 1975). 
It has been further contended (Davidson 1976; Gottesman 1976) that 
totally blind children must rely on less sophisticated sensory mecha­
nisms which bring information to the child in a non-integrated, frag­
mentary manner. There is, therefore, an aspect of this study in which 
tactually and visually based information processing is compared.
The present research has highlighted some differences between 
the blind and sighted children's understanding of the key words and 
concepts studied which can be attributed to the lack of vision. How­
ever, the fact that the sighted group did not significantly outnumber 
the blind group in the total number of attributions for either the 
"more tangible" or the "less tangible" objects shows that those dif­
ferences may not be severe. In fact, the blind children ascribed a 
slightly higher number of attributes to the "more tangible" objects 
than the sighted children.
Based on the number of attributes, or features, used by the 
blind children to describe the stimulus words (objects), the data sug­
gests that information gained through tactual means does not signifi­
cantly differ from information gained through vision. This study, 
therefore, has not shown the meaning of common words, and the
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underlying object concept as revealed through the children's attribu­
tions, to be substantially altered by the absence of vision.
The only consistently significant difference which is directly 
attributable to the lack of vision among the blind, is the sighted 
children’s mention of color in describing the objects more often than 
the blind. Since color cannot be readily perceived via tactual explor­
ation, the infrequency of its mention by the blind is not surprising.
The blind children interviewed in the present study tended to 
invest the words/objects with more private, personal meaning than the 
sighted children drawing upon their experience. The sighted children, 
on the other hand, tended to focus more on functional and perceptual 
characteristics. Differences between vision groups in the number of 
attributes in these categories were not statistically significant, how­
ever, and many of the responses bore much similarity.
Defining meaning in terms of the number and kind of attributes 
assigned to the objects leads to the conclusion that the "more tangible" 
objects held more meaning for the blind children than the "less tangible" 
objects. This seemed especially true for the younger blind children 
(those under CA 7 years) who were found to ascribe considerably (but 
not statistically) fewer egocentric and perceptual attributes to the 
LT objects than the younger sighted children. This seems indicative 
of less experience with the objects/concepts involved on the part of 
the younger blind children. These differences were not as pronounced 
between the older blind and older sighted children, suggesting con­
tinued and more meaningful experience with the LT objects over time. 
Consequently, it may be stated that the younger blind children have
147
an accurate, but more shallow concept of the LT objects than of the MT 
objects. Although the present data does not support the conclusion 
that communication between blind and sighted children is severely ham­
pered by the absence of vision, or that the blind child's thinking in 
regard to these words/concepts is "loose" (Cutsforth 1932, 1951), it 
may be that for more abstract concepts the absence of vision might lead 
to significant differences in meaning.
What is the Nature of the Blind Child's Representational
Thought?
(a) Does the language of congenitally blind children reflect 
their unique experience and means of mental representation?
(b) Does the language of congenitally blind children reflect 
their knowledge of the language of sighted children?
Santin and Simmons (1977) suggested that the early language of 
the congenitally blind mirrors their knowledge of the language of others 
more than it mirrors their knowledge of the world. Hence, the present 
study sought to explore the nature of blind children's representational 
thought— that which gives structure to the child's language (Bloom 1975; 
Sinclair-de-Zwart 1969). The uniqueness of the blind child's experience 
lies in his reliance upon nonvisual sensory input. Information about 
objects and events in the environment comes to the blind child primarily 
through tactual and auditory means (sometimes supplemented with olfactory 
and/or gustatory perceptions). It has been suggested that these sensory 
processes are less sophisticated than vision (Gottesman 1976), provide 
fragmented rather than integrated information (Davidson 1976), and "make 
the total experience of the blind child more restricted" (Warren 1977, 
p. 83). It was presumed that the mental representation of the objects
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and events in the blind child's experience are built from the information 
gained via these nonvisual means, and that the child's verbal description 
(attribution) of the objects will reveal his mental representation of the 
object. If the object concept and mental image significantly differs 
from that of the sighted children (because of the blind child's "less 
efficient" sensory information gathering processes), the characteristics 
which the child attributes to the objects should bear little similarity 
to those which the sighted child describes. Absence of numerous and sig­
nificantly different attributions by blind children, on the other hand, 
would favor the conclusion that the object concept and mental image of 
the objects is essentially the same; that object concepts which are based 
on tactually obtained information closely resemble those which are derived 
from visually obtained information. Little or no difference in attribu­
tion, coupled with the presence of a great many visually oriented attri­
butes would lead to the conclusion that the language of the blind reflects 
not their knowledge of the world of objects, but their knowledge of the 
language of others.
In fact, there were few significant differences in the number of 
attributions made to the objects by either vision group. Many of the 
terms used in describing the function of the objects, actions which can 
be performed with or upon the objects, their major parts, etc., bore 
much similarity between the blind and sighted children. Both vision 
groups made attributions based on functional and perceptual character­
istics— usually a greater number by the sighted children, but not to a 
statistically significant degree. However, many of the actions attributed 
to the objects by the blind group were more concrete and simple, and the
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blind children tended to relate to the objects from a more personal per­
spective than their sighted peers.
The percentage of visually oriented terminology was considerably 
small (2 to 3%) in relation to the total number of attributions advanced 
by the blind children. Use of color words by the totally blind children 
reveals a copying of the language of the sighted, but such visual words 
were seldom used. Most of the references to specific color in the 
response of the blind were made by the child who had some color vision.
If these responses are discounted, the number of visually oriented terms 
would be even less. There was no evidence of a problem of verbal unreal­
ity or verbalism in the present data.
The gestural responses made by the blind on the manual expression 
task (although significantly fewer than were given by the sighted chil­
dren) were appropriate for the objects being considered. This is inter­
preted as indicating that the mental image for the blind children was 
based on the object concept rather than the language of the sighted.
Dimensional adjectives are, perhaps, more abstract than the 
objects used in the verbal attribution task. Nevertheless, significant 
differences in receptive comprehension of adjectives were not found 
between vision groups, and differences on the expressive use of com­
paratives task related only to the fact that the sighted children com­
pared objects on the basis of dimension more readily than the blind.
Error patterns between vision groups were similar, suggesting that the 
development of understanding of the concepts of dimension among the 
blind children parallels that of the sighted. Similarities found on 
the forced-choice task also support this conclusion. However,
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statistically significant differences between conservers and nonconservers 
suggests that the blind children, because of cognitive delay, will begin 
to "lag behind" the sighted children in the use of abstract dimensional 
terms as they become older.
The data from the present study suggests that the language used 
by the blind children to describe the various objects reflects the object 
concept and mental representation which they have gained through their 
intact sensory mechanisms. Furthermore, the data suggest that the object 
concept gained by these means does not significantly differ from that of 
the sighted child.
It is felt that if the lexical semantic tasks were carried out 
with older blind and sighted children (CA 7 to 12 years), greater differ­
ences might be found between vision groups. There is a delay in cogni­
tive development among totally and congenitally blind children such that 
the blind children in the present study were all functioning at the pre- 
operational level of cognitive development. Comparisons between con- 
servers and nonconservers in this research— while not producing statis­
tically significant differences between vision groups— suggested that 
conservers conceive of the objects more in terms of functional and per­
ceptual attributes than nonconservers. Nonconservers, on the other hand, 
continued to assign more egocentric attributes to the objects. If the 
present research was to be replicated with older blind and sighted chil­
dren, where the distinction between concrete operational and preopera- 
tional thought is more pronounced, the data might reveal greater (and 
statistically significant) differences leading to the conclusion that 
the object concept is significantly different (in a negative sense) from 
that which the sighted child derives.
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What Is Revealed in Their Understanding of Common Words/
Concepts Regarding the Congenitally Blind Child's Con­
ceptualization of the World?
The present study demonstrated cognitive delay among the older 
blind children. All the congenitally blind children interviewed were 
functioning at a preoperational level of development. One of the pri­
mary characteristics of this level of reasoning is egocentrism, the 
inability to take the role of another, or to consider things from 
another's point of view, leading to the absence of reflection upon 
one's own thoughts (Wadsworth 1971). This tendency was evident in the 
responses to the Piagetian assessments as well as in many of the more 
personal responses to the attribution tasks. The extent to which nomi­
nal realism and the attribution of feeling to many of the objects was 
present among the congenitally blind confirms that the group was pre­
operational in their thinking.
Such tendencies are found among sighted children who function at 
a preoperational level also, as in this study and others (Williams 1976, 
1977). Thus, though it cannot be concluded that the blind children 
interviewed have a different conceptualization of the world than the 
sighted, it can be said that the cognitive delays experienced by totally 
and congenitally blind children prolong such concepts of objects.
According to Piagetian theory, knowledge of objects (and hence, 
of the world) is derived from acting upon, or transforming, the objects. 
This manipulation of reality is initially carried out through sensori­
motor actions performed directly upon or with the objects. Through 
vision, the sighted child is able to draw together and unify the
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information he receives during these manipulations of objects from all 
of his sensory mechanisms. The concern has been raised whether blind 
children, in the absence of unifying vision, tie together the sensory 
information which they receive in such a manner as to organize or 
mentally construct a concept of the world which is comparable to that 
of the sighted (Santin & Simmons 1977). There are those who suggest 
that auditorily and tactually gathered information is not sufficient 
to compensate for the visual deficit (e.g., Kephart, Kephart, &
Schwarz 1974). However, the present research did not show this to 
be the case; large numbers of significant differences between the 
blind and the sighted in their verbal attributions were not found. 
Rather, many parallels were found in the number and kinds of responses 
given in the various attribute categories. There was a tendency for 
the blind children to use fewer perceptually based attributes in their 
verbal description of the objects and more egocentric and functional 
attributes, but not to a statistically significant degree.
Comparing the responses on the verbal and tactual attribution 
tasks leads to the conclusion that the mental image/object concept for 
both the sighted and the blind children interviewed draw more heavily 
on egocentric and functional characteristics of the objects. This was 
particularly true for the blind children who used a significantly 
greater number of such attributes in verbally describing the objects 
than they did upon tactual examination. When asked to tactually 
describe the objects, both groups named fewer egocentric and func­
tional attributes and described in more detail the perceptual char­
acteristics of the objects.
v
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Differences in mental image or conceptualization of the objects 
were found only to the extent that many of the comparisons, physical 
characteristics, and shape attributes mentioned by the blind showed 
their dependence on tactual information. The sighted children, on the 
other hand, added to the tactually derived attributes a number of char­
acteristics that could only be determined via vision. Nevertheless, 
the present data can be interpreted as indicating that the tactually 
derived conceptualization of the objects among the blind children does 
not significantly differ from the visually dominated object concept 
evident among the sighted children.
Recommendations and Unanswered Questions 
For Further Research
Several areas for continued research are suggested by the present
data.
1. The possibility that as the cognitive differences between 
congenitally blind and sighted children become more pronounced (i.e., 
concrete vs. preoperational), differences in object concept and represen­
tation and/or understanding of dimensional adjective concepts might 
increase, suggests the need to assess older children (e.g., CA 7 to 12 
years) in similar fashion to the present research.
2. The objects used in the present study were more or less tan­
gible and concrete. The same research questions could guide research 
into congenitally blind children's understanding of (a) non-tangible 
objects such as the sun, moon, stars, or air; (b) more abstract concepts 
such as clean, dirty, love, time, etc.; (c) prepositions and directional
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terms necessary for orientation and mobility; and (d) novel objects or 
nonsense words.
3. Investigation of the meaning blind children bring to "visual" 
ideas (e.g., "show me" and "pretend") might be helpful in understanding 
the world of the blind child.
4. More direct study of the effectiveness of verbal communica­
tion among blind child and/or between blind and sighted children would 
yield important information in relation to the mainstreaming practices 
of the public schools. Examination of the functions or uses of language 
among blind children could be included in such research.
Unanswered Questions
The present study did not take into consideration the amount of 
experience the children had had with the various objects. The assump­
tion was made that none of the objects considered would not have been 
encountered previously by the children. The question can be raised 
whether a greater number of experiences (interactions) with the objects 
is required by the blind children in order to form an object concept 
comparable to that of the sighted children in order for meaningful 
communication to ensue. Replication of the tactual attribution task 
using novel objects might help to answer this question.
The inability of the younger congenitally blind children to use 
tactual exploration in an efficient and systematic manner was observed 
during the Piagetian and tactual attribution tasks. Swallow (1973) 
stated that blind children need to be taught how to investigate objects 
actively. Since taction is a primary means of gathering information 
about the world and of forming mental representations of objects,
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why do blind children not use this sense more methodically and effec­
tively?
Implications for Education
The most obvious implication of the present research for edu­
cational practice, particularly at the preschool level, can be drawn 
from the finding that the congenitally blind child's mental conception 
of objects is based on his personal experiences with the object and 
its use, and on the tactual information he gains in that experience. 
Educators must, therefore, take pains to assure that the blind child 
receives sufficient opportunity to experience first hand the objects 
and events. In conjunction with this, the need to assist the congeni­
tally blind child to develop efficient means of tactually gathering 
information from an object in his environment must be underscored.
The use of concrete materials and "real" objects is an acknowl­
edged principle of good teaching, but it must be stressed when working 
with the visually handicapped— especially in those settings where blind 
and sighted children are integrated. When introducing a new object into 
a discussion, for example, it is important that the blind child either 
be the first to work with and examine the object, or have one in his 
possession while the sighted children look at and work with another. 
Also, since the blind children in the present study tended to make 
more comparisons among objects, it might be helpful for the teacher 
to suggest ways in which new or novel objects being introduced into 
the classroom (or to the child) are similar to objects with which the 
blind child has had some previous experience.
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A second point of educational significance is that there was no 
indication that verbal communication between blind and sighted children 
of this age group regarding the kind of objects used in this study would 
be seriously disrupted because of differing mental conceptions. When 
sufficient experiences and interactions with the objects are provided, 
similar concepts are developed. Any efforts at vocabularly development 
among preschool visually handicapped children, however, must center on 
actual experiences with the objects themselves, or make use of concrete 
(manipulative) materials in demonstrating concepts.
With regard to the preschool education of the visually handi­
capped (ages 3 to 6 years), this study suggests that actual experience 
with "less tangible" objects may be limited and/or less meaningful for 
the congenitally, totally blind child than for his sighted peer. This 
may be the case because of the lack of efficient tactual exploration 
skills among the blind population, or because sighted individuals in 
the child's life assume that the blind child possesses the same under­
standing of these common objects as they have gathered from their visu­
ally oriented experiences. Therefore, care must be taken by those who 
manage such preschool programs— particularly those in which blind and 
sighted children are integrated— not to presuppose great familiarity 
among the blind with this type of object. Appropriate programming for 
such children would include the provision of "hands-on" activities and 
experiences which will assist the blind child in gaining a fuller 
understanding of the objects.
A final implication drawn from this study— a reconfirmation of 
the work of others— relates to the cognitive development of congenitally
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blind youngsters. Some cognitive delay was evident and must be con­
sidered in curriculum design for visually handicapped children. Efforts 
to provide activities geared toward cognitive remediation (e.g., 
Stephens, Grube, & Fitzgerald 1977) should be incorporated into the 
educational program for the congenitally blind.
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
BLOCK
PENCIL
BALL
ROPE
PART I: VERBAL ATTRIBUTION AND DESCRIPTION
What is a block? Tell me about a block.
What does (is) a block do (for)? What can you do with a block?
What does a block look like?
Is a block BIG or SMALL? TALL or SHORT? WIDE or NARROW? SHORT or LONG? 
THIN or THICK?
**Show me what you do with a block.
What is a pencil? Tell me about a pencil.
What does (is) a pencil do (for)? What can you do with a pencil?
What does a pencil look like?
Is a pencil BIG or SMALL? TALL or SHORT? WIDE or NARROW? SHORT or LONG? 
THIN or THICK?
**Show me what you do with a pencil.
What is a ball? Tell me about a ball.
What does (is) a ball do (for)? What can you do with a ball?
What does a ball look like?
Is a ball BIG or SMALL? TALL or SHORT? WIDE or NARROW? SHORT or LONG? 
THIN or THICK?
**Show me what you do with a ball.
**Why is it called a ball? Why do we call it a ball?
**Can we call it anything else? Can we call it a ___ ?
**Can a ball feel? hear? think?
What is a rope? Tell me about a rope.
What does (is) a rope do (for)? What can you do with a rope?
What does a rope look like?
Is a rope BIG or SMALL? TALL or SHORT? WIDE or NARROW? SHORT or LONG? 
THIN or THICK?
**Show me what you can do with a rope.
1 5 9
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MALL
BUILDING
BUSH
STREET
What does (is) a wall do (for)? What can you do with (on/to) a wall
What does a wall look like?
Is a wall BIG or SMALL? TALL or SHORT? WIDE or NARROW? SHORT or LONG?
THIN or THICK?
**Why 1s it called a wall? Why do we call it a wall?
**Can we call it anything else? Can we call it a ____?
**Can a wall feel? hear? think?
What is a building? Tell me about a building.
What does (is) a building do (for)? What can you do with (in) a building?
What does a building look like?
Is a building BIG or SMALL? TALL or SHORT? WIDE or NARROW? SHORT or LONG? 
THIN or THICK?
What is a bush? Tell me about a bush.
What does (is) a bush do (for)? What can you do with (to) a bush?
What does a bush look like?
Is a bush BIG or SMALL? TALL or SHORT? WIDE or NARROW? SHORT or LONG?
THIN or THICK?
**Why 1s it called a bush? Why do we call it a bush?
**Can we call it anything else? Can we call it a____?
**Can a bush feel? hear? think?
What is a street? Tell me about a street.
What does (is) a street do (for)? What can you do with (in/on) a street?
What does a street look like?
Is a street BIG or SMALL? TALL or SHORT? WIDE or NARROW? SHORT or LONG? 
THIN or THICK?
What 1s a wall? Tell me about a wall.
161
What does (1s) a house do (for)? What can you do with (1n) a house?
What does a house look like?
Is a house BIG or SMALL? TALL or SHORT? WIDE or NARROW? SHORT or LONG? 
THIN or THICK?
**Why is it called a house? Why do we call it a house?
**Can we call it anything else? Can we call it a ____?
**Can a house feel? hear? think?
CAR What is a car? Tell me about a car.
What does (is) a car do (for)? What can you do with (in) a car?
What does a car look like?
Is a car BIG or SMALL? TALL or SHORT? WIDE or NARROW? SHORT or LONG? 
THIN or THICK?
**Why is it called a car? Why do we call it a car?
**Can we call it anything else? Can we call it a ___ ?
**Can a car feel? hear? think?
YARD What is a yard? Tell me about a yard.
What does (is) a yard do (for)? What can you do with (in) a yard?
What does a yard look like?
Is a yard BIG or SMALL? TALL or SHORT? WIDE or NARROW? SHORT or LONG? 
THIN or THICK?
DOOR What is a door? Tell me about a door.
What does (is) a door do (for)? What can you do with (on/to) a door?
What does a door look like?
Is a door BIG or SMALL? TALL or SHORT? WIDE or NARROW? SHORT or LONG? 
THIN or THICK?
BUS What is a bus? Tell me about a bus.
What does (is) a bus do (for)? What can you do with (in) a bus?
What does a bus look like?
Is a bus BIG or SMALL? TALL or SHORT? WIDE or NARROW? SHORT or LONG? 
THIN or THICK?
HOUSE What 1s a house? Tell me about a house.
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BRUSH What 1s a brush? Tell me about a brush.
What does (is) a brush do (for)? What can you do with a brush?
What does a brush look like?
Is a brush BIG or SMALL? TALL or SHORT? WIDE or NARROW? SHORT or LONG? 
THIN or THICK?
**Show me what you do with a brush.
CUP What is a cup? Tell me about a cup.
What does (is) a cup do (for)? What can you do with a cup?
What does a cup look like?
Is a cup BIG or SMALL? TALL or SHORT? WIDE or NARROW? SHORT or LONG? 
THIN or THICK?
**Show me what you do with a cup.
♦'‘Why Is it called a cup? Why do we call it a cup?
**Can we call it anything else? Can we call it a ___ ?
**Can a cup feel? hear? think?
COMB What is a comb? Tell me about a comb.
What does (is) a comb do (for)? What can you do with a comb?
What does a comb look like?
Is a comb BIG or SMALL? TALL or SHORT? WIDE or NARROW? SHORT or LONG? 
THIN or THICK?
**Show me what you do with a comb.
TREE What is a tree? Tell me about a tree.
What does (is) a tree do (for)? What can you do with (in) a tree?
What does a tree look like?
Is a tree BIG or SMALL? TALL or SHORT? WIDE or NARROW? SHORT or LONG? 
THIN or THICK?
**Why 1s it called a tree? Why do we call it a tree?
**Can we call 1t anything else? Can we call 1t a ____?
**Can a tree feel? hear? think?
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What does (1s) a spoon do (for)? What can you do with a spoon?
What does a spoon look like?
Is a spoon BIG or SMALL? TALL or SHORT? WIDE or NARROW? SHORT or LONG? 
THIN or THICK?
**Show me what you do with a spoon.
**Why is it called a spoon? Why do we call it a spoon?
**Can we call it anything else? Can we call it a____?
**Can a spoon feel? hear? think?
DOLL What 1s a doll? Tell me about a doll.
What does (is) a doll do (for)? What can you do with a doll?
What does a doll look like?
Is a doll BIG or SMALL? TALL or SHORT? WIDE or NARROW? SHORT or LONG? 
THIN or THICK?
**Show me what you do with a doll.
**Why is it called a doll? Why do we call it a doll?
**Can we call it anything else? Can we call it a ____?
**Can a doll feel? hear? think?
KEY What is a key? Tell me about a key.
What does (is) a key do (for)? What can you do with a key?
What does a key look like?
Is a key BIG or SMALL? TALL or SHORT? WIDE or NARROW? SHORT or LONG? 
THIN or THICK?
**Show me what you do with a key.
**Why is it called a key? Why do we call it a key?
**Can we call it anything else? Can we call it a ___ ?
♦♦Can a key feel? hear? think?
SPOON What Is a spoon? Tell me about a spoon.
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PART II: TACTUAL OBJECT IDENTIFICATION 
AND ATTRIBUTION/DESCRIPTION
(Goal: to solicit name and further description of objects)
(Hand child object and say: "TELL ME ABOUT THIS.")
BLOCK:
SPOON:
PENCIL:
KEY:
_____
CUP:
BALL:
COMB:
BRUSH:
ROPE:
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PART III: RECEPTIVE AND EXPRESSIVE USE OF COMPARATIVES
A. EXPRESSIVE USE
(Present objects in pairs and ask questions in sequence as necessary 
to elicit the desired relational term or until it is clear that the 
term will not be used. Desired relational terms are indicated in 
parentheses.)
Questions: 1. TELL ME ABOUT THESE TWO....
WHAT CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT THESE....?
2. THIS ONE IS (X); THIS ONE IS _____?
SPOONS (long/short)
ROPES (thick/thin)
KEYS (big/small)
DOLLS (tall/short)
CUPS (wide/narrow)
B. RECEPTIVE COMPREHENSION
(present object pairs and ask WHICH ONE IS_____? GIVE ME THE
ONE. Key words are in parentheses.)
COMBS (longer) PENCILS (thicker)
SPOONS (shorter) ROPES (thinner)
BALLS (bigger) CUPS (taller)
BRUSHES (wider) BRUSHES (narrower)
KEYS (smaller) BLOCKS (shorter)
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PART IV: VERBAL COMPARISONS— LESS TANGIBLE OBJECTS
1. Which is LONGER, a car or a bus?
2. Which is WIDER, a door or a wall?
3. Which is SMALLER, a house or a bush?
4. Which is THICKER, a tree or a bush?
5. Which is TALLER, a building or a car?
6. Which is SHORTER, a car or a street?
7. Which is BIGGER, a wall or a house?
8. Which is NARROWER, a street or a car?
9. Which is SHORTER, a bush or a tree?
10. Which is THINNER, a tree or a house?
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PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENT - Knowledge of "same," "more," "different,"
and "less."
Materials: 6 pencils of the same length and thickness
2 pencils, same length but different thickness 
2 pencils, same thickness but different lengths
Procedure:
A. E gives two sets of three pencils (same length) to S, and asks—  
"WHAT CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT THESE TWO GROUPS OF PENCILS? WHY?"
(If S does not use relational terms, ask:) "ARE THESE SETS OF 
PENCILS THE SAME OR ARE THEY DIFFERENT? WHY?"
"ARE THERE MORE HERE, LESS HERE, OR ARE THEY THE SAME? WHY?"
B. E takes one pencil for himself from one of the groups so that the 
S has three in one hand and two in the other, and asks—
"WHAT CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT THESE TWO GROUPS OF PENCILS? WHY?"
(If S does not use relational terms, ask:) "ARE THESE SETS OF 
PENCILS THE SAME OR ARE THEY DIFFERENT? WHY?"
"ARE THERE MORE HERE, LESS HERE, OR ARE THEY THE SAME? WHY?"
C. E removes the pencils. E gives two pencils to the S, one short 
and one long (same thickness), and asks—
"ARE THESE PENCILS THE SAME? WHICH ONE IS LONGER? WHY?"
D. E removes the pencils. E gives two pencils to the S, one fat and 
one thin (same length), and asks—
"ARE THESE PENCILS THE SAME OR ARE THEY DIFFERENT? WHY? WHICH 
ONE IS FATTER?"
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CONSERVATION OF SUBSTANCE - MODELING CLAY
Materials: Two balls of different color clay (play-doh)
Preliminary: Before beginning the experiment, S must agree that the 
two balls are of equal size (amount). All transforma­
tions are to be made by the S.
Part I: Hot Dog
(Instruct S to roll one ball of clay into a hog dog shape and 
ask:) "NOW IS THERE THE SAME AMOUNT OF CLAY IN THE BALL AND 
IN THE HOT DOG, OR IS THERE MORE IN THE BALL OR MORE IN THE 
HOT DOG? WHY?"
(Instruct S to roll hot dog into ball shape and insure equality.)
Part II: Pancake
(Instruct S to transform one ball of clay into a pancake and ask:) 
"NOW IS THERE THE SAME AMOUNT OF CLAY IN THE BALL AND IN THE 
PANCAKE, OR IS THERE MORE IN THE BALL OR MORE IN THE PANCAKE?
WHY?"
(Instruct S to roll pancake into ball shape and insure equality.)
Part III: Tiny Pieces
(Instruct S to break one ball of clay into several tiny pieces. 
Proceed as before, but be sure S is comparing the entire group of 
tiny pieces with the intact ball of clay. Ask:) "NOW IS THERE 
THE SAME AMOUNT OF CLAY IN THE BALL AS IN THE TINY PIECES, OR IS 
THERE MORE IN THE BALL OR MORE IN THE TINY PIECES? WHY?"
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TERM TO TERM CORRESPONDENCE
Materials: 6 plastic poker chips; 9 wooden blocks (one inch cubes)
Presentation: Arrange 6 plastic poker chips in a row leaving a space 
of about one inch between each chip. E manipulates S 
hand in making transformations and to assist in tactual 
examination of materials for each part of experiment.
Preliminary:
"TAKE ENOUGH BLOCKS FOR THE PLASTIC CHIPS. PUT A BLOCK IN FRONT 
OF EACH CHIP. THERE SHOULD BE NO MORE OR NO LESS."
(When S has placed the blocks in front of the chips, ask:)
"ARE THERE AS MANY BLOCKS AS THERE ARE CHIPS? WHY?"
Part I:
(E manipulates S hands to move blocks close enough so that they 
touch each other. Chips remain in original position. E asks:) 
"ARE THERE AS MANY BLOCKS AS THERE ARE PLASTIC CHIPS, OR ARE 
THERE MORE BLOCKS OR MORE CHIPS? WHY? HOW DO YOU KNOW?"
"IF WE PUT THEM BACK THE WAY THEY WERE BEFORE WILL THERE BE A 
BLOCK FOR EACH CHIP? WHY?" (After S has responded, E manipulates 
S hands to return blocks to original position.)
Part II:
(E manipulates S hands to move chips close together so that they 
are touching. Blocks remain in original position, about one inch 
apart. E asks:) "ARE THERE AS MANY BLOCKS AS THERE ARE PLASTIC 
CHIPS, OR ARE THERE MORE BLOCKS OR MORE CHIPS? WHY? HOW DO YOU 
KNOW?"
"IF WE PUT THEM BACK THE WAY THEY WERE BEFORE WILL THERE BE A 
CHIP FOR EACH BLOCK? WHY?"
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CONSERVATION OF LENGTH - DISPLACED RODS
Materials: 2 rods, 8" in length and 1" in diameter
1 rod, 10" in length and 1" in diameter
1 rod, 6" in length and 1" in diameter
(all rods slightly flattened to prevent rolling)
Preliminary: S should tactually explore rods in order to choose the 
two that are of equal length. E asks: "WHY DIDN'T YOU 
CHOOSE THIS ONE (10 in.) OR THIS ONE (6 in.)?"
"WHY DIDN'T YOU CHOOSE THESE TWO (10 in. and 8 in.)?"
"WHY DIDN'T YOU CHOOSE THESE TWO (6 in. and 8 in.)?"
Part I: The two equal length rods are placed horizontally on the
table, parallel to each other and about 3 inches apart. S 
should tactually determine that the rods are equal in length.
E can assist in moving S hands along rods to answer questions.
(With S hands on rods, E moves one rod about 4 inches to the right 
and asks:) "ARE THE TWO RODS THE SAME LENGTH (EQUAL) OR IS ONE 
LONGER THAN THE OTHER? WHY? HOW DO YOU KNOW?"
Part II: E assists S in replacing the rods to original position and 
again determining equivalency.
(With S hands on the rods, E moves the rod not moved in Part I 
about 4 inches to the left and asks:) "ARE THE TWO RODS THE SAME 
LENGTH (EQUAL) OR IS THIS ONE LONGER OR THIS ONE? WHY? HOW DO 
YOU KNOW?"
Part III: E assists S in replacing the rods to the original position 
and again determining equivalency.
(With S hands on the rods, E moves both rods simultaneously, one 
to the right and one to the left, about 4 inches. E then asks:) 
"NOW ARE THE RODS THE SAME LENGTH (EQUAL) OR IS THIS ONE LONGER 
OR THIS ONE? WHY? HOW DO YOU KNOW?"
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Materials: 2 rope sections, 24" in length and 1" in diameter
Preliminary: Place the rope sections on the table horizontally so that 
they are parallel and about 4" apart. Allow S to tac­
tually examine the ropes to determine that they are of 
equal length. E should assist S in examining the ropes 
in response to each question.
CONSERVATION OR LENGTH - ROPES
Part I: E places the ropes as in the diagram 
and allows (assists) S to tactually 
examine before asking question.
"ARE THE ROPES THE SAME LENGTH OR IS _A_ LONGER OR IS _ &  
LONGER? WHY? HOW DO YOU KNOW? "
B; /A_/~A
Part II: E places the ropes as in the diagram 
and allows (assists) S to tactually 
examine before asking question.
- WV/
"ARE THE ROPES THE SAME LENGTH OR IS _A_ LONGER OR IS _B 
LONGER? WHY? HOW DO YOU KNOW?"
Part III: E places the ropes as in the diagram A: ------- —
and allows (assists) S to tactually
examine before asking question. B: --------
"ARE THE ROPES THE SAME LENGTH OR IS A LONGER OR IS B 
LONGER? WHY? HOW DO YOU KNOW?"
(Alternative questions for Parts I, II, and III: "IS THERE THE 
SAME AMOUNT OF ROPE IN _A_ AS THERE IS IN B ? IS IT AS FAR 
FROM HERE TO HERE AS IT IS FROM HERE TO HERE?")
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ROTATION OF ORDER - BEADS
Materials: 3 wooden beads of different shapes strung on a stiff wire.
1 cardboard tube, about 8" long
Preliminary: Allow child to tactually examine beads-on-the-wire and 
assign names to the beads (according to their shape). 
During all transformations, assist the S to place beads 
into the tube and hold child's hands while making the 
rotations.
Part I: Direct Order
(Beads are inserted into tube from left side. Before taking beads 
out from right side of tube, E asks:) "IF WE PULL THE BEADS OUT 
FROM THIS SIDE WHICH BEAD WILL COME OUT FIRST? WHY?"
(After S responds, demonstrate what happens.)
Part II: Rotation of 180 Degrees
A. (Beads are inserted into tube from left side. E assists S to
rotate tube 180 degrees in a clockwise direction. Before removing 
beads from right side of tube, E asks:) "IF WE PULL THE BEADS OUT 
FROM THIS SIDE WHICH BEAD WILL COME OUT FIRST? WHY?"
(After S responds, demonstrate what happens.)
B. (Beads are inserted into tube from left side. E assists S to
rotate tube 180 degrees in a counter-clockwise direction. Before 
removing beads from right side of tube, E asks:) "IF WE PULL THE 
BEADS OUT FROM THIS SIDE WHICH BEAD WILL COME OUT FIRST? WHY?"
(After S responds, demonstrate what happens.)
Part III: Rotation of 360 Degrees
A. (E repeats Part II-A but rotates tube 360 degrees and asks the 
question.)
B. (E repeats Part II-B but rotates tube 360 degrees and asks the 
question.)
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CLASS INCLUSION
Materials: 8 wooden discs about 3 h "  in diameter; 3 smooth, 5 rough 
3 wooden squares about 3V' square; all rough
Preliminary: Allow S to tactually explore all materials as presented.
Be sure S can distinguish between shapes and textures.
Part I: E places 5 round/rough and 3 square/round shapes on table 
and assists S to examine tactually, and asks:
"ARE THERE MORE ROUND OR MORE ROUGH-SHAPES? WHY?"
"IF I TAKE AWAY ALL THE ROUND SHAPES, WHAT WILL BE LEFT?"
"IF I PUT BACK THE ROUND SHAPES AND TAKE AWAY ALL THE ROUGH 
SHAPES, WHAT WILL BE LEFT?"
"ARE THERE MORE ROUGH SHAPES OR MORE ROUND SHAPES? WHY?"
Part II: After removing all shapes, E places 5 round/rough and
3 round/smooth shapes on the table. Assist S to tactually 
examine the objects and ask:
"ARE THERE MORE ROUGH OR MORE ROUND SHAPES? WHY?
"IF I TAKE AWAY ALL THE ROUGH SHAPES, WHAT WILL BE LEFT?"
"IF I PUT BACK THE ROUGH SHAPES AND TAKE AWAY ALL THE ROUND 
SHAPES, WHAT WILL BE LEFT?"
"ARE THERE MORE ROUND SHAPES OR MORE ROUGH SHAPES? WHY?"
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